We evolutionists are fond of pointing out genetic similarities between
organisms (apes and man, for example) in support of both common descent and
the descent of one organism from another (man from apes, for example).
When the genetic differences between man and ape are examined, they appear
quite *piecemeal*.
"So what?" you might say, "That's just the way the designers chose to
design them."
Ah, yes, of *course*.
But, there is an oddity here, yet another asymmetricality between ID theory
and naturalistic evolutionary theory (NET). ID theory does not predict that
genetic differences would be piecemeal. Indeed, we *might* suppose that the
designers would make the genetic difference in the form of *one* single
large genetic difference, something that would clearly *not* be possible
via naturalistic evolutionary paths. NET, on the other hand, *does* predict
that when one organism is descended from another from which it differs
significantly, it will be by a series of small (-ish) genetic steps (at
least in most cases). It predicts that we would find a number of small
changes in most cases to distinguish the descended organism from the
ancestor organism.
For example, an okapi-like animal is supposed to be the ancestor of the
modern giraffe. If it *is*, then, if we examine the genomes of the two
animals, we should find several fairly small genetic differences rather
than one large genetic difference. Now, I don't know if anyone has done an
exhaustive genetic comparison of the okapi and the giraffe, but I'd be
willing to *predict* that any such examination of the two genomes would
show that, indeed, they differ from each other in multiple small ways
rather than in one big genetic difference. For example, I'd bet that there
are genetic differences at widely-separated points on the two genomes,
interspersed with chunks of identical genetic material still in the same
general locations and same ordering in the two genomes.
ID theory, of course, would not predict this, because it has no causal
principle upon which to make such predictions, one way or the other. Thus,
as in essentially *all* other respects, ID theory is scientifically useless
in this respect as well.
It *only* gains strength from any inadequacies that might be found in
evolutionary theory, because it has no evidentiary basis of its own. Thus,
it cannot *predict* that there will be anything about an organism that
could not have been the result of naturalistic processes, but that's all it
can really hope for. Hence the search for "irreducible" complexity, etc.,
even though ID theory does *not* predict that any such complexity will
exist. Such facts depend on the fact that NET *does* allow sufficiently
specific predictions that it can be tested. ID theory's hope is not for
scientific validation of itself, but scientific *invalidation* of NET. That
is, Johnson, Behe, et al, hope not to support ID theory directly, but
indirectly by refuting the main alternative to ID theory.
Since NET does not invalidate on demand (given the available empirical
facts), ID theorists sometimes have to "play" with the facts a little (as
in Behe's case) to get them to seem to the too-casual reader to refute NET.
Behe's method is to *define* irreducible complexity in a way that allows
him to find some, but, unfortunately, *also* in such a way that finding it
does not refute (or even affect) NET (if he defined it honestly, so that
finding some *would* refute NET, then he most likely would not be able to
find any).
Thus, though the piecemeal aspect of the genetic differences between man
and ape (for example) does not *refute* design, it *does* support NET
because NET predicts just such a piecemeal collection of differences. No,
of course, it does not *prove* NET, but the point is that it does *support*
NET and it *fails* to support ID theory.
This same relationship between the facts and theory applies to the order of
appearance of organisms (man *after* apes, not in the Cambrian Explosion,
for example) *and* to the *locations* of appearance (hominids appear where
pre-hominids are found, and man where hominids are found, *not* in
Antarctica. ID theory does not have anything to say about order of
appearance or location of appearance, but NET *does* predict that
later-appearing organisms will appear where similar but earlier-appearing
organisms (their ancestors?) were.
Of course, *all* of this, and *all* other evidence for NET theory can be
dismissed with the usual, "Well, that's just the way the designers chose to
do things." In fact, *all* scientific evidence for *any* scientific theory
can be dismissed this way. For example, it can be claimed that there is no
such real-world physical fact as gravitation, that masses of matter move
the way they do because the designers are constantly *moving* them the way
the move, and that *none* of the empirical facts used in support of the
theory of gravitation are meaningful.
This approach would be ludicrous, but it accords perfectly with ID theory.
We can, if we accept the principle of ID theory, completely dispense with
absolutely *all* scientific theories. Why? Because ID theory, thus
generalized, can obviously "explain" everything perfectly, *regardless* of
the empirical facts. Planets move as they do because the designers are
constantly moving them that way. Water boils because the designers make it
boil (the heat from the flame or heating element is irrelevant). When cars
smash together, they get crumpled because the designers *crumple* them.
Etc., etc., etc. There's no limit at all.
Then, people like Jones and Johnson could complain that the ID theory of
planetary motion was not getting a "fair hearing" among scientists, and
that it was not being taught in physics classes because of the secular
"religion" of naturalism, and so on. Or people like Bertvan could claim
that their theory that photons are highly intelligent, creative,
spontaneous, and that they have free will was *also* not getting a fair
hearing, and that scientists were not open to the best criticisms of their
crazy view that there is no evidence whatever that photons are anything
more than mindless, non-creative natural phenomena.
No, the reductio ad adsurdum is not far-fetched; after all, Bertvan
actually *believes* some such theory, and the case of ID in relation to
life closely parallels the case of ID theory with respect to gravitation.
But, fortunately, the Bible does not have a Genesis story about how God
moves large masses in the vastness of space, or people like Jones really
*would* be trying to "sell" an ID theory of planetary motion.
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