Chris:
>Actually, I don't claim intelligence is involved. I claim that logically
>inevitable causal order is involved. In effect, because of the coherence of
>what it is for something to exist, it has an identity which is exhibited in
>its causal relationships. Thus, spherical things behave spherically,
>cubical things behave cubically, etc. (for easily-grasped examples).
>Because of this inevitable causal ordering of any logically possible
>universe, universes will always have characteristics (at a sufficient deep
>level of understanding) that will be intelligible and lawful (however, if
>that level of understanding has not been reached, it may still *appear*
>"lawless" or indeterminate and undeterminstic).
>Since living organisms in a universe must have characteristics that are
>compatible with that universe, and because they must be able to use
>information/energy in sustaining themselves, and because they must have a
>means of storing information for reproduction (i.e., something at least
>remotely like DNA), life *must* exhibit overall orderliness because
>otherwise it cannot *function* in an orderly way in order to maintain
>itself. If it cannot function, it will not survive, and if it is not
>largely orderly, it cannot function.
>In a way, my position is like that of the piece on thermodynamics that was
>discussed briefly a while back, except mine goes back not merely to
>thermodynamics (which specifies *further* causal factors that must be
>present for life to evolve), but to the law of identity itself, to the fact
>that whatever a thing is, *that's* what it is, and it must therefore
>*behave* like what it is (even if it's not a rock but something seeming to
>be a rock, that something has to have the characteristics needed in order
>to seem to be a rock, characteristics that would be, ultimately,
>scientifically detectable and that would enable us to distinguish it from a
>true rock).
Bertvan:
Hi Chris;
You say things are the way they are because they couldn't be otherwise. If
that is a philosophical position, you don't need proof. Most ID supporters
would agree. The universe and laws of nature were designed to be the way it
is and to support life. What I question is that the design is so simple that
humans have the ability to comprehend all of it, that it consists of nothing
more than mechanistic formulas. I question that it can be expressed by
mathematical formulas. I question that there is any way for you to know
whether or not teleology is a part of that design. You say:
>Because of this inevitable causal ordering of any logically possible
>universe, universes will always have characteristics (at a sufficient deep
>level of understanding) that will be intelligible and lawful (however, if
>that level of understanding has not been reached, it may still *appear*
>"lawless" or indeterminate and undeterminstic).
Here you seem to assert an understanding of the universe that few people
claim - "Nature might sometimes appear " indeterminate and undeterministic,
but is that is really an illusion? You claim to know what the universe is
supposed to be like, even if at times it appears otherwise?
As I've said before, you are a consistent materialist. Most materialists
chicken out at free will, the deterministic nature of altruism, or claiming
what a computer posses is intelligence. I urge you to develop and articulate
your philosophy. I am a little startled when you carry on about the
stupidity of anyone who doesn't agree with you. Or when you insist that the
"burden of proof" is upon anyone who thinks otherwise. You can try, but I
don't think many people are going to accept that "burden of proof".
>Bertvan:
>>This shows our different definition of the word "designed". To you it
>>requires a designer. To me it merely means the result of rational,
>>intelligent, choices, as opposed to chance events. Communism was an attempt
>>by human designers. A system, culture or economy, designed by the
individual
>>choices of its components is more successful. (If there is a designer, I'll
>>bet he knew that.) The cultural and economic choices people make are seldom
>>random. They usually have what they consider intelligent reasons.
>Chris
>This is a very poor way of using "design." It is guaranteed to cause or
>promote confusion, because it *contradicts* the standard meanings. The
>ordinary meanings are limited to cases in which what is said to be designed
>is in mind before it is produced, and it is produced *deliberately*, not as
>an accidental consequence of *other* activities (designed or not).
>Your usage commits a mistake similar to Dembski's broadening of the concept
>of design; using a perfectly good concept in a way which degrades its
>cognitive and communicative value, and for things which are well-handled by
>other existing concepts (order, emergent order, self-organization, etc.).
>This is also *not* what ID theorists mean when they claim intelligent
>design for life or the universe.
Bertvan:
ID theorists are a diverse bunch. They share a skepticism that the universe
is the result of chance events -- devoid of purpose or teleology. If you
can convince them you have a corner on the definition of "design", and
persuade them to use another word, such as "order" or "self-organization,
it's OK with me. Meanwhile I'll use the same definition some of them use,
Mike Gene and Michael Denton for instance.
>
>Bertvan:
>>I seen nothing unintelligent about the evolution of the biosphere. Acts of
>>symbiosis are usually performed to the benefit of at least one, and often
>>both, of the organisms involved.
Chris:
>How is that intelligent rather than merely fortuitous?
Bertvan:
If you want to regard it as merely luck (that is the meaning of fortuitous,
isn't it?) I personally am suspicious of such luck.
>Bertvan:
>>Even people can be fooled by a paper tiger, but you have no idea how
bacteria
>>"know" to pursue or flee from certain signals.
Chris
>They don't know. But the ones that happen to have traits that yield these
>results will be the ones that survive (in some environments). The others
>aren't here to tell their story.
Bertvan:
That is only valid if you believe such traits are a purely mechanical process
and can be "created" by chance variation and natural selection.
Chris:
>We already build functionally complex *non-*organic systems. Why does it
>matter whether it is "organic" or not?
Bertvan:
I'm sure you sincerely believe abiogenesis is just around the corner, but
until it is actually accomplished, there is room for those of us who believe
life consists of something more than a machine.
>>Bertvan:
>>These are not live organisms. For an understanding of how multicelled
>>organisms came into existence, we might study the slime mold. It can be
>>individual organisms pursuing their own interests or it can combine to
pursue
>>the interest of the whole. Can you declare with certainty no intelligence
is
>>required to know when to do each? If the parts are "forced" into such
>>cooperative behavior, what forces them? I don't think we know enough about
>>the process to say anything -- unless we already have a philosophical
>>prejudice against the existence of intelligence.
Chris
>If we don't know enough, why are you saying that it's intelligent? I'm
>saying that we have no *evidence* that it's intelligent. And, I'd bet that,
>if we *did* understand it in detail, we'd see that, indeed, it is no more
>intelligent (i.e., mindful) than a computer program. Computer programs are
>intelligent, but in a different (and irrelevant) sense.
Bertvan:
I'm saying it is intelligent for the same reason you are saying it
unintelligent. We each see the same evidence and interpret it differently.
I do admit that as long as you claim an computer program is intelligent, we
are defining that word differently. A computer can only do what it is told
to do. They lack creativity.
Chris:
>It's not a "philosophical prejudice" to assume simpler explanations until
>*specific* evidence shows that more-complex ones are needed. Assuming
>intelligence then requires an explanation of the presence of the
>intelligence, thus complicating things, often needlessly. We don't need to
>impute intelligence to oxidation, for example, so why do so? Similarly, we
>don't need to impute intelligence to the behavior of bacteria until they
>show some specific signs of intelligence rather than mere physiological
>reactions to physical conditions.
Bertvan:
Any assumption is a philosophical prejudice. You assume a mechanistic
explanation will be found, and I assume otherwise. I don't impute
intelligence to oxidation, because it is not organic. I only impute
intelligence to life. I know it exists in humans. It seems obvious that
intelligence exists to some degree in other mammals. I don't know how we
could determine where it stops - which organisms are completely devoid of
intelligence.
>>Bertvan:
>. A computer can store and sort and
>>compare information. Some of us suspect mind can do more.
Chris:
>The question is, is the *basic* nature of the relationship of the process
>to the brain any different from the relationship of a computer program's
>execution to that of a computer? Obviously, they are quite different
>processes, but I'm suggesting that they are both processes carried out by
>dumb matter that is able to do so because of the way it is organized, etc.,
>not because of any *metaphysical* oddness of mind that goes beyond the
>capabilities of suitably organized (but not individually intelligent)
>components.
Bertvan:
Our understanding of brain processes is primitive. When we understand it
completely, maybe you will be justified in claiming it is nothing more than a
complex computer. Maybe not. I say again, you will never find creativity,
free will nor spontaneity in a computer. You won't even find a way to inject
heroism, cowardice, integrity, altruism, hate, love or courage into a
computer. They exist in mammals, but since we don't even know what they are,
I don't know how we can determine which organisms are completely lacking such
qualities.
Bertvan
http://members.aol.com/bertvan
.
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