So now Dembski is differentiating between "apparent" CSI and "real" CSI, is
he? What if *we* differentiate between "apparent" design and "real" design,
and argue that what *appears* to some to be design in Nature is not the
same as real design?
What? You say it only works when we are arguing on the side of ID?
Of course, the issue in both cases must be determined by the actual facts,
viewed "close up," so to speak. But, unless Dembski can specify an
objectively detectable difference between "apparent CSI" and actual CSI,
his case fails.
Of course, even if he *can* do this, his case might still fail because of a
failure of anyone to *find* any actual CSI in Nature. Nature might contain
only apparent CSI, which would not help the "design inference" case at all.
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