At 09:36 PM 10/05/2000, you wrote:
> >DNAunion: That sounds like an oxymoron to me. If you have any kind of
>intelligence and design involved in the selection process, then it is not
>NATURAL selection, be definition. What am I missing?
>
> >Huxter: So ID is not natural? If something is not natural, is it then
>supernatural?
>
>DNAunion: I see you trying so hard to get ID classified as supernatural,
>especially from an IDists, but your trick doesn't work.
>
>Simple question. The computer on which you typed your reply: is it natural?
>No - it is intelligently designed. Now consider this: according to your
>above question/claim "If something is not natural, is it then supernatural?",
>since a computer is not natural, then it must be supernatural? See, your
>logic produced the wrong result for something known, so we surely cannot
>trust it for things unknown.
>
>Even if I did say that ID is not natural, that would not mean it was
>supernatural. The opposites (yes, opposites: plural) of natural are
>supernatural AND intelligent causation.
>
> >"Charles Thaxton: The first objection to intelligent design of DNA is
>philosophical. Most scientists come into discussions of science, particularly
>origins, already with a natural/supernatural way of thinking. It is easy,
>therefore, for these scientists to conclude that the notion of intelligent
>cause is a ruse, that it is really the supernatural without the courage of
>the one promoting it saying so. And because we do not incorporate the
>supernatural into science, the objection continues, the only way to proceed
>in the investigation of any natural phenomenon is to assume a natural cause.
>
>It is easy to see how the critic might think intelligent cause is a ruse, for
>surely the cause might be supernatural. The problem is that we do not know
>from the inference we make from experience of DNA (and protein) whether the
>intelligence is beyond the cosmos, or within it. These prepositions "beyond"
>and "within" make all the difference. Because we do not know from the
>inference itself which preposition truly represents the case, we must remain
>equivocal.
Chris
Not so. For the same general burden of proof reasons, we may presume until
evidence indicates otherwise, that the intelligent causes, if any, are
naturalistic. Further, since we only have a theoretical means of
recognizing intelligent design by naturalistically-occurring beings (i.e.,
humans, aliens (because they would necessarily live under the same *basic*
conditional factors, limitations, and constraints as we do)), we have yet
another reason for presuming that any "design" we claim to see should be
regarded by presumption as design by metaphysically naturalistic beings.
If you, or Behe, or Johnson, or Dembski, or anyone else can come up with a
*rational* way of specifying what divine design would necessarily look
like, then go right ahead. But, until then, and until evidence is found
that "works" better with that concept of divine design than with
naturalistic design, divine design is verbal and conceptual fog.
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