RE: TE,souls, and freedom

Brian D Harper (bharper@postbox.acs.ohio-state.edu)
Thu, 23 Sep 1999 13:48:18 -0700

At 07:44 PM 9/20/99 -0500, John wrote:

I think John and I agree on just about everything except perhaps
about how common this extremely determinisic point of view really
is. I have stated a few times that I thought this view to be
either dead or nearly dead. Perhaps I'm wrong. Perhaps also I
have a view slanted by reading a disproportionate amount from
the complexity/self-organization literature. In this paradigm
one would be really hard pressed to find an ultra determinist.
In fact, I think one of the motivations for the formation of
this view of things was a reaction against determinism. I can
remember reading a proceedings volume a few years ago where the
section related to complexity/self-organization began with a
cover page containing the following statement:

"The mechanical world view will be swept away and replaced
by the picture of a self-creating world."

[...]

[deleted a lot of stuff including a nice explanation of the determinists
position, thanks]

BH:==
>
>> Also, the scientific method itself seems to rely on freedom.
>> How can a rational agent introduce and test hypotheses and then
>> select the one most in agreement with the evidence if they
>> are not free? Was Newton's painstaking work in discovering
>> the laws of mechanics just written into the initial arrangement
>> of the particles at the time of the big bang?
>

JR:==
>Agreed -- rationality seems particularly a problem for atheistic
>materialism, in that not only is everything beyond our control, but
>everything -- even rationality -- is ultimately non-rational. Not good.
>(Alvin Plantinga wrote a criticism of -naturalistic- evolution along these
>lines, but he was careful to point out that it did not apply to theistic
>evolution, since there the ultimate causal reality is deeply personal and
>rational rather than impersonal and non- or irrational. That's one reason
>why I was annoyed that the guy who wrote the Tower of Babel book lumped him
>together with Henry Morris or even Phil Johnson. In my view, he is head and
>shoulders above them wrt clarity and subtlety of views; it's going to take
>more than a little forced stirring to make them seem from the same batch.)
>

I was fortunate enough to see Alvin give this criticism as a lecture
during the Veritas forum held here a few years ago. One of my favorites,
second only to Ravi Zacharias.

I am very disappointed to hear that Pennock lumped Al together with
Morris and Johnson. While here, Plantinga gave an invited talk (closed
to the public) to the Philosophy department. I doubt Henry gets too
many invitations of this nature :). Seriously, Plantinga is a philosopher
of the highest calibre.

BH:==
>> Before I go on, let me try to clear the air of another source
>> of possible confusion probably due again to careless reading
>> on my part. The original question had to do with how TE's
>> view soul and freedom, which was what I was trying to answer
>> from my point of view, emphasizing what can be learned from
>> nature as opposed to my own personal beliefs and my theology.
>> But above, you are talking about a scientistic view. Is there
>> any implication that a TE is somehow constrained by that narrow
>> view?
>

JR:==
>-Not in the least.-
>
>But it's important to realize that to avoid this, a Christian (or any other)
>thinker need go beyond science alone, beyond what current science
>countenances in its fundamental ontology and causality. Science-plus, not
>science alone. To me (and I suspect you), this seems like undefeated common
>sense; but to those who are scientistic, it seems superstitious, irrational,
>retrograde, bad, etc.
>

Yes, it is common sense, IMHO. It is also what I've always considered
to be the main idea behind methodological naturalism.

[... trimmed Chaitin stuff ...]

>>
>
>One question: how do they computationally discover these truths for which
>there are no reasons without thereby demonstrating the reason for their
>truth? Or does he just mean (ala Gšdel) that they do not follow from
>particular popular sets of axioms?
>

Yes, this is a good question and one I asked myself a few times :).
Unfortunately :), I'm not a mathematician myself so I have to rely
on the explanations that mathematicians provide for us lowlifers :).
Also unfortunately, almost all my books etc. are in boxes awaiting
my move to another building [applied mechanics has finally bitten
the bullett and is being absorbed by mechanical engineering :-(]

So, I'm having to rely on memory a lot. Thinking this over in the
past few days resulted in my remembering a few more of the details.
One important thing I had previously forgotten was that Chaitin
had proved that there are an infinite number of these "random facts"
in arithmetic. This in itself is a little disconcerting. When first
hearing something like this I imagine many will think that these
are contrived examples that only a mathematician might think up :),
but that had no practical significance. There being an infinite
number of these gives some pause to this knee jerk reaction.

Next, if one were to pick one of these propositions at random, there
is an equal probability of it being true are false. Further, and
I think this is distinctly different from Godel, one can never prove
whether any specific proposition is either true or false.

Brian Harper
Applied Mechanics
Ohio State University
214 Boyd Lab
155 W. Woodruff Ave
Columbus, OH 43210

"God forbid that we should give out a dream of
our own imagination for a pattern of the world"
-- Francis Bacon