From: Chris Cogan <ccogan@telepath.com>
>Hi Dave,
[I suspect that the following text is from Bertvan, not Dave]
>>I might define materialism as the belief that all the forces of nature are
>>"empirically detectable and , to some degree, predictable". Conversely,
>>anything that is not "empirically detectable, and to some degree,
>>predictable" would not exist under a philosophy of materialism. The
>problem
>>of free will is the first that comes to mind. By definition, free will
can
>>never be predictable (otherwise it wouldn't be free)
>
>Chris
>This is false. Free will is simply acting according to, and on the basis
>of, one's understanding of the "situation" one is in (including one's
>understanding of contextual factors such as the Universe, one's future
>prospects for various outcomes, and so on). There is nothing in any
>rational concept of free will that requires that it be unpredictable.
I don't think your definition of "free will" is a useful one. If a decision
follows automatically (in a predictable way) from a given state of
understanding that I hold, then in what sense can it be considered "free"? I
have no choice in the matter, because my action is predetermined by my brain
state.
If one takes a deterministic view of the world, as you do, then it's hard to
see how any decision can be considered "free". We are all automata (albeit
highly complex ones), reacting automatically to stimuli in accordance with
our program, in the manner of computers.
I would *define* free will to be that element of decision making which is
*not* predetermined (in either a deterministic or probabilistic sense). (By
"predetermined in a probabilistic sense", I mean having a predetermined
probability distribution.) So I would say that, insofar as a decision is
predictable, it is not a product of free will.
How natural laws can produce consciousness and free will (the two concepts
are very closely related), is, as far as I'm concerned, a great mystery. I
have yet to see any adequate explanation. If you think you have one, I would
be glad to hear it.
>Bertvan
>>and I can think of no
>>way to detect it scientifically. Those who adopt a materialistic
>philosophy
>>sometimes suggest free will doesn't *really* exist, that at some level
free
>>will is actually the result of casual, deterministic forces. Would
>>materialists therefore regard free will, if they postulated its existence,
>as
>>"supernatural"? Most people are convinced, from personal experience, that
>>free will exists.
I'm inclined to agree with Bertvan here (shock, horror!), except that I
don't think labelling free will as "supernatural" performs any useful
function. What does it mean? We should use the plainer expressions "not
understood" or "seemingly paradoxical".
>Chris
>What experience could *rationally* persuade a person that indeterministic
>free will exists? The experience of the *lack* of awareness of determining
>factors in one's own mental processes? Ah, yes, the old argument from
>ignorance raises its (*very*) ugly head again. But, if you are doing what
>you choose to do, and if you are choosing according to what you understand,
>and if you are acting accordingly, what would be the *difference*,
>subjectively, experientially, between indeterministic free will and
>deterministic free will? That's right: Absolutely none at all.
I agree that we cannot objectively distinguish between predetermined
decision-making and free will (or indeterministic free will, as you call
it). But the very fact that we have a subjective, conscious experience at
all indicates that something very strange is going on which cannot yet be
explained. If we accept that we have conscious feelings at all, then why
should we not accept that our feeling of exercising free will is as real as
our feeling of consciousness?
>The "experience" argument is an *interpretation* of experiences, based on a
>lack of awareness of certain kinds of limitations. Some people interpret
>their experiences in different ways. Some people, realizing that reasoning
>from ignorance, from a lack of awareness of certain kinds of causal
>factors, is not a valid type of argument, adopt a more conservative
>interpretation.
I think we can't separate the issues of consciousness and free will, and I
think your conservative interpretation simply ignores the undeniable
phenomenon of consciousness.
>Bertvan
>>Should such personal experience, acknowledged by the vast
>>majority, be labeled "supernatural"?
>
>Chris
>No. There is no such experience. There is *an* experience, but it is not an
>experience of indeterministic free will (for one thing, no such experience
>is logically possible, even if indeterministic free will were real), but
>the label of "indeterminism" is put on it on the basis of utterly invalid
>reasoning.
>
>You are, again, reasoning from what is "obvious". Next you'll be trying to
>get us to take seriously the "obvious" fact that the Earth is at the center
>of the Universe, I expect.
>
>Bertvan
>>Should science be limited to take
>>into account only that part of reality that is "empirically detectable
and,
>>to some degree, predictable"?
It's not a question of "should be". Science *is* limited to phenomena which
are, to some extent, predictable. It cannot deal with any phenomenon which
is totally unpredictable. But that doesn't mean that such phenomena don't
exist.
As far as "empirically detectable" is concerned, this is more of a gray
area. I don't have a clear definition of "empirical", and I'm open to
suggestions. What I had in mind was experiences which can be shared by
anyone (more-or-less) who has access to the necessary resources. For
example, if a phenomenon is observable through an experiment, then anyone
who repeats the experiment can observe the phenomenon. A fossil can be
observed by anyone who has access to it. Etc. These examples differ somewhat
from consciousness and emotions, say, which can be experienced by
more-or-less anyone, but which cannot be shared in the sense of directly
showing them to another person. I think phenomena of the latter type are
still accessible to science. On the other hand, out-of-body experiences are
not (or only very weakly), because they cannot be consistently reproduced.
>Love and hate cannot be empirically
>detected.
>
>Chris
>Yes they can. We detect it empirically all the time.
Obviously, a definition of empirical is needed here.
Richard Wein (Tich)
--------------------------------
"Do the calculation. Take the numbers seriously. See if the underlying
probabilities really are small enough to yield design."
-- W. A. Dembski, who has never presented any calculation to back up his
claim to have detected Intelligent Design in life.
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