Critical Thinking
in
Closed Science
for studies of evolution
and intelligent design
by Craig Rusbult, Ph.D.
What
is Closed Science?
The most common type of closed science is produced by methodological
naturalism (MN), a proposal to restrict the
freedom of scientists by requiring that they include only natural causes in their
theories. The important difference between rigid-MN and testable-MN is
explained in the right column.
A basic theory of intelligent
design does
not propose supernatural action, but — unless the "basic" theory
of design is supplemented by explicitly claiming that the design-directed
action was not supernatural — it
does acknowledge this as a
possibility, so
it
is potentially non-naturalistic and it does violate
the rigid-MN of Closed Science.
If you're not familiar with the disadvantages
of Closed Science — and the advantages of an Open Science that
is willing to evaluate design theories based on their scientific
merit — you can read an
introduction.
In this half of the page, you can read about
The Freedom of Open Science
When is critical thinking unscientific?
Mike Behe's Adventures with Science Journals
Of course, Section 7D below
(quoted from a page that has been reorganized into other pages) is
preceded
by 7C, which concludes:
Some arguments against design are trivial, while others (especially
those about the practical effects of methodology) are more worthy,
if only because they stimulate productive thinking and discussion. But
even though some arguments for Closed Science may seem strong initially,
I think the counter-arguments are stronger and more logical, and the
closer we examine Open Science, the better it looks.
7D. The Freedom
of Open Science
This section, building on the
foundation of Section 7C, examines the benefits of scientific freedom and
conceptual diversity.
The Benefits of Open Science
The difference between science
that is open and closed is the difference in responding to a question: Has
the history of the universe included both natural and non-natural causes? In
an open science (liberated from MN) this question
can be evaluated based on scientific evidence. In a closed
science (restricted by MN) the process of science is irrelevant,
since the inevitable conclusion — no matter what is being studied,
or what is the evidence — is that "it happened by natural process."
In open science, a scientist begins
with MN but is free to use both MN and non-MN modes of thinking, to consider
a wider range of possibilities that include both non-design and design. There
is metaphysical tolerance and open inquiry, with individual and communal
freedom of thought, and scientists can follow the data wherever it leads. Each
theory is evaluated based on its merit, and if a non-MN conclusion is justified
by the evidence, this is allowed. An open science is consistent with
scientists' preference for intellectual freedom.
Critical
Thinking in Closed Science
Have the benefits of open science
earned it a gracious welcome from the scientific community? What
has been the response to theories of design? When Michael Behe
submitted papers about irreducible complexity to
science journals, individual editors were interested, but groups were
intolerant. One
editorial board concluded its rejection letter, "Our
journal... believes that evolutionary explanations of all structures
and phenomena of life are possible and inevitable." {details
about Behe-and-journals}
In an open-minded free science,
the response would be different. Behe's thought-provoking questions
would be welcomed as a constructive challenge, an opportunity to gain
a more complete understanding of evolution at the molecular level. The
journals would be eager to communicate new ideas, to host invigorating
debates between critics of a theory and its loyal defenders.
Instead, critical questions are
resented and rejected. This response does offer a practical benefit. It
lets a community defend the reigning paradigm (*)
by using its power to make important decisions: which views will
(and won't) be expressed in journals and textbooks, at conferences and
in the media? what
types of research, by which scientists, will be funded? who will
be hired and promoted? and who will determine the policies of scientific
and educational organizations? {* There
are practical scientific reasons for defending a paradigm, as explained
by Del Ratzsch in theories:
maxi and mini. But why should scientists defend a maxi-theory
paradigm by preventing questions instead of answering them? }
A "closed science" does
not seem consistent with the lofty ideals of scientists, with their noble
vision of science as an intellectually free, objective pursuit of truth. Instead,
in a community of scientists who are exploring freely, thinking flexibly,
and dedicated to finding truth, Behe's tough questions would be used
as a stimulus for critical analysis, creative thinking, and productive
action.
Should we ask the question?
In the near future, scientists
will disagree about the plausibility and utility of design, but conflicts
are common in science, and can be productive. Should journal editors
wait until proponents of design have irrefutable proof? As discussed
in Section 7B, proof is impossible in science, and it can be difficult
to confidently answer the question, "Was design-action involved
in producing this feature?" But it should be easy to decide, "Should
we ask the question?" A curious, open-minded community
will say "YES, we want our science to be flexible and open to inquiry,
not rigid and closed by dogmatism.
When
is critical thinking unscientific?
To explain the origin of life,
scientists have proposed many theories about chemical
evolution, but — since what is required
for life seems
much greater than what is possible by natural
process — each theory seems implausible. Supporters
of one theory point out the weakness in other theories, and their
critical thinking is welcomed by the scientific community.
What would make their critical
thinking unscientific? a claim that a natural formation of life
is extremely improbable, and maybe impossible? a perception (by
others) that this claim implies a non-natural cause? an explicit
proposal for a non-natural cause? Is there any limit to the severity
of criticism before it becomes unscientific? If all non-design
theories are criticized and there is a proposal for design-directed
action, is this unscientific? If severe criticism is accompanied
by a proposal for a naturalistic theory, does this make it scientific?
Can scientists admit that "we
are far from finding the answer" but not that "maybe there
is no natural answer"? Consistent with the restrictions of
Closed Science, should we control the thinking of scientists by removing
their freedom to think that "maybe..."? What are
the questions?
If all questions about biological
evolution have been answered, if the ideas of Mike Behe have
no scientific merit and
his
claims
already have been proved false, then his ideas should be
excluded from
science
journals. But
if he asks questions that might raise doubts about current theories,
there
is a reason to
include his ideas in journals.
What are the questions? In Darwin's
Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (1996), Michael
Behe illustrates the principle of irreducible complexity with
a mousetrap that has five interacting parts: a base, hammer, spring,
catch, and holding bar. Each part is necessary, and there is no
function unless all parts are present. A trap with only four parts
has no practical function. It doesn't just catch mice poorly,
it doesn't catch them at all.
What are the evolutionary implications? Behe
says, "An irreducibly complex system cannot
be produced directly... by slight, successive modifications of a precursor
system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is
missing a part is by definition nonfunctional. An irreducibly
complex biological system, if there is such a thing, would be a powerful
challenge
to Darwinian evolution." (from Darwin's Black Box, page
39)
Mike
Behe's Adventures in Non-Publishing
Design of Biocomplexity?
Design theorists have raised a variety
of questions about the plausibility of neo-Darwinian evolution. For
example, in Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (1996),
Michael Behe claims that some biochemical systems are irreducibly
complex and could not have been produced in the step-by-step process
proposed in current neo-Darwinian theories.
Consistent with the standards of modern
molecular biology, Behe is encouraging a detailed examination of evolution,
at a deeper level with higher standards. As expected, his challenges
have stimulated creative thinking and experimenting among individual scientists
who read his book or heard about his ideas in subsequent reviews, lectures,
or internet debates. His critical questions have served as a catalyst
for action by defenders of evolution who want to show he is wrong, and by
proponents of design.
Critical Thinking in Closed Science
Section 7B concludes, "the
potential of design theories to make valuable scientific contributions should
be recognized and welcomed." In reality, has there been
a gracious "welcome to our house" reception, or is the door being
jealously guarded by zealous gatekeepers? When Mike Behe submitted
papers about irreducible complexity to science journals, what was the response? Behe
summarizes: "While some science journal editors
are individually tolerant and will entertain thoughts of publishing challenges
to current views, when a group (such as the editorial board) gets together,
orthodoxy prevails." { In this section,
all quotations are from Correspondence
with Science Journals: Response to Critics concerning Peer-Review by
Michael Behe. }
For example, one editor described
a problem, "I am painfully aware of the close-mindedness
of the scientific community to non-orthodoxy, and I think it is counterproductive." Behe's
submission was sent to a senior journal advisor, who responded to Behe's
critical analysis with a generous proposal for delayed publication: "Having
not yet understood all of biology is not a failure after just 200 years,
given the amount of understanding already achieved. Let us speak
about it again in 1000 years." The editor, in rejecting
Behe's paper, said "I would like to encourage
you to seek new evidence for your views, but of course, that evidence
would likely fall outside of the scientific paradigm, or would basically
be denials of conventional explanations. You are in for some tough
sledding."
With another journal, after Behe submitted
a tightly focused paper (a reply to specific criticisms) the editor made
an excellent proposal for an expanded project that — consistent with
the noble ideals of science — would have performed a valuable service
by encouraging the open discussion of an exciting new idea:
"The notion
of intelligent design is one that may warrant further exploration, even though
the topic has been dealt with extensively by both practicing scientists and
philosophers of science. Should this exploration take the form of contrasting
viewpoints in articles by two persons, published in the same issue, on the
more general aspects of the topic, then our editorial policy of presenting
current issues of significance in the biological sciences might be satisfied. / Recast
in more general terms, your article could present the "pro" side
of the issue, and in that context it could address some of the criticisms
that have appeared since your book was published, but it would have to provide
a much broader perspective. In particular, it would have to assume
a readership that is not familiar with your book, at least not in any detailed
way. An accompanying article could present the "con" side
of the issue, again taking a general perspective. No doubt your book
would figure prominently in both articles, but the theme would be modern
concepts of intelligent design rather than a specific publication. This
approach would almost certainly reach a broader readership than a detailed
response to specific criticisms. It also has the added advantage of
allowing you to present a synopsis of your entire case rather than just defending
specific aspects of it. Such a paired set of articles would imply that
the topic is important, and therefore would attract additional readers."
This is an excellent "open science" approach. But
the journal's editorial board was less enthusiastic. They protested that "it
is not possible to develop a meaningful discussion" between a design
theory "based on intuitive, philosophical, or religious
grounds" and an evolutionary theory "based
on scientific fact and inference." And they concluded, "Our
journal... believes that evolutionary explanations of all structures and phenomena
of life are possible and inevitable. Hence a position such as yours,
which opposes this view on other than scientific grounds, cannot be appropriate
for our pages. Although the editors feel that there has already been
extensive response to your position from the academic community, we nevertheless
encourage further informed discussion in appropriate forums. Our journal
cannot provide that forum, but we trust that other opportunities may become
available to you."
Comparing the Actual and Ideal
The editors informally recognize that "there
has already been extensive response to your position from the academic community," but
official recognition (by publication in their journal) is denied. Why? They
explain that, in contrast with Behe's intuitive religious philosophy, their
journal contains pure science. But the situation seems reversed. Although
Behe's ideas are based on observations and scientific logic, publishing them "cannot
be appropriate" because "our journal...
believes that evolutionary explanations... are possible and inevitable." The
rejection seems to be based on philosophical preference, not scientific merit.
But according to a noble ideal of objective
science — operating in a community of curious, open-minded scientists
who are exploring freely, are thinking critically, creatively, and flexibly,
and are dedicated to finding the truth — the response should be different. Ideally,
instead of ignoring the concept of design, pretending it doesn't exist and
trying to exclude it from the mainstream of science, its tough questions
would be carefully examined and used as a stimulus for productive action.
Perhaps, when the evidence and arguments
have been thoroughly examined and debated, when more experiments and analyses
have been done, Behe's ideas will be shown to be wrong. But critical
thinking should be allowed in science, so there should at least be some
recognition — by allowing publication in science journals — that his questions
are important and
are worthy of
being asked.
Some possible reasons for rejection are examined in the
appendix.
|
Critical Thinking in
Open Science
for studies of evolution
and intelligent design
by Craig Rusbult, Ph.D.
What is Open Science?
In open science, a scientist begins with an MN-assumption
by assuming "it happened by natural process," but does not insist on ending with
an MN-conclusion unless
this is justified by
the evidence. An
open scientist rejects rigid-MN (in which
a naturalistic conclusion is required) and
replaces
it with testable-MN that treats the assumption
of MN as an assumption, as a theory to be tested rather than a conclusion to
be accepted.
In the first half of this page,
in the left column, I claim that "a closed
science does not seem consistent with the lofty ideals of scientists,
with their noble vision of science as an intellectually free, objective
pursuit of truth."
In this part of the page, I share
my views about how — in a science that is open and is objectively pursuing
truth — theories should be evaluated.
Does biased evaluation
produce false conclusions?
In the current scientific community the conventional methodology,
accepted by most scientists, includes methodological naturalism (MN),
which is a proposal to restrict the freedom of scientists by requiring that they
include only natural causes in their theories.
How does MN affect the process and
results of science? The circular logic of MN converts a naturalistic
assumption into a naturalistic conclusion by declaring that "no" is the
only acceptable answer when we ask, "Has the history of the universe
included both natural and non-natural events?" With MN the inevitable
conclusion — no matter what is being studied or what is the evidence — must
be that "it happened by natural process." In reaching this conclusion
the process of science is irrelevant, yet the conclusion is considered
scientific. Thus, MN provides a way to bypass
the process of science and then claim the
authority of science. But if some non-natural events did
occur during history, MN will automatically force scientists to reach
some false conclusions. At the very least, methodological naturalism
produces a significant decrease in the quality of critical thinking about
naturalistic theories, which are unfalsifiable (since they're protected
by MN) when they're being compared with non-naturalistic theories.
But even though scientists
(as individuals or in a group) may be motivated to reach
a naturalistic conclusion, this does not necessarily mean
that the process of scientific
evaluation, or the conclusion reached,
will be biased. • process: Perhaps the
scientists can overcome their "tendency toward bias" and
make an objective evaluation. • conclusion: Or
a person (or group) might hope so strongly that the evidence
will point to a
certain conclusion, that they are incapable of an objective
evaluation leading to another conclusion, but the reality
is that an objectively neutral evaluation of the evidence
actually would point to the desired conclusion, so the scientist's
bias (during the process of evaluation) makes no difference
in the conclusion.
Therefore, we cannot say "If scientists
have a motivation to be biased, their conclusion will be biased." Instead,
we must look at the evidence and ask, "If there was a neutral evaluation
of the evidence, based on logic rather than desires, what would be the conclusion?"
Scientific Objectivity:
What is it?
Here are two ways
to
think
about objectivity in science:
• One way to define objectivity, based
on the premise that objectivity and flexibility are
related, is to ask: "How strongly does a scientist hope that a theory
evaluation will result in a particular conclusion?" or "To what extent
has a scientist already decided, due to non-scientific criteria, that a particular
theory must be correct?" or "Would a scientist be open-minded and
willing to change views (if this is supported by the evidence and logic) and
accept another theory?"
• Another definition is based on
the premise that a conclusion would be more objective if it was produced by pure
scientific logic, if cultural-personal factors exerted
no influence during the process of evaluation. Just as Newton
tried to imagine the characteristics of idealized motion without
friction, we can try to imagine the characteristics of an idealized
evaluation without cultural-personal
influences, with only scientific logic. {quoted
from Tools
for Analyzing Science: Idealizations and Range Diagrams}
These definitions are examined
in the next two sections.
Objectivity and
Flexibility
The table below shows a
range of nonscientific predispositions (in the purple column)
about what five people hope is true, a range
of scientific conclusions (in the green row), and a
range of emotional responses (in the white cells) with shades
of red showing levels of unpleasant cognitive dissonance. Imagine
that the five scientists are considering a theory claiming that design-directed
action was involved in the production of a particular biological feature.
The five imaginary
people have decided, based on nonscientific criteria, that "design-directed
action by God" certainly did not occur (at one extreme), or certainly
did occur (at the other extreme), with three intermediate views. Then
imagine five
different science-scenarios for the conclusion reached by an unbiased
evaluation of the evidence. Because proof is impossible in science,
but strong confidence is possible, the conclusions range from almost-0% to
almost-100%. The responses (to each scenario,
by each person) vary from +++ (Wow, am I happy!) to --- (This is worse
than ants at a picnic!).
HOPE of
scientist
|
idealized SCIENTIFIC LOGIC
|
.1 %
|
25%
|
50%
|
75%
|
99.9%
|
A ( 0 %)
|
+ + +
|
+ +
|
-
|
- -
|
- - -
|
B (25%)
|
+
|
+
|
?
|
-
|
- -
|
C (50%)
|
OK
|
OK
|
OK
|
OK
|
OK
|
D (75%)
|
- -
|
-
|
?
|
+
|
+
|
E (100%)
|
- - -
|
- -
|
-
|
+ +
|
+ + +
|
If objectivity
is related to flexibility, a person who doesn't care about the
outcome — whose predisposition is an indifferent "maybe
or maybe not, either is OK, I don't care one way or the other" — will
find it easier to be objective. For this person, whatever the
evidence indicates will be personally acceptable, so there is less
motivation to evaluate the evidence in a non-objective way.
By contrast, a person with an extreme
view who wants a 0%-conclusion (that design certainly did not occur) will
be highly motivated, in order to maintain personal consistency, to interpret
the evidence in any way that is necessary to make it seem (to self and others)
that "it certainly did not occur" is the most rational conclusion. At
the other extreme, a person with a 100%-view will feel a similar motivation
to evaluate in a non-objective
way. Notice the steep gradient of emotions for A and
E (the extreme views) from "+++" to "---", compared
with the "all OK" plateau for the neutral unbiased C. For
A and E, an undesirable conclusion (labeled "---") would produce
unpleasant cognitive dissonance that, if it
isn't resolved by changing either the personal predisposition or personal
conclusion, could lead to continuing mental distress due to a recognition
of personal inconsistency.
The "probably" positions (B
and D) do care about the scientific outcome, but they have more flexibility,
analogous to a weather forecaster who predicts "75% chance of rain" and,
when it doesn't rain, says "Well, that was the 25% that I predicted."
When a strong
predisposition is supported by logic, as in a "+++" cell,
process-bias is possible but its effects will be hidden because the
conclusion will be the same whether or not the
evaluation process
is
biased. Questions of scientific integrity occur when
there is a conflict
between predisposition and logic, as in a "---" cell. In
this situation, how does a scientist (or a scientific community) respond?
Is objectivity related
to flexibility? Yes,
but only if a pre-disposition becomes a post-disposition
that is retained after a scientist carefully examines the evidence and logic. If
a scientist begins the evaluation process with a predisposition (A or E,
B or D) but is not deeply committed to maintaining this view, a flexible
response
could be: "Previously I hoped ____ would be the conclusion, but the
evidence-and-logic indicates otherwise, so I'll change my view." This
temporal factor, regarding a willingness to change views if there is a
scientific reason, is
part of flexible objectivity. Earlier, I said that "perhaps
scientists can overcome their 'tendency toward bias' and make an objective
evaluation." If
scientists are able to evaluate in an unbiased way despite their predispositions,
they are being flexible and objective.
Of course, scientific objectivity isn't
the only goal in life. A person may think that some benefits (scientific,
intellectual, spiritual, social, professional, political,...) will arise
from avoiding the noncommittal "maybe, maybe not" unbiased indifference
of C, and these benefits are more important than a decrease in objectivity. And
if a non-scientific source of knowledge leads to a predisposition that
is true (that corresponds to reality), this "bias" can be a scientific
benefit in guiding a scientist's experimenting, theorizing, and evaluating.
Objectivity and Scientific
Logic It can be useful to think about evaluation
factors (the criteria used by scientists when evaluating theories)
as being in two general categories: factors that are based
on scientific logic, and are not based
on scientific logic.
Factors that I'm calling scientifically
logical include: • empirical reality-checks
(made by comparing observations with theory-based predictions) and • conceptual logic-checks
(of a theory's internal consistency, and its external relationships with scientific
theories that are well established). *
The cultural-personal and conceptual factors
that are not scientifically logical include: • psychological
motives and practical concerns that lead to asking, "If I evaluate this
theory favorably, will it help me get publications, grant money, employment,
and status? Will I gain more by joining those who are arguing for this
theory or against it? Who has more power, and with whom should I form
alliances?"; • metaphysical philosophy and ideological principles
that exert an influence on science when theories are evaluated based on their
external relationships with worldview theories (about
metaphysics and ideology)*, and • conceptual
constraints on the types of entities and actions that should (and should not)
be included in a theory; to the extent that these methodological constraints
are influenced by cultural-personal factors and worldviews, they are "not
scientifically logical."
* We
should not allow naturalistic worldview theories to
be defined as scientific theories. (an
example)
Of course, factors that are "not
scientifically logical" are part of the actual practice of science, so
I'm asking "Is this factor a part of scientific
logic?" rather than "Is this factor a part of science?" I
think we should recognize the existence of these factors in science,
and try to minimize their influence if we want science to be more effective
in helping us search for truth about nature.
Calling a factor "not scientifically
logical" does not imply an absence of logic, since non-scientific theories
(about metaphysics and ideology) do have a basis in logic. Also, an individual
who is influenced by asking "Will I gain more by arguing for this theory
or against it?" is behaving rationally on a professional and personal
level. And at the level of a community, factors that are not "scientific
logic" can be effective "rhetorical logic" for persuasion within
the community. But these factors are not helpful if we want objective
scientific evaluation that is based, as much as possible, on scientific logic.
The simplicity of basic science (with
only empirical reality-checks) and the complexity of actual science
(including conceptual and cultural-personal factors) are described
in an
introduction to scientific
method.
"In
a rational open science, a design theory is evaluated in two ways,
in terms of scientific
evidence [using only scientific logic] and theory
interpretation [based on a wide range of scientific and nonscientific
criteria]." { quoted from a page asking, Can
a design theory be scientific? }
The process
of trying to imagine an idealized science (in which evaluations are
made using only scientific logic) cannot be done using only scientific
logic. This process will include "theory
interpretation" with subjective nonscientific judgments that
are debatable and are debated, as discussed below. There will be
disagreement about the definition of an idealized pure-logic
evaluation and also (because the scientific questions are complex
and difficult) the idealized pure-logic conclusion.
Is naturalism scientific?
When we ask, "Is naturism (a
belief that "nature is all that exists") scientific?",
the answer is simple, and is NO. But what are the relationships
between naturism and naturalism, and between atheistic philosophical naturism and methodological naturalism? And
if you learn and use science, will this weaken your faith? These
questions are the focus of a page about The
Non-Scientific Effects of Methodological Naturalism that builds
on the foundation of another page that asks, "Are science and religion
at war?", and looks at relationships between science and natural
process, miracles, and scientism.
When we ask, "Is methodological
naturalism scientific?", the answer is complicated. A principle
of MN cannot
be derived from science (so it is nonscientific)
but it is compatible with science (so it is not
unscientific). A more important question is whether rigid-MN is useful in science, whether it makes science more effective in our search
for truth
about nature. I think the answer is NO, for reasons that are summarized
in a page about the origin of life. But other scholars think there
are reasons to say YES. In the "foundation page" mentioned
above, I briefly explain why "science does not claim that miracles are
impossible,... and miracles are compatible with the logical methods of science," and
I claim that "there are two rational ways [by either accepting or rejecting
rigid-MN] to view historical science and miracles; among scientists and philosophers
who are Christians, some support one approach and some think the other is
better."
Some
scholars think that rigid-MN should not be required in science. But
others think rigid-MN is useful because, even though it is not based on scientific
logic,
it makes
scientific logic
more
effective. But
if the history of nature has included some non-natural events, rigid-MN will
lead to some unavoidable falsity. Therefore, I think science will be
more effective in a search for truth with testable-MN that
lets scientists use scientific logic to consider all possibilities and decide
which is the best explanation for the evidence. |