In a message dated 10/5/2000 11:11:44 PM Pacific Daylight Time, DNAunion
writes:
> >FMAJ: Why not? If natural selection is an intelligent designer for
> instance, why are there limits to evolution.
>
> >DNAunion: That sounds like an oxymoron to me. If you have any kind of
> intelligence and design involved in the selection process, then it is not
> NATURAL selection, be definition. What am I missing?
>
> >FMAJ: One of the fundamental problems of ID: Wesley Elsberry:…
>
> DNAunion: You didn't address my actual question. Here, let me provide some
> background information. Let us see what Darwin had to say about this.
>
Irrelevant. You have to show that Darwin is using the same definition of
intelligence as is used by ID. The equivocation of terms leads to a confusion
of intelligence ala ID which cannot eliminate natural selection as being an
intelligent designer and the use of intelligence by Darwin.
> [snip]
> It seems clear to me that Darwin excludes from natural selection both
> external conscious choices (as in the intervention by a Deity) and internal
> conscious choices (as in the organism directing its own evolution). What
> kind of conscious choice remains?
Now you are conflating intelligence as used by ID with conscious choice.
Where does it follow from ID that the intelligent design requires conscious
choice?
Dna: None that I can think of. The only "choice" I see that fits into
Darwin's definition is that of the environment acting upon
> the pheontype: this is neither intelligent nor designed (unless you are
> going to claim that someone did it the hard way, indirectly, and modified
> the environment to obtain the desired organismal results).
>
Ah, you now assert that it is neither intelligent nor designed. But is that
correct? It surely does not follow from the definitions of ID as proposed by
Dembski or Behe. B
Behe on Design: "Purposeful arrangement of parts."
Ignoring the potential equivocation of purposeful, indeed natural selection
can lead to purposeful arrangement of parts. What about intelligence? What is
meant by intelligent design ala Dembski?
Wesley Elsberry wrote on talk.origins:
"I 've read it. Dembski merely claims that one can *detect* "design".
Detection is not explanation. Dembski's "design" is just the residue
left when known regularity and chance are eliminated. Dembski's
arguments that natural selection cannot produce "specified complexity"
are, to say the least, highly unconvincing. If "specified complexity"
exists at all, Dembski has not yet excluded natural selection as a
cause of events with that property."
http://inia.cls.org/~welsberr/evobio/evc/argresp/design/rev_tdi.html
http://inia.cls.org/~welsberr/zgists/wre/papers/dembski7.html
http://inia.cls.org/~welsberr/ae/dembski_wa.html
So is intelligence logical consequence of the design inference or just a name
for that which falls through the filter?
It's the latter.
How does ID intend to eliminate natural selection as the intelligent
designer? It can't define it out of existence so it has to follow from its
premises
Wesley Elsberry:
"The apparent, but unstated, logic behind the move from design to
agency can be given as follows:
1. There exists an attribute in common of some subset of objects
known to be designed by an intelligent agent.
2. This attribute is never found in objects known not to be designed
by an intelligent agent.
3. The attribute encapsulates the property of directed contingency
or choice.
4.For all objects, if this attribute is found in an object, then we
may conclude that the object was designed by an intelligent agent.
"This is an inductive argument. Notice that by the second step, one
must eliminate from consideration precisely those biological
phenomena which Dembski wishes to categorize. In order to conclude
intelligent agency for biological examples, the possibility that
intelligent agency is not operative is excluded a priori. One large
problem is that directed contingency or choice is not solely an
attribute of events due to the intervention of an intelligent agent.
The "actualization-exclusion-specification" triad mentioned above also
fits natural selection rather precisely. One might thus conclude that
Dembski's argument establishes that natural selection can be recognized
as an intelligent agent. "
http://inia.cls.org/~welsberr/zgists/wre/papers/dembski7.html
> DNAunion: In addition, I believe it safe to say that Darwin also excluded
> from natural selection any idea of its knowing the future and directing
> evolution to a predetermined fixed goal (I don't have a quote handy, but I
> think we all accept this). There is no blueprint guiding selection, and
> there is no particular end to which it is striving, and there is not
> intended purpose to its actions. So what atypical defintion of the word
> "design" must be used to fit in here?
>
Again you are playing with words that have many meanings. Is there a purpose
to its actions ? Is there a purposeful arrangement of parts ? Is there a
predetermined fixed goals? These assertions are all begging the question.
Does ID require all these? Please show how this follows logically from either
Dembski's or Behe's arguments? But you have caught on to the fact that ID is
indeed using a somewhat atypical definition of the word "design" but that's
its problem. It's through equivocation of the meaning of the word design that
ID tries to eliminate natural selection but as Wesley has shown, it cannot do
this.
> DNAUnion: Since no conscious choice - either external or internal - is
> allowed, nor is a future template/blueprint/purpose allowed as a target to
> strive for, I don't see how both intelligence and design can be fitted into
> Darwin's definition of NATURAL selection. In view of this, let us take
> another look at my original statement:
>
Your definition of ID is strangely enough not the same as the common usage.
Although ID can include conscious choice, future goals, templates and
purpose, it does not logically follow that this is a requirement for ID.
> "If you have any kind of intelligence and design involved in the selection
> process, then it is not NATURAL selection, b[y] definition."
>
> Sounds right to me. It still sounds like an oxymoron to say that that an
> NATURAL selection is an intelligent designer.
>
Sure, I understand that it sounds that way, which shows why ID is having such
problems because it is a logical consequence of the ID thesis. It does not
identify the designer, merely design. That people then confuse ID with
purpose, blueprints etc to eliminate natural selection as the designer is an
ad hoc step, not one that follows logically from the design inference.
Wesley Elsberry did a great job at showing this. I understand that you are
waiting for Dembski to address this but his argument is not limited to
Dembski but in general to ID.
If you want to define ID to be a purposeful, conscious choice of a pathway
requiring intelligent choices and a look towards the future then this ID for
all practical purposes although similar in name is quite different in origin
and Dembski and Behe's arguments for design inference cannot be used to
support this new version of design.
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