George, I agree with your post. But I think overnight I have come up with
something that more directly addresses Burgy's concern about God's
foreknowledge and human freedom.
So, Burgy, imagine that you know Jack, not well enough to know every
event in his life, but very well. Along comes Joe who knows some events
in Jack's past that you haven't heard about. Joe describes one of these
situations and asks, "What did Jack do?" You answer correctly, event
after event. In a few cases, you note that the description of the event
is not adequate, that matters not reported could shift the consequences,
so the answer is conditional. Does this accuracy mean that you caused
Jack to act? Have you removed or denied Jack's freedom?
Knowing is not causing. Even in the physical realm, knowledge does not
determine. Knowing the causal relationships plus setting up the necessary
and sufficient conditions is required for someone to cause the result.
The tangle of problems connected with determinism, causality, free will,
moral responsibility, etc., is one of the most difficult in philosophy
and has spawned more nonsense than any other area that comes to mind.
Since my dissertation dealt with causality, I was very careful to set up
matters to avoid that morass. Introducing the human element would have
had a result analogous to battling the Hydra by cutting off its heads.
Hope this helps to clarify the situation.
Dave
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