This is a follow-up of my post of a few nights ago titled
"Supernaturalism's Basic Flaws," in which I argued that supernaturalism
could not be proved because:
A. It would exhibit no empirical evidence that we could not attribute to
natural-world bases, that it had no empirically distinguishing features.
B. That positing the supernatural as a means of answering philosophical
questions either does not answer them (because of inherent failure or
because of infinite regresses) or because any actual fact the supernatural
might provide a basis for could also be provided by the natural world.
I also pointed out that, by the over-and-above the natural world claims
made by supernaturalism, it takes on an over-and-above the natural world
burden of proof, just as I would if I claimed that a dead man was shot, not
by a human being, but by God himself.
Responses have been to remarks other than these central claims, so I'm
still wondering if any Jones-type ID-theorists claim to be able to prove
the existence of the supernatural, and, if so, what is the general nature
of such a proof, and why does it work. How do you show that there is a
known fact or set of facts that can only be attributed to a supernatural
cause or basis?
Just curious.
--Chris
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