Hi Dave,
>I might define materialism as the belief that all the forces of nature are
>"empirically detectable and , to some degree, predictable". Conversely,
>anything that is not "empirically detectable, and to some degree,
>predictable" would not exist under a philosophy of materialism. The problem
>of free will is the first that comes to mind. By definition, free will can
>never be predictable (otherwise it wouldn't be free)
Chris
This is false. Free will is simply acting according to, and on the basis
of, one's understanding of the "situation" one is in (including one's
understanding of contextual factors such as the Universe, one's future
prospects for various outcomes, and so on). There is nothing in any
rational concept of free will that requires that it be unpredictable.
Bertvan
>and I can think of no
>way to detect it scientifically. Those who adopt a materialistic philosophy
>sometimes suggest free will doesn't *really* exist, that at some level free
>will is actually the result of casual, deterministic forces. Would
>materialists therefore regard free will, if they postulated its existence, as
>"supernatural"? Most people are convinced, from personal experience, that
>free will exists.
Chris
What experience could *rationally* persuade a person that indeterministic
free will exists? The experience of the *lack* of awareness of determining
factors in one's own mental processes? Ah, yes, the old argument from
ignorance raises its (*very*) ugly head again. But, if you are doing what
you choose to do, and if you are choosing according to what you understand,
and if you are acting accordingly, what would be the *difference*,
subjectively, experientially, between indeterministic free will and
deterministic free will? That's right: Absolutely none at all.
The "experience" argument is an *interpretation* of experiences, based on a
lack of awareness of certain kinds of limitations. Some people interpret
their experiences in different ways. Some people, realizing that reasoning
from ignorance, from a lack of awareness of certain kinds of causal
factors, is not a valid type of argument, adopt a more conservative
interpretation.
Bertvan
>Should such personal experience, acknowledged by the vast
>majority, be labeled "supernatural"?
Chris
No. There is no such experience. There is *an* experience, but it is not an
experience of indeterministic free will (for one thing, no such experience
is logically possible, even if indeterministic free will were real), but
the label of "indeterminism" is put on it on the basis of utterly invalid
reasoning.
You are, again, reasoning from what is "obvious". Next you'll be trying to
get us to take seriously the "obvious" fact that the Earth is at the center
of the Universe, I expect.
Bertvan
>Should science be limited to take
>into account only that part of reality that is "empirically detectable and,
>to some degree, predictable"? Love and hate cannot be empirically detected.
Chris
Yes they can. We detect it empirically all the time.
Bertvan
>Do they exist as part of the real world or are they "supernatural"? Are they
>off limits to science?
Chris
No. They exist as states and processes in the real world (in people's
brains). They can even be *measured*.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Mon Dec 18 2000 - 23:42:30 EST