To: ccogan@telepath.com (Chris Cogan)
>Chris
> >I acknowledged that it should never be imposed on anyone. I did not
>>acknowledge that it cannot be proved, because it can.
Bertvan:
You'll get a lot of argument, not just from me, if you claim philosophies can
be proved. If that were the case everyone would generally share the same
philosophy.
Chris
>Are you aware that your views
>regarding intelligent design are minority views?
Bertvan:
I am aware that intelligent design is a minority view among twentieth-century
biologists. I doubt it is a minority view among non-scientists. I'm not
even sure materialism is a majority view among scientists other than
biologists. If intelligent design were not a minority view, I wouldn't have
much interest in discussing it. The majority view always gets a fair hearing
and needs no defense. I suspect materialism was a twentieth-century
philosophy, which will wane in popularity. I am eager to observe such
progress. (Which I'm sure you will not regard as progress.)
>
>Chris
>What has mathematics got to do with anything? I was merely using
>mathematics as an example. The question, which you did not answer, is:
> Are you saying that reason applies to mathematics
>but not to causation, not to the law of identity?
>More generally, are you saying that reason applies to some things (such as
>mathematics) but not to causation?
>The law of identity is simply the fact that whatever a thing is, *that's*
>what it *is*. It has been "articulated" since Aristotle's day. It wasn't
>proved; it is an axiomatic fact, like the fact that something exists. Proof
>is not even theoretically possible without assuming it. It's required as an
>implicit assumption merely to be *conscious*.
Bertvan:
To say that "whatever a thing is, that's what it is" is one of the most
ridiculous statements I've heard. Of course "whatever a thing is, that's
what it is"! I suspect you really mean "whatever a thing is, it's what Chris
Cogan, by reason of his infallible logic, says it is."
Mathematics is a game played with certain rules, which may or may not
describe the real world. Things have causes, yes, but not necessarily the
causes you envision. You believe everything is caused by impersonal factors.
I believe some things are caused by me, by the choices I make. Or by the
choices you make. In some cases the same evidence and experience is
available to both you and I, but we make different choices. I believe my
choices make a real difference in the world. Some of my choices are hard,
and not predictable until I make them. You seem to believe your "choices"
are merely the inevitable result of your logic, and I suspect you also
believe your logic is the only true logic, and everyone else's logic should
be identical. If I've grossly misrepresented you, I apologize, and await
clarification.
>Chris
>How is it not a *real* choice if it is deterministic? For decades now, this
>has been a big mystery to me. How is a choice made on the basis of what one
>understands the situation to be not a real choice?
Bertvan:
We each do our best to understand the world, and our understanding changes.
I suppose you believe that understanding is an inevitable result of
experience and logic. I can respect your view, but I differ. I put real
effort into my working on my understanding, and believe my own will helps
develop my understanding.
>Bertvan:
>>Your example leaves little room for real choice. As you say "mostly you
>>choose correctly and everything turns out alright". (With terms like
"choose
>>correctly" and "everything turns our alright" you are flirting with giving
>>nature moral values.) However, instead of your example, what about a choice
>>of saving someone you love at the expense of hundreds who would die? That
>>would offer a real choice. (If the answer seems obvious to you, how about
>>saving someone you love at the expense of three who would die?)
Chris
>How is this example even *slightly* better than mine? Obviously, if two
>alternatives are so close to being equal in one's understanding that one
>cannot rate one above the other, *then* no real choice is possible, because
>one might just as well flip a coin. Free will can be significant only if
>there is some significant relative difference in the values involved in the
>alternatives. One must be choosing between a higher and a relatively lower
>value, or choice becomes essentially meaningless. If it is meaningless, it
>simply doesn't *matter* if its deterministic or not. On the other hand, if
>the differences in the alternatives are significant, then choice is
>meaningful. But then indeterminism would be the *last* thing one would
>want; one would want *always* to choose the best course one could see as
>available.
Bertvan:
I agree, that in most choices little free will is required. It is only
required for difficult choices. In fact, I suspect a person might live their
entire lives without exercising much free will, just doing the obvious and
the acceptable. You say indeterminism should be the last thing I should
want. What I want has little to do with anything. The truth is hard choices
exist. What about the people who endangered their families to help Jewsih
people in Nazi Germany? You think that didn't require an act of will? They
didn't flip a coin. I'm sure they agonized over their decision.
Bertvan
http://members.aol.com/bertvan
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