Wesley again
http://www.deja.com/=dnc/getdoc.xp?AN=532248147
"Dembski's article, "Explaining Specified Complexity",
critiques a specific evolutionary algorithm. Dembski does not
dispute that the solution represents CSI, but categorizes the
result as "apparent CSI" because the specific algorithm
critiqued must necessarily produce it. Dembski then claims
that this same critique applies to all evolutionary
algorithms, and Dembski includes natural selection within that
category.
The question all this poses is whether Dembski's analytical
processes bearing upon CSI can, in the absence of further
information from inside the "Algorithm Room", decide whether
the solution received was actually the work of the intelligent
agent (and thus "actual CSI") or the product of an algorithm
falsely claimed to be the work of the intelligent agent (and
thus "apparent CSI")?
If Dembski's analytical techniques cannot resolve the issue of
possible cheating in the "Algorithm Room", how does he hope to
resolve the issue of whether certain features of biology are
necessarily the work of an intelligent agent or agents? If
Dembski has no solution to this dilemma, the Design Inference
is dead."
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