From: Howard J. Van Till (hvantill@chartermi.net)
Date: Mon Apr 14 2003 - 19:42:20 EDT
>From: "John Burgeson" <burgythree@hotmail.com>
I had said the following re MN:
>>... if any scientific theory is going to be formulated to account for some
>>collection of observational data, then that scientific theory will, because
>>of the character of contemporary natural science, deal with natural causes
>>only. This approach, often labeled> methodological naturalism (MN),
>>maintains a stance of agnosticism regarding the reality of non-natural
>>causes. For example, MN does not explicitly reject or accept divine action
>>-- whether of the supernatural (coercive) or the non-coercive variety -- it
>>simply excludes divine action (and any other form of non-natural action)
>>from scientific theorizing.>>
Burgy responds:
> Two things still bother me about the above.
>
> 1. The last words in () -- to what might they refer? I ask you again, do you
> consider the willful actions of a human being to be "non-natural?" Or do you
> see three kinds of possible causation, natural causation, "creaturely," and
> divine (supernatural)?
Your concern is fair. It seems we need to be more specific. It might also be
the case that MN means different things to different people who use the
term.
Here's my preferred meaning: MN is not a statement about the character of
reality, but a statement about the way science is currently done. In the
formulation of scientific theories, only the action of natural agents shall
be considered. By "natural agent" we here mean any agent -- whether it be an
inanimate object, an insentient living organism, or a sentient/rational
being -- that is a member of our universe. The action of divine agents, for
instance, whether coercive (supernatural) or non-coercive (persuasive), is
explicitly excluded from scientific theorizing. The action of sentient
beings with free will is not excluded, provided that they are members of
this universe. [Think of the way that the human behavioral sciences are
conducted. This way of defining MN includes these as authentic sciences.]
It seems to me that stating the MN principle this way allows us to deal
directly with the way in which science and ID relate. This is the form of MN
that ID rejects. The biologically relevant action that ID most commonly
labels "intelligent design" is non-natural action by an unembodied agent
that IS NOT a member of this universe. Much confusion arises, however, when
such action is compared to the action of sentient, choice-making agents who
ARE members of this universe. Intelligent agents, as ID proponents use the
term, includes both agents who ARE members of this universe and those who
ARE NOT.
Perhaps this is why we are in this particular discussion. The question is
whether or not action by sentient, choice-making agents who are members of
this universe is or is not excluded by MN.
Are we making any progress?
Howard
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