At 09:24 AM 10/17/2000, you wrote:
>From: Chris Cogan <ccogan@telepath.com>
>
> >This is a too-brief exposition of material from a larger essay that I have
> >not yet typed from my notebook. It is not about ID as such, nor even merely
> >supernaturalistic ID as such, but it deals with and is relevant to both.
> >
> >Problems with Supernaturalism
> >
> >I think it would be good to eliminate a lot of the confusion and silliness
> >from the debate over ID. To promote this goal, I propose that we eliminate
> >references to supernatural designers and methodologically assume that
> >*only* naturalistic designers (i.e., aliens, etc.) be considered as
> >possible intelligent designers. That is, ID proponents should propose
> >naturalistic designers with sufficient definition to be meaningfully
> >identified if we happen to run into them, and that ID proponents *drop* the
> >Rationalistic attempt to define design without respect to the nature of the
> >designer, in the lame *hope* that somehow, if design is ever discovered, it
> >can be attributed to a supernatural being.
>[...]
>Richard
>Chris, I fail to see why IDers should accept this suggestion. They claim
>that they have a method of detecting ID without regard to the nature of the
>designer, be he natural or supernatural. They are therefore under no
>obligation to differentiate between natural and supernatural designers. What
>they *are* under an obligation to do (but have failed to do) are the
>following:
>
>
>1. Define what they mean by ID.
>2. Establish that their methods can do what they're claimed to do.
>3. Cease to claim that mainstream scientists reject ID a priori because they
>have a philosophical objection to supernatural explanations. (They may have
>such an objection, but, since ID does not necessarily involve the
>supernatural, the argument is a non sequitur.)
Chris
Well, if they would define what they mean by ID in terms that were
demonstrably sound and empirically testable, that would be fine. But, as
long as they are trying to sneak supernaturalism in, they can't very well
do that because supernaturalism has no empirically testable distinguishing
features. The moment it becomes testable, it's no longer supernaturalistic
ID. That is, the moment they define ID well enough to make it empirically
meaningful, it loses any need for a supernatural designer. Mike Gene's
"Paleyian designer" is a case in point. It supposedly has empirical
implications, but in taking them on, it loses its supernaturalism. It
becomes merely *any* being(s) who can design life as we have found it, who
can manipulate molecules in the right ways.
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