Re: Natural and Supernatural (was Chance and Selection)

From: Chris Cogan (ccogan@telepath.com)
Date: Tue Dec 19 2000 - 22:03:53 EST

  • Next message: Richard Wein: "Re: Natural and Supernatural (was Chance and Selection)"

    At 01:31 PM 12/19/2000 -0500, you wrote:
    >Bertvam:
    > >>I might define materialism as the belief that all the forces of nature are
    > >>"empirically detectable and , to some degree, predictable". Conversely,
    > >>anything that is not "empirically detectable, and to some degree,
    > >>predictable" would not exist under a philosophy of materialism. The
    > problem
    > >>of free will is the first that comes to mind. By definition, free will can
    > >>never be predictable (otherwise it wouldn't be free)
    >
    >Chris
    > >This is false. Free will is simply acting according to, and on the basis
    > >of, one's understanding of the "situation" one is in (including one's
    > >understanding of contextual factors such as the Universe, one's future
    > >prospects for various outcomes, and so on). There is nothing in any
    > >rational concept of free will that requires that it be unpredictable.
    >
    >Bertvan:
    >Hi Chris. There is exactly the same amount of evidence for the existence of
    >free will as there is for it's non existence. If free will exists it is
    >unpredictable until the moment a choice is exercised.

    Chris
    Why do you make such a claim? What is the evidence for this, other than
    your arbitrary definition of free will as unpredictable? (Obviously, if you
    *define* it as such, then, if it exists, it must be unpredictable, so
    merely defining it that way does not prove anything about facts of reality).

    Bertvan
    >Recently you
    >acknowledged that philosophy can never be proved and shouldn't be imposed
    >upon anyone.

    Chris
    I acknowledged that it should never be imposed on anyone. I did not
    acknowledge that it cannot be proved, because it can.

    Bertvan
    >I understand why a materialist would question the existence of
    >free will, or anything else not scientifically predictable, but it seems
    >presumptuous for you to state that any view except your own about the
    >existence of free will "is false".

    Chris
    I didn't say that free will doesn't exist. I said there's no reason to
    believe that it's indeterministic. I *do* wish you would quit grossly
    misrepresenting my views.

    I also claim that any view other than mine on the issue of whether 2+2=4 is
    true is false. Why do you assume (without evidence, apparently) that this
    issue is any different in fundamentals? Are you saying that reason applies
    to mathematics but not to causation, not to the law of identity?

    Bertvan
    >I do not state that materialism "is
    >false". I do not state that free will exists. I merely say that IF free
    >will exists, it is unpredictable.

    Chris
    Again, *why* must it be unpredictable if it exists?

    >What you describe as actions based upon
    >contextual factors is not by any stretch of the imagination free will.

    Chris
    I assume you mean *your* imagination? Let us suppose you had some *other*
    kind of free will. Suppose you are faced with choosing between A and not-A
    as an action and some other action (or inaction). Suppose, in your
    understanding, A is what you would rationally choose to do, because all the
    not-A actions that you can think of mean the deaths of everyone you love.
    Suppose, for reasons that are not significant here, you are faced with this
    same kind of choice several times in succession. Mostly, you choose
    correctly, and everything turns out alright. The lives of those you love
    are saved.

    But, because you have *indeterministic* free will, you are free to choose
    some not-A course of action, and, one time, despite knowing how bad it is,
    your free will leads you to choose a not-A action and all of your loved
    ones are killed.

    Now, of course, if you were able *consistently* to act rationally, you
    would always choose the A course of action in each instance. But, the
    problem is, *that* would be *predictable*. The only way for free will to be
    unpredictable in an absolute sense is for you to sometimes choose the wrong
    course of action, even though you know it's wrong, you are not emotionally
    compelled to do it, you have no childhood trauma causing you to do it, or
    *any* other such factors. You just freely choose wrongly, knowingly dooming
    all your loved ones to death.

    This is an *inevitable* consequential implication of the concept of free
    will as acausal, indeterministic, absolutely unpredictable choosing.

    More later. This is probably enough to think about for now.



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