This page, containing excerpts from other pages, is
an overview. The main themes are: A) methodological
naturalism is theologically acceptable for a Christian, but... B) in
a scientific search for truth about nature, it doesn't seem wise to
demand that history must be all-natural; C) scientific
methodology can influence personal and societal worldviews.
For a condensed overview of the main ideas in this page,
read Sections 7C and 7D in my FAQ for
Creation, Evolution, and Intelligent Design.
A. Naturalism
and Theology
Is methodological
naturalism theologically acceptable?
Currently, most scientists
adopt methodological naturalism in science
by including only natural causes in their scientific theories. But
according to the Bible, history has included both natural and non-natural
events. Is a naturalistic science compatible with Christianity? I
think the answer is "yes" because Christians — who believe
that non-natural miracles occur, and who therefore should view a naturalistic
science as only one aspect of a broader "search for truth" that
considers all possibilities, including the non-natural — can accept
methodological naturalism while rejecting extensions beyond science.
According to a nontheistic
(atheistic, pantheistic,...) religious philosophy of naturism,
nature is all that exists, with no God and no divine action, so everything
that happens is caused by matter/energy in natural operation. This philosophical naturism differs
from methodological naturalism in
two ways. First, methodological is not philosophical; a
theist can adopt a methodology (for the
purpose of doing science) without accepting it as a philosophy (about
the way the world really is) that is used as a basis for living. Second,
naturalism is not naturism, as explained below.
terminology: philosophical
naturism is usually called philosophical
naturalism but also metaphysical naturalism and
(because it is a theory about reality) ontological
naturalism and also materialism or physicalism. {
Multiple terms are used interchangeably or with distinctions that
vary. Basically, it's a linguistic mess, very confusing. }
Naturalism
is not Naturism
When precise thinking and
communication are important, precise definitions are important. To
avoid the imprecision (and sloppy thinking) that occurs if the same term
is used for different views, I'm using naturalism for
only one view, for a claim that "it all happened by natural process" during
a stage of history. But most people use "naturalism" to
mean both this limited view (claiming "only natural process")
and a comprehensive view (claiming "only nature exists"), and
one word with two meanings — limited naturalism and comprehensive NATURALISM — can
cause confusion.
If we want to avoid confusion,
we should avoid using "naturalism" with two meanings. Yes,
there can be connections (in some ways but not others) between the
two meanings. But when we're thinking about these connections,
the clarity of our thinking will improve if we use two terms. Otherwise,
it's too easy to fall into sloppy thinking by comparing two ideas called "naturalism" — claiming "only
natural process" (usually theologically acceptable) and "only
nature exists" (never theologically acceptable) — and concluding
that since both have the same name, they're the same in all ways. {
This problem is examined more thoroughly in a page about naturalism
and NATURALISM. }
To show two differences
between naturalism and naturism, the table below shows
answers to five questions — Was the universe designed and created
by God? Is natural process sustained by God? Is natural
process guided by God? Did miracles occur in the formative
history of nature? Do miracles occur in the salvation
history of humans? — by four theories about origins: Theistic miraculous-appearing creation (Tmac)
as in old-earth progressive creation or young-earth creation; Theistic natural-appearing creation (Tnac)
as in evolutionary creation, which is also called theistic
evolution; deism (D); philosophical Naturism (pN)
as in atheism or pantheism.
|
Tmac
oeC
yeC
|
Tnac
EC
(TE)
|
|
pN
ath
panth
|
universe designed/created by God?
|
yes
|
yes
|
yes
|
NO
|
natural process sustained
by God?
|
yes
|
yes
|
?
|
NO
|
natural process guided by
God?
|
yes?
|
yes?
|
NO
|
NO
|
miracles in salvation history?
|
yes
|
yes
|
NO
|
NO
|
miracles in formative history?
|
yes
|
NO
|
NO
|
NO
|
1) Notice that theistic
evolution (with a naturalistic formative history) and deism (with a naturalistic
total history, both formative and salvation) both say "yes, the
universe was designed and created by God" so despite their historical naturalism (partial
or total) they reject the broader claim of naturism that "only
nature exists."
2) Beliefs about natural process
also differ. Proponents of theistic evolution believe that natural
process is designed, created, and sustained by God, and might be guided by
God (thus the "yes?" *) so
their naturalistic claim that during formative
history "it all happened naturally" does not mean "it all
happened without God," which is the claim of naturism. A
deist believes that natural process is designed, created, and perhaps sustained
by God, but is not guided by God. An atheist thinks that only nature
exists, so there is no God, and all answers are NO.
* Theists
believe that God can guide natural process, but difficult theological
questions — about the frequency of such guidance (does God do it
always, usually, seldom, or never) and the degree of control (is it partial
or total, for situations, thoughts, and/or actions) and whether it differs
in stages of history (formative and salvation) — are examined in Theistic
Action but not here.
Two
Options for Christians
A devout Christian who believes "miracles occurred
in salvation history" could evaluate the scientific evidence and conclude
that "formative history was all-natural." But should this naturalistic
conclusion be the only possibility that is considered during scientific evaluation,
as required by methodological naturalism?
In my opinion, there are two rational, theologically
acceptable ways for Christians to view methodological naturalism (MN). Among
scientists (and other scholars) who are Christians, some support one approach
and some think the other is better.
• In one approach,
proponents of an open search accept MN but
consider MN-science to be only one aspect of a broader "open search
for truth" that considers all possibilities, including miracles. Their
scientific search, but not their open search, is restricted by MN. Although
MN-science is respected as an expert witness, it is not allowed to be
the judge and jury when we're defining rationality and searching for
truth. { Everyone who accepts MN should
also adopt MN-Humility by recognizing the
possibility of unavoidable error in MN-Science because if
an event really did involve a non-natural cause, any explanation of this
event by MN-Science (in terms of only natural causes) will be incomplete
or incorrect. }
• In another approach,
proponents of open science claim that — since
we believe that miracles did occur in salvation history and might have occurred
in formative history — we should not assume that "miracles did
not occur" while doing science. They propose replacing rigid-MN with
a testable-MN in which scientific investigations
begin by assuming "it happened by natural process" but consider
this to be an assumption, a theory to be tested rather than a conclusion
that must be accepted.
In both approaches, a Christian
believes that natural process was designed by God, is sustained by God,
and can be guided by God, so "natural" does not mean "without
God", and a naturalistic explanation does not lead to a conclusion
of atheistic naturism.
This section was originally in a page about Theistic
Evolution & Theology.
Yes,
but... (we should ask some questions)
Although accepting MN can be
rational and theologically acceptable for a Christian, we should ask: "What
is the most effective way to search for truth about nature, rigid-MN or
testable-MN?"
What are the interactions
between methodology and philosophy? In a "broader
search for truth" about the history of nature, will people
seriously consider "nonscientific" theories in a competition
with "scientific" theories that (due to MN) must conclude "history
was all-natural"?
These questions, and others,
are examined in Sections B1, B2, and C.
B1.
Closed Science and Open Science
Methodological
Naturalism and Closed Science
Currently, most scientific inquiry is closed by methodological
naturalism (MN), a proposal to restrict the
freedom of scientists by requiring that they include only natural causes in their
scientific theories. In a closed science (restricted
by MN), evidence and logic are not the determining factors because the inevitable
conclusion — no matter what is being studied, or what is the evidence — must
be that "it happened by natural process."
Can
we avoid the possibility of unavoidable error?
Is MN the best way to do
science? Maybe not. It depends on what actually happened
in history. We should ask, "Does the
assumption match the reality?" because a rigidly enforced
MN will probably be scientifically useful IF there is a match
between "what MN assumes about the world" and "how the
world really is."
Imagine two possible worlds: one
has a history of nature with all events caused by natural process, while the
other has a history that includes both natural and non-natural events. When
we ask, "Which type of world do we live in?", we hope our science
will help us, not hinder us, in our search for truth. But in one of the
two possible worlds, a closed science (restricted by MN) must inevitably reach
the wrong conclusion. By contrast, in either world a non-MN science will
allow, although it cannot guarantee, reaching a correct conclusion.
The
Freedom of Open Science
Imagine that we're beginning
our search for truth with a logically justifiable attitude of humility,
by refusing to decide that we already know — with certainty, beyond
any doubt — what kind of world we live in. If we don't know
whether history has been all-natural, our best scientific strategy for
finding truth is an open science, with scientists
humbly asking a question instead of arrogantly assuming an answer.
In open science a scientist
begins with MN by assuming, consistent with MN, that "it happened
by natural process." But an open-thinking scientist is free
to use both MN and non-MN modes of thinking while logically evaluating
the evidence, to flexibly consider a wider range of possibilities. A
scientist begins with an MN-assumption,
but does not insist that — no matter what the evidence indicates — it
is necessary to end with an MN-conclusion. An
open scientist adopts testable-MN instead
of rigid-MN, because the assumption
of MN is treated as an assumption, as a theory to be tested rather
than a conclusion to be accepted as a required dogmatic belief. There
is flexible open-minded inquiry, with freedom of thought for the individual
and community, and scientists are free to follow the evidence-and-logic
wherever it leads. Each theory is evaluated based on its merit,
and if a non-MN conclusion is justified by the evidence, this is allowed. {two
dogmas}
As explained above & below,
Open Science is Better Science
in a search for truth about nature.
Should
science be logical?
If we want science to be a search for truth, should
we define science as a search for NATURAL explanations, or a search for LOGICAL
explanations? Of course, when we ask "Should science be logical?",
everyone agrees that YES is the answer. But disagreements occur when we
ask "If there is a conflict between logical and natural,
which criterion should have higher priority?" If we want to
be logically rational, should we let methodological naturalism force us to accept
a "scientific" conclusion that is less logical — and less likely
to be true? — simply because it is natural? For example,...
Is
evidence irrelevant?
To see the irrelevance of evidence when MN determines
the conclusion, compare the evidence-based implausibility (earned
by current theories for a "chemical evolution" origin of life) with
the naturalism-based confidence of the National
Academy of Sciences in claiming that "the question
is no longer whether life could have originated by chemical processes. ... the
question instead has become which of many pathways might have been followed to
produce the first cells." Yes, with MN the evidence is irrelevant. Even
though each of the "many pathways" is
implausible, one pathway must have produced life — because according
to MN this is the only possibility — so confidence does not require evidence. {
Words are carefully chosen to avoid technical falsity, by saying "life could have
originated" (a statement that cannot be proved false by rigorous
logic) and "might have been followed." But
the words are also chosen to clearly express the claim that "the
question is no longer" whether it did occur naturally, the
only question is how it occurred naturally. }
Of course, the irrelevance of evidence
does not mean there is no evidence, or that MN is leading to the wrong conclusion. But
it does illustrate a logical weakness of MN, since MN requires that we must
reach a scientific conclusion before doing any science.
Bypass
the Process, Claim the Support
The
Conclusion of MN-Science — that no matter what is being
studied, or what is the evidence, it happened by natural process — is
actually The Assumption of MN. The circular logic of MN,
which converts a naturalistic assumption into a naturalistic conclusion,
is illogical (because circular logic is bad logic) yet is unavoidable,
and it requires no science. But instead of acknowledging this logical
weakness of MN-Science, usually MN-Humility is ignored and there is an
implication that the assumption made by MN (that
it happened by natural process) is a conclusion
reached by science, and is therefore true. MN provides
a way to bypass the process of science and then claim the authority
of science as support.
For example, there is an implication
that the declaration by the National Academy of Sciences (speaking with authority
in the name of "science") is based on scientific evidence and logic. But
the main reason for believing that life had a natural origin is not science. Instead,
it is a naturalistic assumption that everything had a natural origin.
Is a
closed science theologically acceptable?
For a Christian who believes that God can do miracles,
as claimed in the Bible, is a closed science — with MN forcing scientists
to assume that no miracles have occurred in the entire history of nature — theologically
acceptable? This question is examined in Section A.
Section B in this page (above
in B1,
and below
in B2) contains excerpts from sections that originally were in The
Origin of Life. Section B2 begins by observing that "design is
common," continues with five questions — Does design violate MN? Is
MN scientific? Is MN required by The Rules? Is MN scientifically productive?
When is critical thinking unscientific? — and concludes with ideas from
a page about Critical Thinking in Closed Science, in a scientific community
that says "No, we should not ask the question."
B2. Naturalism
and Design
Design
is Common in Science
In science, theories of design
are common. In every design investigation, scientists ask the same
question: If we assume a uniformity of natural
process, was undirected natural process sufficient to produce
what we observe? Sometimes the answer is "probably not," and
design-action is proposed to explain a wide variety of features such
as bird nests, ant hills, predator-prey events, paintings on a cave wall,
metal satellites in orbit, and faces on Mount Rushmore. A design
theory is proposed — for example, when a crime detective concludes
that "this death occurred by murder, not natural causes" — when
an inference that "design-directed action did occur" can be
justified based on a logical evaluation of evidence.
Design is common in science, and
most design theories are judged on their scientific merit. But some are
controversial, partly due to concerns about naturalism.
Does
design violate rigid-MN?
Methodological questions about design occur when
design-action seems unfamiliar. In some situations the action and agent
are familiar (as when a beaver builds a dam, or humans make faces on Mount Rushmore)
but in other cases the design-action is unfamiliar and it could be either natural
(for example, if space aliens produced designed features by using their unfamiliar
advanced technologies) or supernatural (as in Biblical miracles). Most
opponents of design have methodological concerns only when design-action is unfamiliar
and it could be supernatural, so the concerns seem religious (not methodological)
and a common claim is that a design theory is a creation theory. Is this
claim justified?
For any question about design in
any area (radioastronomy, homicide, origins,...) we can view the scientific
inquiry as a two-stage process: first we ask "Was there design-directed
action?", and then we investigate the details. A basic design
theory claims only that design-directed action did occur (the first
stage) but does not try to explain the details (who, why, how,...) of design-and-production. Of
course, we should evaluate a design theory based on what it does claim (that
design occurred) instead of what it does not claim (that it can explain
the details).
In origins, a design theory is
not a creation theory. A basic design theory can be supplemented with
details (about the designer's identity and actions, about who, why, how,...)
to form a variety of theories about supernatural creation (by
God or...) or natural non-creation (as in a theory
proposing that evolution on earth was intelligently designed and directed by
space aliens who evolved before us). But a basic design theory does not
try to distinguish between creation and non-creation, it just claims that "design-directed
action did occur." A design theory does not propose divine action,
but does acknowledge this as a possibility, so it is potentially non-naturalistic
and it violates a rigid-MN.
Is rigid-MN
scientific?
A principle of MN cannot
be derived from science (so it is nonscientific)
but is compatible with science (so it is not unscientific). A
more important question is whether rigid-MN is
useful in science, whether it makes science more effective in our search
for truth about nature. ...
Some scholars think that
because a rigid-MN is nonscientific, it should not be required in science. But
others think a rigid-MN is useful because, even though it is not based
on scientific logic, it makes scientific logic more effective. But
if the history of nature has included some non-natural events, rigid-MN
will lead to some unavoidable falsity. Therefore, I think science
will be more effective in a search for truth with testable-MN that lets
scientists use scientific logic to consider all possibilities and
decide which is the best explanation for the evidence.
Is
rigid-MN required by The Rules?
A design theory acknowledges the possibility of divine
action, so it violates a rigid methodological naturalism and thus, according
to some people, it violates "the rules of science."
Is science a game with rules? This
is an interesting perspective. In terms of sociology, regarding interpersonal
dynamics and institutional structures, it is an idea with merit. But
it seems less impressive and less appealing when we think about functional
logic and the cognitive goals of science. It seems more logical to view
science as an activity with goals (which include
searching for truth) rather than a game with rules (which
include the restrictions imposed by rigid-MN).
Let's compare "cheating" in
sports, business, and science. In a Strong Man Contest, if other contestants
carry a refrigerator on their backs, one man should not be allowed to move
it using a two-wheel cart because this is not useful for achieving the goal
of the game, for determining who is the strongest man. But if the goal
of a business is to move refrigerators quickly, many times during the day,
a two-wheeler is useful.
Although it isn't the only goal,
for most scientists the main goal of science is finding truth about
nature. But a rigid-MN might lead to unavoidable false conclusions. When
some scientists recognize this and decide to reject rigid-MN, is it cheating
or wisdom? Is adopting a rigid-MN, rather than a testable-MN, always
useful in our search for truth? { Among scholars who carefully
study MN, most agree that we should ask "Is it scientifically useful?" instead
of relying on dogmatic rules. }
a word-game: In natural science,
should natural phenomena and natural history
be explained by natural causes? Or
is this a circular argument camouflaged by verbal
ambiguity?
Will design theories be
productive in helping us achieve the goals of science? This is
the most important question, according to a consensus
of scholars who have carefully examined the issues.
Is
rigid-MN scientifically productive?
Perhaps the search by Closed Science (restricted
by a rigid methodological naturalism) is occasionally
futile, like trying to explain how the faces on Mt Rushmore were produced by
undirected natural processes such as erosion. If scientists are restricted
by an assumption that is wrong (that does not correspond with historical reality)
the finest creativity and logic will fail to find the true origin of the faces.
Occasionally, perhaps MN is forcing
scientists into a futile search, like a man who is diligently looking for missing
keys in the kitchen when the keys are sitting on a table on the front porch. No
matter how hard he searches the kitchen, he won't find the keys because they
aren't there! ...<snip>...
Is a claim for design a science-stopper? No,
this simplistic "slippery slope" argument is based on narrow either-or
thinking, and is unrealistic because most scientists will continue their
non-design research — probably with renewed vigor because they are
responding to a challenge — when they hear a claim that "maybe
a non-design explanation doesn't exist." And proponents
of design want non-design research to continue so we can learn more, so
we can more accurately evaluate the merits of non-design and design, because
the goal is to find truth. They want to supplement non-design
research, not replace it. They want to stimulate productive action
and critical thinking, with invigorating debates between critics of a theory
and its loyal defenders. And this type of scientific stimulation did
occur due to Michael Behe's claims for "irreducible complexity" in
1996, although (as explained in Section 3) the current scientific community
does not want to acknowledge this scientific stimulation.
When
is critical thinking unscientific?
To explain the origin of
life, scientists have proposed many theories about chemical
evolution, but — since what is required
for life seems much greater than what is
possible by natural process — each theory seems highly implausible. Supporters
of each naturalistic theory point out the weakness in other theories,
and their critical thinking is welcomed by the scientific community.
What would make their critical
thinking unscientific? a claim that a natural formation of life
is extremely improbable, and maybe impossible? a perception (by
others) that this claim implies a non-natural cause? an explicit
proposal for a non-natural cause? Is there any limit to the severity
of criticism before it becomes unscientific? If all non-design
theories are criticized and there is a proposal for design-directed action,
is this unscientific? If severe criticism is accompanied by a proposal
for a naturalistic theory, does this make it scientific?
Can scientists admit that "we
are far from finding the answer" but not that "maybe there
is no natural answer"? Consistent with the restrictions
of Closed Science, should we control the thinking of scientists by
removing their freedom to think that "maybe..."? YES,
it is unscientific to think "maybe" so this cannot be allowed,
claim some scientists, as you'll see in the section below.
From
the "closed" side of a page about Critical
Thinking in Closed Science and Open Science,
Critical
Thinking in Closed Science
Have the benefits of open
science earned it a gracious welcome from the scientific community? What
has been the response to theories of design? When Michael Behe
submitted papers to science journals about irreducible
complexity (that he claims could not be produced in a step-by-step
process of neo-Darwinian natural evolution) some individual editors were
interested, but editorial groups were intolerant. One editorial
board concluded its rejection letter, "Our
journal... believes that evolutionary explanations of all structures
and phenomena of life are possible and inevitable." {from
Behe's Correspondence
with Science Journals}
In an open-minded free
science, the response would be different. Behe's thought-provoking
questions would be welcomed as a constructive challenge, an opportunity
to gain a more complete understanding of evolution at the molecular
level. The journals would be eager to communicate new ideas,
to host invigorating debates between critics of a theory and its loyal
defenders.
Instead, critical questions
are resented and rejected. This response does offer a practical
benefit. It lets a community defend the reigning paradigm
by using its power to make important decisions: which views
will (and won't) be expressed in journals and textbooks, at conferences
and in the media? what types of research, by which scientists,
will be funded? who will be hired and promoted? and
who will determine the policies of scientific and educational organizations?
But a "closed
science" does not seem consistent with the lofty ideals of
scientists, with their noble vision of science as an intellectually
free, objective pursuit of truth. Instead, in a community
of scientists who are exploring freely, thinking flexibly, and
dedicated to finding truth, Behe's tough questions would be used
as a stimulus for critical analysis, creative thinking, and productive
action. {details about Behe's
Adventures with Journals and several possible Explanations for
Rejections}
Should
we ask the question?
In the near future,
scientists will disagree about the plausibility and utility
of design, but conflicts are common in science, and can be
productive. Should journal editors wait until proponents
of design have irrefutable proof? (*) Proof
is impossible in science, and it can be difficult to confidently answer the
question, "Was design-action involved in producing this
feature?" But it should be much easier to decide, "Should
we ask the question?" A curious, open-minded
community will say "YES, we want our science to be flexible
and open to inquiry, not rigid and closed by dogmatism."
* Two
common questions — Can we prove or disprove a design theory?
What about future developments in science? — are examined in
the "Origin of Life" page and (in condensed form) in a page
asking Can a theory of
intelligent design be authentically scientific?
Should
you examine it more carefully?
Although arguments for excluding
design from science make good cartoons and
one-line slogans, the arguments seem less logical when you look more
closely. Can design be scientific? If you want to explore
this question in more depth, another
page describes the arguments, analyzes them logically, and concludes
that "the closer we examine Open Science, the better it looks."
C. Scientific
Methodology and Worldviews
One side of a page about Interactions
between Science and Worldviews asks, "Can
worldviews influence science?",
Recognize
and Minimize
Scientists are influenced
by cultural-personal factors that include
personal desires, group pressures, philosophical or religious views,
and cultural thinking habits. In my opinion, we should recognize the
influence of cultural-personal factors, and — in an effort to
make science more effective in a search for truth — we should
try to minimize the biasing influence of these factors. We
should want scientific theories to be evaluated by thinking that is
unbiased and logical. We should pursue this noble goal, using
it as an aiming point and taking actions that will move us closer to
it, while humbly recognizing that we haven't yet achieved it and never
will. One way to minimize nonscientific influences is to make
science more open-minded, allowing theory evaluation to be based on
evidence and logic, not rules that can bypass
the process of science and make evidence irrelevant. .....
Open
Science is not Theistic Science
theistic
science is based on the principle that "Christians
ought to consult all they know or have reason to believe when forming and
testing hypotheses, when explaining things in science, and when evaluating
the plausibility of various scientific hypotheses. Among the things
they should consult are propositions of theology. (J.P. Moreland & John
Mark Reynolds; page 19 in Three Views of Creation, 2000)" Alvin
Plantinga describes the rationality of adopting this approach: "a
Christian academic and scientific community ought to pursue science in
its own way, starting from and taking for granted what we know as Christians." In
theistic science, a theistic worldview is used as a metaphysical foundation
for doing science. But theistic science is not a single way of thinking,
since it can lead to different theological propositions about God, nature,
and science.
open
science is open to different perspectives. In contrast
with the current monopoly of naturalistic science (and education)
that allows only one perspective, I'm advocating an open science
that allows a variety of perspectives — including naturalism,
intelligent design, and different types of theistic science — and
is open-minded toward a range of scientific conclusions.
Scientific
Objectivity: What is it?
Here are two ways to think about objectivity in science:
• One way to define objectivity,
based on the premise that objectivity and flexibility are
related, is to ask: "How strongly does a scientist hope that a theory
evaluation will result in a particular conclusion?" or "Would a scientist
be open-minded and willing to change views (if this is supported by the evidence
and logic) and accept another theory?"
• Another definition is
based on the premise that a conclusion would be more objective if it was
produced by pure scientific logic, if cultural-personal
factors exerted no influence during the process of evaluation. Just
as Newton tried to imagine the characteristics of idealized
motion without friction, we can try to imagine the characteristics
of an idealized evaluation without cultural-personal
influences, with only scientific logic.
Bias
and Falsity
Even if scientists (as individuals or in a group)
are motivated to be biased in a particular way, this does not mean that the
process of scientific evaluation, or the conclusion reached,
must be biased, or that the conclusion will be false.
I'll define an unbiased
conclusion as one that matches the conclusion of an "idealized
evaluation" when we ask, "If there was an objectively neutral evaluation
of the evidence, based on logic rather than desires, what would be the conclusion?" There
are two ways that biased scientists could reach an unbiased conclusion. • process: Perhaps
the scientists can overcome their tendency toward bias, and can make an objective
evaluation. • conclusion: Or a person (or group) may
strongly hope the evidence will point to a certain conclusion, and they are
incapable of making an objective evaluation, but the reality is that an objectively
neutral evaluation of the evidence actually does point to the desired conclusion,
so the scientist's bias (during the process of evaluation) makes no difference
in the conclusion.
What about falsity? Perhaps
the evidence "points to the desired conclusion" because
it is true, because "the way they hope the world is" corresponds
to "the way the world really is," so bias does not indicate falsity.
Therefore, we cannot say "If
scientists have a motivation to be biased, their conclusion will be biased
and will be wrong," since a biased motivation can lead to four types of conclusions:
biased and wrong, biased yet true, unbiased yet wrong, unbiased and true.
Freedom
and Necessity
Freedom: a Judeo-Christian theist has a wide
range of options — in the many variations of theistic
evolution (chemical and/or biological), old-earth
creation (this is my view), or young-earth creation — and
is free to follow the evidence and logic of science wherever it leads.
Necessity: by contrast, an atheist (or an inflexible
agnostic who wants to remain agnostic) has no options and no scientific freedom,
since only one conclusion is acceptable — some type of natural evolution
(both chemical and biological) somewhere in the universe, with no action by God.
• And from the other side of the page, asking "Can
science influence worldviews?",
Two
Limits for Science
MN is
a proposed limit (proposing "only natural
causes in scientific theories") for what can claim to be
science, while MN-Humility (acknowledging
the possibility of unavoidable error) is
a limit for what MN-Science can claim to explain.
A Change
of Mind
In 1998, I was willing to
support either of two approaches, as described in Section
1: an open search (with
a combination of MN plus MN-Humility, using a closed MN-Science as one
part of an open search for truth) or an open science (treating
naturalism as a theory to be tested, not a conclusion to be accepted
in science). Two years later, I concluded that it was more rational
to reject rigid-MN, mainly because I had become convinced that — in
a search for truth about nature — open science is better science,
because we should let scientists use the entire
process of science (including a logical evaluation of all
competitive theories) when they are determining
the conclusions of science. Otherwise,
evaluative bias will occur because scholars who advocate an open search will
have a strong tendency to reduce their cognitive dissonance (as
individuals and as a community) by claiming, in the non-science phase
of the open search, that "we would have reached the same conclusion
in a testable-MN open science" instead of admitting that "maybe
the rigid-MN closed science we're advocating is wrong."
Another reason to reject
rigid-MN is the rarity and futility of humility.
The
Futility of Humility
In principle, an open
search (with MN-Science plus MN-Humility) is logically acceptable. In
practice, usually the result is not satisfactory because even when MN-Humility
is acknowledged (which is rare) it is not effective. Why?
Think about what happens when
a "non-scientific" design theory and a "scientific" non-design
theory both claim to describe the same event, such as the origin of life. Due
to the cultural authority of science, the nonscientific theory is not respected
because most people assume that, for a theory about nature, "not scientific" means "probably
not true." Instead, the scientific theory is assumed to be more
plausible, even if the scientific evidence does not support it. And
in a classroom where "only science is taught," only the naturalistic
non-design theory is taught, and it is taught as "the conclusion of
science."
Methodology
can influence Philosophy
In principle, methodology
and worldview-philosophy can be independent. In practice, they
are interactive and each influences the other.
In principle, an open search
(conducted with MN-humility) can prevent the naturalistic methodology of
MN-science from influencing our philosophical worldviews of "the way
the world is, what is and isn't real, what can and cannot happen."
In practice,
methodology often influences our thinking because naturalistic
assumptions automatically become naturalistic conclusions
about "the way the world is according to science," and
many people are influenced by science.
Is methodological
naturalism theologically acceptable?
In Section 1, I explain how "philosophical naturism differs
from methodological naturalism in
two ways" and why "in my opinion, there are two rational, theologically
acceptable ways [open search or open science] for Christians to view
methodological naturalism." But I also explain why, "although
accepting MN can be rational and theologically acceptable for a Christian," I
think an open science is preferable for two reasons: it is a more
effective way to search for truth about nature; and, as explained
in the two sections above (about the futility of humility and how methodology
can influence philosophy), "in principle, an open search... can
prevent the naturalistic methodology of MN-science from influencing our
philosophical worldviews" but "in practice... naturalistic
assumptions automatically become naturalistic conclusions about 'the
way the world is according to science,' and many people are influenced
by science."
For these two reasons, most proponents
of Intelligent Design agree with William Dembski when he says, "The
empirical evidence [for a naturalistic origin and development of life] is in
fact weak, but the conclusion follows necessarily as a strict logical deduction
once science is as a matter of definition restricted to undirected natural
processes. ... There is a simple way out of this impasse [of illogical circular
reasoning]: dump methodological naturalism," and a second
reason-to-dump is because "methodological naturalism
is the functional equivalent of a full blown metaphysical naturalism... once
science comes to be taken as the only universally valid form of knowledge within
a culture." (from Intelligent Design: The Bridge between Science & Theology, p
119) This important question — Are there two acceptable ways for
a Christian to view methodological naturalism? — will be explored more
fully (eventually but not yet) in a page about relationships between theistic
evolution and intelligent design.