Bertvam:
>>I might define materialism as the belief that all the forces of nature are
>>"empirically detectable and , to some degree, predictable". Conversely,
>>anything that is not "empirically detectable, and to some degree,
>>predictable" would not exist under a philosophy of materialism. The problem
>>of free will is the first that comes to mind. By definition, free will can
>>never be predictable (otherwise it wouldn't be free)
Chris
>This is false. Free will is simply acting according to, and on the basis
>of, one's understanding of the "situation" one is in (including one's
>understanding of contextual factors such as the Universe, one's future
>prospects for various outcomes, and so on). There is nothing in any
>rational concept of free will that requires that it be unpredictable.
Bertvan:
Hi Chris. There is exactly the same amount of evidence for the existence of
free will as there is for it's non existence. If free will exists it is
unpredictable until the moment a choice is exercised. Recently you
acknowledged that philosophy can never be proved and shouldn't be imposed
upon anyone. I understand why a materialist would question the existence of
free will, or anything else not scientifically predictable, but it seems
presumptuous for you to state that any view except your own about the
existence of free will "is false". I do not state that materialism "is
false". I do not state that free will exists. I merely say that IF free
will exists, it is unpredictable. What you describe as actions based upon
contextual factors is not by any stretch of the imagination free will. If
every action were merely based upon contextual factors, I suspect nature
would be monotonous. It would resemble a universe run by computers - without
growth or spontaneity. Nature's diversity is the result of creative
exceptions - whether those exceptions are playful, selfish, altruistic,
rational, adventurous or whatever.
Chris
>What experience could *rationally* persuade a person that indeterministic
>free will exists? The experience of the *lack* of awareness of determining
>factors in one's own mental processes? Ah, yes, the old argument from
>ignorance raises its (*very*) ugly head again. But, if you are doing what
>you choose to do, and if you are choosing according to what you understand,
>and if you are acting accordingly, what would be the *difference*,
>subjectively, experientially, between indeterministic free will and
>deterministic free will? That's right: Absolutely none at all.
Bertvan:
Most people believe in the existence of free will, which according to you is
an irrational belief. I understand the reasoning of materialists, and while
I differ, I do not call you irrational. If you've never had the experience
(of exercising free will), no one can give it to you. You label those who
have experienced free will as promoting the "(*very*) ugly old argument from
ignorance" -- colorful words to support your own minority held philosophy.
You speak of the "*lack* of awareness of determining factors in one's own
mental processes." You admit all the determining factors might be unknown,
but you have faith that such determining factors exist for every action.
Clinging to belief in the existence of unknowns is faith, isn't it? It is a
faith I don't share, and I'm sure you wouldn't want to try to impose your
faith upon others, would you?
Bertvan
>>Should such personal experience, acknowledged by the vast
>>majority, be labeled "supernatural"?
Chris
>No. There is no such experience. There is *an* experience, but it is not an
>experience of indeterministic free will (for one thing, no such experience
>is logically possible, even if indeterministic free will were real), but
>the label of "indeterminism" is put on it on the basis of utterly invalid
>reasoning.
Bertvan:
I think you are saying that determinism is the only valid philosophy. Am I
right?
If you have never experienced indeterministic free will, neither has anyone
else?
Chris:
>You are, again, reasoning from what is "obvious". Next you'll be trying to
>get us to take seriously the "obvious" fact that the Earth is at the center
>of the Universe, I expect.
Bertvan:
It seems to me accepting the obvious, until seeing evidence to the contrary,
is preferable to always questioning the obvious. Next you'll be trying to
get us to take seriously the "obvious" fact that the human mind is nothing
more than a complex computer, I expect. Those of us who believe
"intelligence" is something more than the information processing performed by
computers, believe intelligence is a part of part of the real world, and the
business of science - even though at the moment science is unable to define
or measure it.
Bertvan
>>Should science be limited to take
>>into account only that part of reality that is "empirically detectable and,
>>to some degree, predictable"? Love and hate cannot be empirically detected.
Chris
>Yes they can. We detect it empirically all the time.
Bertvan:
You know of scientific methods to measure love and hate???
Bertvan
>>Do they exist as part of the real world or are they "supernatural"? Are
they
>>off limits to science?
Chris
>No. They exist as states and processes in the real world (in people's
>brains). They can even be *measured*.
Bertvan:
Please tell me more about these scientific methods capable of measuring hate
and love in the human brain. :-)
Bertvan
http://members.aol.com/bertvan
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