DABradbury (12/17/00 catching up on past posts)
>
>Richard Wein wrote: (11/30/00)
>
>[skip]
>
>>
>> Here's a copy of
>> a post I recently made to the Meta Reiterations list, to which I had
>> virtually no response. Perhaps people here would be interested in
>discussing
>> it.
>> -------------
>>
>> I frequently see people invoking the dichotomies of natural vs
>supernatural
>> and material vs non-material, but I've yet to see adequate definitions of
>> these terms. The definitions I've seen have always been vague or circular
>in
>> some way. Yet these concepts seem to form a major part of some people's
>> arguments, especially of those anti-evolutionists (such as Phillip
>Johnson)
>> who accuse evolutionists of rejecting Intelligent Design out of hand due
>to
>> their alleged commitment to "materialism". With your help, I'd like to
>> explore these concepts, and see if I can make any sense of them.
>
>DAB1 ) I strongly agree that precise, unambiguous definitions for terms
>used in
>this dialog are MOST important. Indeed, contextually imprecise (careless,
>loose) usage of language is responsible for far more misunderstanding and
>disagreement than any actual scientific evidence or observation.
>
>> It seems to me that the two dichotomies are very similar, so I'm going to
>> concentrate on just material vs non-material for now.
>
>[skip]
>
>> The usual definition of "non-material" (in the philosophical sense) seems
>to
>> be something like "consisting of something other than matter or energy."
>The
>> assumption then seems to be that any phenomenon which does not consist of
>> matter or energy is somehow outside the realm of science. (I take "within
>> the realm of science" to mean that the effects of the phenomenon are
>> empirically detectable and, to some degree, predictable.)
>> But why should this be so? What if science one day demonstrates the
>> existence of a phenomenon which is neither matter nor energy, and is able
>to
>> make predictions about its behaviour? Wouldn't we want to refer to such a
>> phenomenon as "material" too?
>
>DAB2) Here we are confronted by the necessity to first understand what
Dr.
>Wein is using as a definition of 'science'.
Thank you for awarding me an honorary doctorate. But I don't think I deserve
it. ;-)
Actually, I was careful to define what I meant by "within the realm of
science". See above. Perhaps I need to go a stage further and define what I
mean by "empirically detectable", but I was hoping that wouldn't be
necessary. One has to stop defining terms at some point, or else face an
infinite regression!
>This term has many different
>contextual definitions -- each having its own arbitrarily assigned
>criteria --
>and which must be at least mutually understood if communication is to be at
>all
>effective.
>
>CONTEXT 1) In thIS LARGER, OVERALL, GENERAL CONTEXT we can perhaps agree on
>something like "Science is man's best efforts to establish cause-and-effect
>relationships explaining real-world phenomena to the most compelling level
>of
>relative certainty." This appears to include many other equally valid,
but
>less complete condensations as : "Science being the means by which we can
>distinguish observation from imagination; thought from emotion." and far
>more
>meaningful than vaguaries as "Science is what scientist's do."
>
>CONTEXT 2) METHOD OR PROCESS of SCIENCE is at the next (lower) contextual
>level. recommended (taught) as the means to fulfill the above goal. This
>Baconian scientific method involving physical testing/confirmation is
>universally presented in all introductry science/biology textbooks and
>popular
>writings as being the hallmark of EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. Such verification by
>the
>five senses being the accepted mechanism by which one can claim to have
gone
>beyond personal opinion and properly qualify any successfully demonstrated
>explanation as being "science".
>
>"Science is limited by its tools -- observable facts and testable
>hypotheses."
>Dr. Eugenie Scott; CREATION/EVOLUTION NEWSLETTER; 12/88; Pg. 6.
>
>"In the end, the scientific method must be adopted as the only method that
>is
>capable of being agreed upon by people of varying cultural and sociological
>backgrounds. ... Such scientific facts can be agreed upon because their
>veracity
>is subject to observation and experimentation. The results of an
>experiment
>conducted by one scientist may be verified by another, and it is this that
>sets
>the scientific method apart from all other means of attaining knowledge."
>Editorial; THE HUMANIST magazine, Mar./April 1990; Pg. 30.
>
>"An idea that has not yet been sufficiently tested is called a hypothesis.
>Different hypotheses are sometimes advanced to explain the same factual
>evidence. Rigor in the testing of hypotheses is the heart of science. If
>no
>verifiable tests can be formulated, the idea is called an 'ad hoc'
>hypothesis --
>one that is not fruitful; such hypotheses fail to stimulate research and
are
>unlikely to advance scientific knowledge." National Academy of Sciences;
>SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM; 1984; Pg. 9.
>
>CONTEXT 3) Which is the still lesser, but larger and much more
>confusion-causing contextual level of the different SUB-TYPES OR BRANCHES
OF
>SCIENCE. These being selectively (and often metaphysically) established
>identifiable limited, specialized approaches to the larger "science" as
>defined
>above. These include, but certainly are not limited to, 'deductive'
>science,
>'historical' science, 'evolutionary' science, 'theoretical' science,
>'mathematical' science, etc., etc. Each has its own self-imposed
>identifying
>sub-criteria. In most instances these sub-criteria limit, or takes
>exception
>to, the larger criteria of science stipulated in 1) and 2) above.
>
> Which (finally) brings us back to Dr. Wein's seeming embrace of the
>oft-proposed "mechanistic" science as his yardstick. Here he basically
>accepts
>(metaphysically) that we KNOW enough about reality to aribitrarily exclude
>all
>possible (yet to be discovered/determined) influences on earthly reality.
I don't know where you got that idea. I wrote nothing of the sort.
>Such
>a judgement/determination might better be recognized as a self-imposed
>barrier/limitation. This artificial (subjective) presumption that ONLY
>'mechanistic' explanations are to be considered is purely a philosophical
>(not
>an evidentially/scientifically established) position.
By introducing the concept of "mechanistic", you've obfuscated the very
issue that my post was trying to clarify. Does "mechanistic" mean the same
as "material"? If so, why introduce it? If not, what does it mean?
>> If so, then it seems that "material" really means "that which is within
>the
>> realm of science (though it may not be detectable at present)." If not,
>then
>> non-material phenomena are *not* beyond the realm of science.
>> Thus, to say that non-material phenomena are beyond the realm of science
>is
>> either tautological (true by definition) or false. Either way, I think we
>> have a problem with the way the terms "material" and "non-material" are
>> commonly used.
>
>DAB3) One can propose that "material" is the one (self-imposed, narrower)
>yardstick by which we can attempt to (MUST) explain reality. But on what
>basis? There are many things yet to be "scientifically" explained and
>demonstrated -- the most important of which is that claimed random mutation
>and
>natural selection (RM+NS) can/does somehow produce the complex genetic code
>that
>MUST appear in a gene pool BEFORE any observable evolutionary changes can
>appear. While this remains most difficult for "mechanistic" (chemical
>deterministic) believers, it is well explained by those willing to
consider
>some sort of external (directional) non-mechanistic involvement.
>
>> Note that, when defining a phenomenon which is within the realm of
>science,
>> I said "the effects of the phenomenon are empirically detectable" and not
>> "the phenomenon itself is empirically detectable." It's important to bear
>in
>> mind that nothing is *directly* empirically detectable. We always detect
a
>> phenomenon through its effects. So, if we say that a deity is not
directly
>> empirically detectable even though its effects are, this does not remove
>it
>> from the realm of science any more than a neutrino is removed from the
>realm
>> of science because we detect its effect on our instruments, rather than
>> detecting it directly.
>>
>> Furthermore, I hope to show (in another post) that, if we define
>"material"
>> to mean "that which is within the realm of science", then non-material
>> phenomena cannot have any effect on the observable world.
>
>DAB4) Here Dr. Wein chooses to limit science to only that which is
>"material".
No. I was looking at the implications of *defining* "material" to mean that
which is within the realm of science.
How about giving your own definition of "material"?
>Dare I suggest this is his personal, metaphisical (and science-limiting)
>determination? I choose to define science as that which is physically
>confirmable.
What exactly does this mean?
Hypotheses are generally propositions whose validity cannot be confirmed by
direct physical perception. Their validity is assessed indirectly, by
inference from empirical ("physical" if you like) observations.
>Anything less is (I contend) is better identified as
>subjective,
>fascinating, and possibly true philosophical speculation. But it is NOT
>proper
>scientific conclusion..
>
>> But that's all for now. Comments would be welcome.
>>
>> Richard Wein (Tich)
>>
>DAB5) I join with Richard's request for YOUR thoughtful input.
I don't think that any further discussion is going to be useful unless you
actually read what I write and reply to that.
Richard Wein (Tich)
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