Re: ID science (subtopic 2)

From: John Burgeson (burgythree@hotmail.com)
Date: Fri Apr 18 2003 - 16:37:14 EDT

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    Replying to Howard:

    >>Here's my preferred meaning: MN is not a statement about the character of
    >>reality, but a statement about the way science is currently done.>>

    Agreed. If it WERE a statement about the reality of nature, it would be
    methodological atheism."

    >>In the formulation of scientific theories, only the action of natural
    agents shall be considered. By "natural agent" we here mean any agent --
    whether it be an inanimate object, an insentient living organism, or a
    sentient/rational being -- that is a member of our universe. The action of
    divine agents, for instance, whether coercive (supernatural) or non-coercive
    (persuasive), is explicitly excluded from scientific theorizing. The action
    of sentient beings with free will is not excluded, provided that they are
    members of this universe. [Think of the way that the human behavioral
    sciences are conducted. This way of defining MN includes these as authentic
    sciences.]>>

    OK, I can agree with that definition. Unlike the tighter definition, which
    would exclude all creaturely actions, that definition allows for a wider
    definition of science. Which, I think, is "good."

    >>It seems to me that stating the MN principle this way allows us to deal
    >>directly with the way in which science and ID relate. This is the form of
    >>MN that ID rejects.>>

    Here we diverge. If you substitute for "ID" in the above the words "the
    current ID movement as promoted by Johnson, Dembski, Wells, etc." then I
    would agree. But I'd like to address the general idea, not a particular
    incanation of it which both you and I see as fatally flawed.

    >>The biologically relevant action that ID most commonly labels "intelligent
    >>design" is non-natural action by an unembodied agent that IS NOT a member
    >>of this universe. Much confusion arises, however, when such action is
    >>compared to the action of sentient, choice-making agents who ARE members
    >>of this universe. Intelligent agents, as ID proponents use the term,
    >>includes both agents who ARE members of this universe and those who ARE
    >>NOT. >>

    Same comment as the above.

    >>Perhaps this is why we are in this particular discussion. The question is
    >>whether or not action by sentient, choice-making agents who are members of
    >>this universe is or is not excluded by MN.>>

    And I think we are agreed that if the IA is a sentient choice-making member
    of this universe that actions by it/them are included in the MN principle.

    >>re we making any progress?>>

    I think so. But we need to focus AWAY from the Johnson/Dembski/Wells crowd
    and towards the general concept.

    I asked you if you had read Ratzsch's last book on the subject? I purchased
    my own copy which just arrived so I can take Iliff's library copy back and
    start marking my own.

    Burgy

    www.burgy.50megs.com

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