[snip]
>>As Pascal pointed out, when two ultimate positions are equally
>>unresolvable by rational argument *alone* then the truly rational thing to do
>>is embrace the position that yields the greatest benefit and avoids the
>>greatest loss:
>
>"Let us then examine this point, and let us say: 'Either God is or he
>is not.' But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot
>decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of
>this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down
>heads or tails. How will you wager? Reason cannot make you
>choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong. Do not then
>condemn as wrong those who have made a choice, for you know
>nothing about it. 'No, but I will condemn them not for having made
>this particular choice, but any choice, for, although the one who
>calls heads and the other one are equally at fault, the fact is that
>they are both at fault: the right thing is not to wager at all.' Yes, but
>you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed.
>Which will you choose then? Let us see: since a choice must be
>made, let us see which offers you the least interest. You have two
>things to lose: the true and the good; and two things to stake: your
>reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your
>nature has two things to avoid: error and wretchedness. Since you
>must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by
>choosing one rather than the other. That is one point cleared up.
>But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved
>in calling heads that God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you
>win you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing." (Pascal B.,
>"Pensees," [1670], Penguin, 1966, p.122)
>
>
>Stephen's claim is only true (if at all) when there *are* "two ultimate
>positions that are equally unresolvable by rational argument
>alone." There are two problems: You have yet to show that your position
>is ultimate. You are simply *asserting* that it is, probably because you
>know damn well that it is rationally unsupportable. "Pascal's Wager"
>situations rarely occur (if ever) in philosophy. Pascal's entire line of
>argument in this regard is unsound because it, itself, if it is assumed to
>be valid, *creates* just such a situation, and one that cannot be resolved
>by his method. That is, Pascal's argument can be easily inverted to show
>that one should bet *against* the existence of his God, because there is
>no apriori reason to assume that *his* God is the one that exists if one
>does exist. The one that exists might be one that tortures people for
>eternity for crimes of stupidity such as using "Pascal's Wager" for
>justifying belief in God. Pascal's method of resolving the conflict
>between two equally good ultimate positions simply does not work. It's yet
>another excuse for irrational belief.
Pascal's Wager urges people to believe in god so as to maximize the
benefits to them
and minimize the risks, as Stephen points out above. In other words, it's
a spiritual
insurance policy against a god who's into threats and punishments. This is
surely one
of the most cynical reasons for believing in a supernatural being that I
have ever come
across. Following this line of reasoning it would be best to profess a
belief in as many
different deities as possible, so as to cover all the bases. I'm always
surprised when
religionists drag this bit of reasoning out.
ralph
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