Jones and his "Gimme-that-old-level-playing-field-so-I-won't- have-to-prove-my-outrageous-claims" blues.

From: Chris Cogan (ccogan@telepath.com)
Date: Sat Jul 08 2000 - 13:02:14 EDT

  • Next message: Bertvan@aol.com: "Jones and his "Gimme-that-old-level-playing-field-so-I-won't- have-to-prove-my-o"

    I think it's obvious that theism has a burden of proof that non-theism does
    not have. Basic or core naturalism is mute on the question of theism; it is
    simply irrelevant. It *presumes* that there is no God because there is
    nothing to indicate that there is, just as ordinary naturalism presumes
    that Santa Claus and the Easter Bunny don't really exist, along with an
    infinity of other conceivable things that have nothing to do with ordinary
    naturalism simply because the natural world does not provide evidence for them.

    Stephen Jones says he wants a "level playing field," but when I describe
    what that would mean, he objects that I'm misrepresenting him.

    Theism has a burden of proof because it is a positive claim and because it
    is obviously not a logically axiomatic fact. Non-naturalism of *any* type
    has a similar burden of proof.

    Further, it has a burden of proof to show that it is a *better* theory than
    a functionally equivalent naturalistic theory for the same facts. It needs
    to be a better theory because it requires an additional (and *major*)
    metaphysical assumption.

    Now, my own particular variant of naturalism does include the presumption
    that nothing non-natural does exist, precisely *because* there seem to be
    no facts for which a non-natural theory is better than a naturalistic one,
    and because people like Jones have not even been able to specify an
    *imaginable* set of empirical facts for which a non-naturalistic theory
    would be a better theory than the same theory "naturalized" (or another
    naturalistic theory altogether).

    Jones' complaint about the lack of levelness of the playing field is really
    a complaint about the very nature of his own claims. Non-naturalism makes
    remarkable claims that go way beyond naturalism's claims, so ("naturally"
    ;-) ), it has the burden of proof for those claims. If he doesn't want the
    burden of proof, there is a simple way to relieve himself of it: Drop the
    claims.

    That is, the burden of proof requirement is inherent in the very remarkable
    nature of his *claims*. They are *epistemological* requirements, not mere
    arbitrary demands imposed by us naturalists. He wants a special exception,
    for *his* claims alone, from standard burden of proof requirements. But,
    since he's making positive claims, let him prove them.



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Sat Jul 08 2000 - 13:03:49 EDT