Re: Natural and Supernatural (was Chance and Selection)

From: David Bradbury (dabradbury@mediaone.net)
Date: Mon Dec 18 2000 - 00:57:45 EST

  • Next message: Richard Wein: "Re: Natural and Supernatural (was Chance and Selection)"

    DABradbury (12/17/00 catching up on past posts)

    Richard Wein wrote: (11/30/00)

    [skip]

    >
    > Here's a copy of
    > a post I recently made to the Meta Reiterations list, to which I had
    > virtually no response. Perhaps people here would be interested in discussing
    > it.
    > -------------
    >
    > I frequently see people invoking the dichotomies of natural vs supernatural
    > and material vs non-material, but I've yet to see adequate definitions of
    > these terms. The definitions I've seen have always been vague or circular in
    > some way. Yet these concepts seem to form a major part of some people's
    > arguments, especially of those anti-evolutionists (such as Phillip Johnson)
    > who accuse evolutionists of rejecting Intelligent Design out of hand due to
    > their alleged commitment to "materialism". With your help, I'd like to
    > explore these concepts, and see if I can make any sense of them.

    DAB1 ) I strongly agree that precise, unambiguous definitions for terms used in
    this dialog are MOST important. Indeed, contextually imprecise (careless,
    loose) usage of language is responsible for far more misunderstanding and
    disagreement than any actual scientific evidence or observation.

    > It seems to me that the two dichotomies are very similar, so I'm going to
    > concentrate on just material vs non-material for now.

    [skip]

    > The usual definition of "non-material" (in the philosophical sense) seems to
    > be something like "consisting of something other than matter or energy." The
    > assumption then seems to be that any phenomenon which does not consist of
    > matter or energy is somehow outside the realm of science. (I take "within
    > the realm of science" to mean that the effects of the phenomenon are
    > empirically detectable and, to some degree, predictable.)
    > But why should this be so? What if science one day demonstrates the
    > existence of a phenomenon which is neither matter nor energy, and is able to
    > make predictions about its behaviour? Wouldn't we want to refer to such a
    > phenomenon as "material" too?

    DAB2) Here we are confronted by the necessity to first understand what Dr.
    Wein is using as a definition of 'science'. This term has many different
    contextual definitions -- each having its own arbitrarily assigned criteria --
    and which must be at least mutually understood if communication is to be at all
    effective.

    CONTEXT 1) In thIS LARGER, OVERALL, GENERAL CONTEXT we can perhaps agree on
    something like "Science is man's best efforts to establish cause-and-effect
    relationships explaining real-world phenomena to the most compelling level of
    relative certainty." This appears to include many other equally valid, but
    less complete condensations as : "Science being the means by which we can
    distinguish observation from imagination; thought from emotion." and far more
    meaningful than vaguaries as "Science is what scientist's do."

    CONTEXT 2) METHOD OR PROCESS of SCIENCE is at the next (lower) contextual
    level. recommended (taught) as the means to fulfill the above goal. This
    Baconian scientific method involving physical testing/confirmation is
    universally presented in all introductry science/biology textbooks and popular
    writings as being the hallmark of EMPIRICAL SCIENCE. Such verification by the
    five senses being the accepted mechanism by which one can claim to have gone
    beyond personal opinion and properly qualify any successfully demonstrated
    explanation as being "science".

    "Science is limited by its tools -- observable facts and testable hypotheses."
    Dr. Eugenie Scott; CREATION/EVOLUTION NEWSLETTER; 12/88; Pg. 6.

    "In the end, the scientific method must be adopted as the only method that is
    capable of being agreed upon by people of varying cultural and sociological
    backgrounds. ... Such scientific facts can be agreed upon because their veracity
    is subject to observation and experimentation. The results of an experiment
    conducted by one scientist may be verified by another, and it is this that sets
    the scientific method apart from all other means of attaining knowledge."
    Editorial; THE HUMANIST magazine, Mar./April 1990; Pg. 30.

    "An idea that has not yet been sufficiently tested is called a hypothesis.
    Different hypotheses are sometimes advanced to explain the same factual
    evidence. Rigor in the testing of hypotheses is the heart of science. If no
    verifiable tests can be formulated, the idea is called an 'ad hoc' hypothesis --
    one that is not fruitful; such hypotheses fail to stimulate research and are
    unlikely to advance scientific knowledge." National Academy of Sciences;
    SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM; 1984; Pg. 9.

    CONTEXT 3) Which is the still lesser, but larger and much more
    confusion-causing contextual level of the different SUB-TYPES OR BRANCHES OF
    SCIENCE. These being selectively (and often metaphysically) established
    identifiable limited, specialized approaches to the larger "science" as defined
    above. These include, but certainly are not limited to, 'deductive' science,
    'historical' science, 'evolutionary' science, 'theoretical' science,
    'mathematical' science, etc., etc. Each has its own self-imposed identifying
    sub-criteria. In most instances these sub-criteria limit, or takes exception
    to, the larger criteria of science stipulated in 1) and 2) above.

       Which (finally) brings us back to Dr. Wein's seeming embrace of the
    oft-proposed "mechanistic" science as his yardstick. Here he basically accepts
    (metaphysically) that we KNOW enough about reality to aribitrarily exclude all
    possible (yet to be discovered/determined) influences on earthly reality. Such
    a judgement/determination might better be recognized as a self-imposed
    barrier/limitation. This artificial (subjective) presumption that ONLY
    'mechanistic' explanations are to be considered is purely a philosophical (not
    an evidentially/scientifically established) position.

    > If so, then it seems that "material" really means "that which is within the
    > realm of science (though it may not be detectable at present)." If not, then
    > non-material phenomena are *not* beyond the realm of science.
    > Thus, to say that non-material phenomena are beyond the realm of science is
    > either tautological (true by definition) or false. Either way, I think we
    > have a problem with the way the terms "material" and "non-material" are
    > commonly used.

    DAB3) One can propose that "material" is the one (self-imposed, narrower)
    yardstick by which we can attempt to (MUST) explain reality. But on what
    basis? There are many things yet to be "scientifically" explained and
    demonstrated -- the most important of which is that claimed random mutation and
    natural selection (RM+NS) can/does somehow produce the complex genetic code that
    MUST appear in a gene pool BEFORE any observable evolutionary changes can
    appear. While this remains most difficult for "mechanistic" (chemical
    deterministic) believers, it is well explained by those willing to consider
    some sort of external (directional) non-mechanistic involvement.

    > Note that, when defining a phenomenon which is within the realm of science,
    > I said "the effects of the phenomenon are empirically detectable" and not
    > "the phenomenon itself is empirically detectable." It's important to bear in
    > mind that nothing is *directly* empirically detectable. We always detect a
    > phenomenon through its effects. So, if we say that a deity is not directly
    > empirically detectable even though its effects are, this does not remove it
    > from the realm of science any more than a neutrino is removed from the realm
    > of science because we detect its effect on our instruments, rather than
    > detecting it directly.
    >
    > Furthermore, I hope to show (in another post) that, if we define "material"
    > to mean "that which is within the realm of science", then non-material
    > phenomena cannot have any effect on the observable world.

    DAB4) Here Dr. Wein chooses to limit science to only that which is "material".
    Dare I suggest this is his personal, metaphisical (and science-limiting)
    determination? I choose to define science as that which is physically
    confirmable. Anything less is (I contend) is better identified as subjective,
    fascinating, and possibly true philosophical speculation. But it is NOT proper
    scientific conclusion..

    > But that's all for now. Comments would be welcome.
    >
    > Richard Wein (Tich)
    > --------------------------------

    DAB5) I join with Richard's request for YOUR thoughtful input.



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