From: SZYGMUNT@EXODUS.VALPO.EDU <SZYGMUNT@EXODUS.VALPO.EDU>
>Richard,
>
>You wrote:
>
>===========================================================
>Chris, I'm probably just repeating something you've already written, but I
>I'd like to restate it in my own words...
>
>If a computer simulation faithfully models a natural process, then it is
not
>displaying any more intelligence than the natural process itself (and
>probably *less*, since real computer simulations are actually simplified
>models of natural processes). Thus, a computer simulation of evolution is
no
>more intelligent than the natural process of evolution itself.
>
>The intelligence of the computer designer or programmer is irrelevant. Is a
>computer simulation more intelligent if it's run on the latest Cray
>supercomputer than if the identical simulation is run on an old TRS-80? Is
a
>computer program more intelligent if it's written by Einstein than if the
>same program was written by a trainee programmer? Of course not. The
>intelligence of the simulation is purely a function of the algorithm that
is
>being executed. And, if the simulation is running the same algorithm as
>natural evolution (or a simplified version of it), then the simulation is
no
>more intelligent than the natural process of evolution.
>
>Phew... it's *difficult* explaining the obvious!
>
>When IDers claim that there's a fundamental distinction between the
>algorithm as it's executed in nature and the same algorithm as it's
executed
>by a computer, because the latter is somehow infused with the intelligence
>of the programmer, they're effectively denying the value of computer
>simulations in general. Oh dear...there goes *another* field of endeavour
>sacrificed on the altar of Intelligent Design, before which knowledge
>and reason must bow their heads.
>
>
>Richard Wein (Tich)
>==============================================================
>
>I don't think you really addressed Paul Nelson's point here. I believe
>you are correct that the intelligence (or intelligent infusion of
>information) of the programmer is not an issue **if the computer program
>faithfully models a natural process**. For example, I trust that
>Monte Carlo simulations of an experiment in particle physics will
>give results that agree with experiment, if the relevant physics equations
>are faithfully written into the program and if the numerical techniques
>are handled carefully. If such simulations do *not* agree with experiment,
>then there is a possibility that there is a need for *new physics* that
>is not modeled by the simulation.
>
>I believe Paul was pointing out that so-called genetic algorithms (GAs)
>are not really faithful models of "random mutation and natural selection".
>My knowledge of GAs is limited, but I believe that programmers spend a
>considerable amount of time designing such algorithms in order to
efficiently
>solve a given problem. Since their goal is *not* to faithfully reproduce
>conditions for RM & NS but rather *to solve a specific problem*, they
choose
>special cases of "mutation" conditions that allow for quick problem
solving.
>They have enough foresight and can perform enough trials to know what
>parameters will be best suited to a particular task. I think this is what
>Paul was pointing out (although he can certainly speak for himself).
[...]
I disagree. I don't think that was Paul's point, and I can find no statement
to that effect in his post. What he wrote was:
"All known EC and GAs implicate at least one intelligent
designer. Thus they cannot possibly provide sound
counterexamples to the claim that CSI requires a
designer, whether immediately or remotely."
My point is that it makes no difference whether the algorithm was written by
an intelligent designer or resulted from natural processes. An algorithm is
an algorithm.
Paul went on to make a second point, that natural selection requires the
prior existence of a self-replicating entity. That's a separate issue, which
I didn't address.
Disclaimer: For the sake of this particular argument, I've been accepting
Wesley's interpretation of CSI. However, I don't think this interpretation
is actually the one intended by Dembski. According to what I think is
Dembski's definition of CSI, I don't accept that CSI actually exists in
nature.
Richard Wein (Tich)
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Oct 03 2000 - 18:54:15 EDT