> >Chris
> > >I acknowledged that it should never be imposed on anyone. I did not
> >>acknowledge that it cannot be proved, because it can.
>
>Bertvan:
>You'll get a lot of argument, not just from me, if you claim philosophies can
>be proved. If that were the case everyone would generally share the same
>philosophy.
Chris
You mean, like nearly everyone in Europe would agree that the Earth was the
center of the Universe five hundred years ago?
Your claim here is nearly absurd; it assumes that nearly everyone has
devoted the necessary time and energy and conscientious effort to learning
the skills of rational thought, logic, and has also devoted the necessary
time in thinking through the various issues involved. I'm curious as to
the nature of your reasoning here. *Why* would nearly everyone share the
same philosophy?
>Chris
> >Are you aware that your views
> >regarding intelligent design are minority views?
>
>Bertvan:
>I am aware that intelligent design is a minority view among twentieth-century
>biologists. I doubt it is a minority view among non-scientists.
Chris
I said *your* views regarding intelligent design. I *do* find it annoying
that you so consistently try to *evade* answering questions like this,
because you know very well that the answer does not reflect well on your
own suggestion that such fundamental issues of metaphysics are to be
determined by majority vote, since your *own* views are *also* incompatible
with the majority's views.
Bertvan
>I'm not
>even sure materialism is a majority view among scientists other than
>biologists. If intelligent design were not a minority view, I wouldn't have
>much interest in discussing it. The majority view always gets a fair hearing
>and needs no defense.
Chris
Then, pray tell, what was the *point* of pointedly telling me that my views
were not majority views? Your hypocrisy is showing through here, I think.
Bertvan
>I suspect materialism was a twentieth-century
>philosophy, which will wane in popularity. I am eager to observe such
>progress. (Which I'm sure you will not regard as progress.)
Chris
You're right; watching civilization slide back into the Dark Ages would not
appeal to me. If that is *progress*, if returning to the age of the
Inquisition and the Crusades is *progress*, then I'll have none of it. That
you are willing, even eager, to see that happen is a scary thought. But,
that *is* what you are working toward, even if you are not honest enough
with yourself to acknowledge it, just as many communists would not have
acknowledged that they were working toward the slaughter of several tens of
millions of people.
> >Chris
> >What has mathematics got to do with anything? I was merely using
> >mathematics as an example. The question, which you did not answer, is:
>
> > Are you saying that reason applies to mathematics
> >but not to causation, not to the law of identity?
>
> >More generally, are you saying that reason applies to some things (such as
> >mathematics) but not to causation?
>
> >The law of identity is simply the fact that whatever a thing is, *that's*
> >what it *is*. It has been "articulated" since Aristotle's day. It wasn't
> >proved; it is an axiomatic fact, like the fact that something exists. Proof
> >is not even theoretically possible without assuming it. It's required as an
> >implicit assumption merely to be *conscious*.
>
>Bertvan:
>To say that "whatever a thing is, that's what it is" is one of the most
>ridiculous statements I've heard.
Chris
Ridiculous? Hmm. So you believe, explicitly, that some things *aren't* what
they are?
Bertvan
>Of course "whatever a thing is, that's
>what it is"!
Chris
Why is it "ridiculous" when *I* say it, but something that deserves "of
course" when *you* say it?
Bertvan
> suspect you really mean "whatever a thing is, it's what Chris
>Cogan, by reason of his infallible logic, says it is."
Chris
Logic itself *is* infallible. However, *my* logic, as a process in my mind,
is not. No, I'm simply pointing out the basis of logic generally: The
acceptance and recognition of the fact that what a thing is, *is* what it
is, and that, therefore, if you find yourself having used "logic" (or
whatever) to arrive at a conclusion to the effect that something was *not*
what it was, *you have made a mistake*. Your nearly total failure to
understand this principle, and logic generally, means that you are
intellectually free to believe nearly *anything* you can think of and that
you *want* to believe, completely in disregard of reality. You have
demonstrated again and again and again that you are perfectly willing to
accept, hold onto, and dogmatically proclaim the truth of logical
contradictions, of claims that a thing is both what it is and not at all
what it is, at the same time.
Bertvan
>Mathematics is a game played with certain rules, which may or may not
>describe the real world. Things have causes, yes, but not necessarily the
>causes you envision. You believe everything is caused by impersonal factors.
>I believe some things are caused by me, by the choices I make.
Chris
Why do you assume that these are incompatible things? And, why do you think
I believe that everything is caused by impersonal factors? I believe that
*I* was caused by impersonal factors *and* that some things are caused by
me, by choices I make. You are confusing proximate and not-so-proximate
causes. I do *not* believe that everything I do *now* is *now* caused by
impersonal factors.
But, how did I get to be what I am? By past events, many of which I had no
part in, such as the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan. But, even
those events that I *did* have some part in, such as breaking a tooth in a
bathtub as a child, were determined by who I was at that time, and that
child was not someone whose nature I had any choice in determining the
nature of, at that time. One cannot, even in principle, determine what one
is at any given instant, but only (to some extent) what one will become in
the future, and *that* is determined by what one is now (and other factors
as well).
Bertvan
>Or by the
>choices you make.
Chris
Just who is the "you" that makes the choices? Do you get to choose who you
*were*? Do you get to choose who you *are*, right this *instant*? No, you
only get to choose who/what you *will* be, and you do *that* from the base
of who you *are*, right now, this instant, and you have no choice whatever
over that.
Free will, as *you* define it, requires that who you are, right now, this
instant, is *not* the determining factor in at least some of your choices.
Indeed, it requires that there be *no* determining factor in at least some
of your choices. You cannot have it both ways. Well, you *can*, but not in
*reality*. In your fantasy world, where some things *aren't* whatever they
are, yes, you can have it both ways. But, in reality, you must either
choose deterministically, on the basis of what you *are*, or you must
choose indeterministically, on no ultimate basis whatever, and *despite*
what you are, *despite* what you most devoutly *value* and *believe* and
understand of the situation you are in. In reality, you can't have it both
ways. You can't have a choice based on your nature and morality *and* have
that same choice be *free* of that base.
Bertvan
>In some cases the same evidence and experience is
>available to both you and I, but we make different choices. I believe my
>choices make a real difference in the world. Some of my choices are hard,
>and not predictable until I make them.
Chris
Not predictable by *whom*? Of course they are not predictable by *you*, but
that does not mean that they are not predictable even in principle, by
someone who had absolutely perfect knowledge of you and the situations you
are in when you make those choices (God, if He existed, for example). You
are being incredibly arrogant to think that your lack of
self-predictability somehow raises you above the law of causation, to the
level of *absolute* unpredictability, even in principle. But, you have been
making such arrogant claims for at least the past two years on this list,
so I suppose I should not find it surprising.
Bertvan
>You seem to believe your "choices"
>are merely the inevitable result of your logic, and I suspect you also
>believe your logic is the only true logic, and everyone else's logic should
>be identical. If I've grossly misrepresented you, I apologize, and await
>clarification.
Chris
Some of my choices are made on the basis of logic, *and*, logically enough,
on the basis of what I take to be the ultimate value. Some are made on the
basis of impulse. Others are made, sometimes harmfully, on the basis of
irrational desires. But *all* are made on the basis of what I am at the
instant of choosing, not on the basis of *nothing*.
> >Chris
> >How is it not a *real* choice if it is deterministic? For decades now, this
> >has been a big mystery to me. How is a choice made on the basis of what one
> >understands the situation to be not a real choice?
>
>Bertvan:
>We each do our best to understand the world, and our understanding changes.
>I suppose you believe that understanding is an inevitable result of
>experience and logic. I can respect your view, but I differ. I put real
>effort into my working on my understanding, and believe my own will helps
>develop my understanding.
Chris
How is this relevant to my question? My claim is that your *will* is free
if you choose on the basis of what you understand of your situation in life
at the time of making the choice.
>Bertvan:
> >>Your example leaves little room for real choice. As you say "mostly you
> >>choose correctly and everything turns out alright". (With terms like
>"choose
> >>correctly" and "everything turns our alright" you are flirting with giving
> >>nature moral values.) However, instead of your example, what about a
> choice
> >>of saving someone you love at the expense of hundreds who would die? That
> >>would offer a real choice. (If the answer seems obvious to you, how about
> >>saving someone you love at the expense of three who would die?)
>
>Chris
> >How is this example even *slightly* better than mine? Obviously, if two
> >alternatives are so close to being equal in one's understanding that one
> >cannot rate one above the other, *then* no real choice is possible, because
> >one might just as well flip a coin. Free will can be significant only if
> >there is some significant relative difference in the values involved in the
> >alternatives. One must be choosing between a higher and a relatively lower
> >value, or choice becomes essentially meaningless. If it is meaningless, it
> >simply doesn't *matter* if its deterministic or not. On the other hand, if
> >the differences in the alternatives are significant, then choice is
> >meaningful. But then indeterminism would be the *last* thing one would
> >want; one would want *always* to choose the best course one could see as
> >available.
>
>Bertvan:
>I agree, that in most choices little free will is required. It is only
>required for difficult choices. In fact, I suspect a person might live their
>entire lives without exercising much free will, just doing the obvious and
>the acceptable. You say indeterminism should be the last thing I should
>want. What I want has little to do with anything. The truth is hard choices
>exist. What about the people who endangered their families to help Jewsih
>people in Nazi Germany? You think that didn't require an act of will? They
>didn't flip a coin. I'm sure they agonized over their decision.
Chris
I'm sure many of them did, though not all. And, I don't in the least deny
that it was an act of will. The *question*, however has *nothing* to do
with acts of will, but with what the *basis* of such acts of will is. I'm
claiming that those who endangered their families (and themselves) to help
Jewish people did so because of the kind of people they were, and because
of the kind of situation they found themselves in, *not* because
deterministic causation momentarily *halted* and they just *happened*,
acausally, and for no reason, to choose that way rather than the other,
like the roll of "metaphysical" dice (dice that could be *truly* random).
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Fri Dec 22 2000 - 22:19:27 EST