Re: Is Darwinism Self-Refuting? (was: An intelligent discussion with Intelligent Design's designer)

From: Richard Wein (rwein@lineone.net)
Date: Thu Jul 27 2000 - 16:48:57 EDT

  • Next message: Stephen E. Jones: "Re: Scopes in reverse"

    From: John E. Rylander <rylander@prolexia.com>

    From: Richard Wein <rwein@lineone.net>
    >
    >> There are, of course, plenty of other things to criticize in the cited
    >> article. But most subscribers to this list will not need me to point them
    >> out.
    >>
    >> However, there is one point on which I'm in agreement with Johnson:
    >>
    >> >A: The typical tactic is to cede to science the authority to
    >> determine the
    >> >"facts," then try to salvage some area for Christian faith in
    >> the realm of
    >> >"value." But since "values" are not granted the status of genuine
    >> knowledge,
    >> >what you put there is eventually dismissed as subjective fantasy.
    >> Christians
    >> >need to insist that they are making genuine knowledge claims. I
    >> like to put
    >> >it this way: Is there any "-ology" in theology? Are we studying anything
    >> >real?
    >>
    >> If a religion makes no claims to factual truths, then what is the
    >> basis for
    >> its claims regarding values? How is it any different from a secular
    school
    >> of philosophy? If, on the other hand, it does make claims to
    >> factual truths,
    >> then it must hold its own in the scientific arena. So I think that ID
    >> proponents are right to look for scientific evidence for their God. The
    >> problem is that they are so desperate to find it that they will claim to
    >> have it whether it exists or not.
    >>
    >> Richard Wein (Tich)
    >
    >A few very quick points:
    >
    >(1) From an atheistic perspective, Christianity probably is akin to
    >philosophy

    As an atheist, I'm probably better able to judge on this one. ;-)

    To me, religion (no reason to pick on Christianity in particular) is a lot
    more than philosophy. It also consists of factual claims and claims of moral
    absolutes. Some of the philosophy may be valid, but much of it is based on
    these unsubstantiated claims.

    >(2) Philosophy is not limited to values, but rather engages deeply in
    >factual issues -- these are tradtionally its primary focus, in fact (i.e.,
    >what the facts, esp. the foundational truths, are and how our knowledge of
    >them is justified).

    I'd like to know exactly what you mean by this. So I'm going to introduce a
    couple of definitions. Since I'm not versed in the language of philosophy,
    I'm making up my own terminology. If there are standard terms that I could
    be using, please let me know.

    First of all, I want to distinguish between facts about the real world (i.e.
    about things that really exist), which I'll call "real facts", and other
    facts, which I'll call "notional facts". What we know about mathematics
    consists of notional facts, and I guess your "foundational truths" are also
    notional facts (but I'm not sure what you have in mind here).

    Let me clarify (before Steve Clark objects) that, when I talk about facts, I
    don't necessarily mean things that we know for certain. (I don't claim to
    know *anything* for certain, except maybe "cogito ergo sum".) I suppose that
    by "facts" I mean assertions that are provisionally accepted.

    When I talked earlier about religions making factual claims, I was referring
    to *real* facts, not notional facts.

    Now, I'd like to know whether you think that philosophy can tell us any real
    facts. I accept that philosophy can tell us notional facts, but I say that
    only science can tell us real facts. (If you consider science to be a branch
    of philosophy, then I'm talking here only about that part of philosophy
    which is not science. And perhaps we need to define where the border lies
    between philosophy and science.)

    >(3) Scientific validation is not generally required for a proposition to be
    >true or to be rztionally believed. What philosophers call "Scientism"
    would
    >deny this, but for very good reasons, very few philosophers (though, alas,
    >very many practicing atheists) take scientism seriously. Science is
    >distinct from truth, and distinct from rationality.

    I agree that science is distinct from (i.e. not synonymous with) truth;
    science can only give us provisional truths and there are obviously truths
    which science has not yet discovered. Furthermore, science is only concerned
    with real facts, not notional facts.

    I agree that science is distinct from (i.e. not synonymous with)
    rationality. Rational thinking used to arrive at notional facts (e.g.
    mathematics) is not science.

    But I do say that science (in its broadest sense) is the only effective
    method we have for establishing real facts. I say "science in its broadest
    sense" because I include the kind of rational thinking (whether conscious or
    unconscious) that we use to draw conclusions about the world in our everyday
    lives. For example, I see a man go into a changing cubicle, and a few
    minutes later an identical man comes out. It is scientific thinking, with
    its principle of parsimony, that tells me that these are the same man, and
    not identical twins, shape-changing demons or androids. Without scientific
    thinking such as this, how could we make any sense of the world?

    Now, if you're saying that there's some other method than this for learning
    about the real world, please tell me what it is.

    And this is not scientism, as I understand the word. But I'm having
    difficulty finding a good definition. Merriam-Webster only has the rather
    vague "an exaggerated trust in the efficacy of the methods of natural
    science applied to all areas of investigation (as in philosophy, the social
    sciences, and the humanities)". I certainly don't claim that science can be
    applied to philosophy and the arts (although, of course, real facts
    established by science may be used in those fields).

    >(3a) I agree with you that IDers tend to be scientistic, but I see this as
    a
    >serious philosophical mistake. You, Chris, Richard Dawkins, and others
    will
    >disagree with me on this point, I imagine. :^>

    I very much doubt whether IDers are scientistic!

    Richard Wein (Tich)



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