Reflectorites
On Sun, 02 Jul 2000 18:27:10 -0500, Chris Cogan wrote:
CC>One common view of reason is that, though reason can prove a conclusion on
>the basis of given premises, and it can prove those premises on the basis
>of still more premises, we eventually arrive at premises that cannot be
>proved on the basis of any further premises, and that *these* premises are
>simply *assumed.*
This is not merely a "view". This is a *fact*!
CC>The assumption is that, a proposition is either rationally proved or it
>cannot be validated at all in any serious way. Thus, if Phillip Johnson
>accepts different starting point premises than does a naturalistic
>evolutionist, there may not be much, given this view of reason and proof,
>that can be said about either his set of starting point premises or those
>of the naturalistic evolutionist.
Johnson's (and my) claim is that one's ultimate *assumptions* cannot be
"rationally proved" but it does not follow that they "cannot be validated at
all in any serious way". For example, different starting points can be
compared against each other and starting point may quickly run into
trouble with the evidence.
But one of Johnson's major aims is to get scientific materialists to realise
that they *do* have ultimate starting points which they assume, rather than
prove.
CC>But this view of reason is not entirely uncontroversial. One problem shows
>up almost instantly: Suppose we challenge the person with this view of
>reason to prove that it is true, rather than *merely* his opinion based on
>premises that he has simply *assumed* and which therefore may have no
>cognitive status at all. If this view of reason is correct, then, whatever
>premises he introduces to support it are themselves subject to the same
>challenge. If he is challenged over and over again until he eventually
>arrives at premises that he takes as starting points, as ultimate premises,
>we may say, "Well, what about *those* premises? If *they* are simply
>assumed, then the conclusion that reason or rational knowledge ultimately
>rests on premises that are simply assumed has no more to be said in its
>defense than those premises. Since those premises are simply assumed, the
>conclusion itself is no better than a mere assumption."
See above. No one said anything about "*merely* his opinion based on
premises that he has simply *assumed* and which therefore may have *no
cognitive status at all*."
Chris is up to his usual trick of putting straw man arguments in the
mouths of his opponents!
CC>That is, if this view of reason is true, it makes any argument supporting
>it essentially unsound, because the premises are not first established as
>true but are merely *assumed* to be true.
See above. They are not *merely* assumed to be true (my change of emphasis).
CC>This demonstrates that there is definitely something wrong with this view
>of reason and the supporting argument for it. But knowing that it is
>unsound and knowing *why* it is unsound are two different things. In what
>follows, I will show exactly what is wrong with this view of reason, and
>will offer a rational alternative.
There is indeed "definitely something wrong with this view", i.e. Chris'
straw man caricature of it!
CC>The flaw is in the *assumption* that there is no way to cognitively
>establish the truth of a proposition other than by logic applied to prior
>*premises*. This is the typical and narrow logician's concept of proof. But
>such proof is not the only way to cognitively validate propositions. I'm
>using the concept of validation as a broader concept than that of proof
>(even broader than proof as fully sound argument for a conclusion).
See above. "The flaw is in" *Chris'* *assumption*!
[...]
CC>That is, the basic facts of metaphysics, and epistemology are inherent in
>any perceptual (or other) experience we may have. Slightly more is
>necessary to give us the basis of a value system and a morality, but you
>get the point: The *true* starting points are not up for grabs. There is no
>choice about them. They are *not* merely *assumed* according to taste.
No one said that starting points *were* "merely *assumed* according to
taste."
Chris' straw man goes from bad to worse! It is interesting how Chris hardly
ever deals with his opponent's actual argument but invents a straw man to
manipulate.
CC>They are axiomatic facts (as are contents of perceptual experiences, but in
>a different sense). Existence is an axiomatic fact. Even Phillip Johnson
>cannot deny that he exists and that *some* kind of world exists without
>blatantly contradicting himself in the process (since any statement one
>makes implicitly includes the statement "I exist," etc.). He also cannot
>logically argue for the falsehood of the law of identity. He cannot argue
>coherently that a thing is not what it in fact *is*. He also cannot deny
>coherently that he is conscious (at least in a primitive way).
Why would "Phillip Johnson" even *want to* "deny that he exists and that
*some* kind of world exists"? But then Chris has erected a straw man
"Phillip Johnson" so that Chris can get him to say what ever Chris wants
him to say, so that Chris can imagine to himself that he has `won' the
argument!
CC>Now, within any subject area, two people may, clearly, start from different
>premises. But, *if* these premises are simply *assumed*, without prior
>argumentation or cognitive validation, they cannot be trusted. If Phillip
>Johnson is merely *assuming* the existence of God, or that non-naturalistic
>claims do not have any burden of proof above and beyond ordinary scientific
>claims, then not only may we criticize any invalid logic leading from his
>starting points to his conclusions within the subject area, we may reject
>the premises as unsound, not validated.
I (and I presume "Phillip Johnson") assume (not "merely) "the existence of
God" as an ultimate fact, because it better fits *all* the evidence and makes
better sense of our whole existence and experience.
CC>In short, if Stephen Jones thinks he can excuse Phillip Johnson's
>egregiously bad arguments on the premise that Johnson is merely using a
>*different* set of initial premises from those his opponents use, Jones is
>seriously mistaken. *ALL* premises need to be validated, either directly or
>by logically strong argument from premises that *have* been validated
>directly. This applies even in a Popperian view of science, in that we may
>regard a theory as "validated" (for scientific purposes) if it has
>withstood sufficient testing (though it may *still* turn out to be wrong in
>some respect and have to be modified or replaced). This is why Gould and
>others agree that naturalistic evolutionary theory *could* in fact be
>wrong, but that, *given* the evidence and the testing, it is the *only*
>currently available theory (or class of theories) that we can reasonably
>accept. Gould is *not* merely starting from some arbitrarily *assumed*
>premises and then arguing to evolutionary theory as the conclusion. Phillip
>Johnson *is* doing this, precisely because he does *not* validate his
>premises. He does *not* show that the bizarre metaphysical claims of
>non-naturalist views can be accepted without proof or validation. He does
>*not* show that these premises are axiomatic.
See above re Chris' straw man. Johnson (and I) have no problem with
subjecting our ultimate Christian theistic premises to scrutiny and testing
against the evidence. That was a major part of Johnson's book "Reason in
the Balance".
But will Chris will allow *his* ultimate atheistic premises to scrutiny and
similar testing against the evidence *on a level playing field*? To date
Chris has continually demanded that his atheistic ultimate premises be
granted apriori default status.
This tells me that Chris is not confident that his ultimate premise: "there is
no God" is able to win against the Christian theist's ultimate premise "there
is a God".
CC>Scientifically, we know that there is a natural world, the world of daily
>experience for most of us, the world of rocks, trees, people, a long past,
>stars, galaxies, subatomic particles, and so on. We have amassed a *very*
>large amount of evidence for the existence of this world and for certain
>factual claims about it. Where is Johnson's *similarly* strong and massive
>evidence for a non-natural realm outside of the natural world?
No one is denying that "there is a natural world". But Chris assumes as part
of his ultimate premise that the "natural world" is *all* that there is.
The Christian theist assumes that "there is a natural world", but also
assumes that that there is also "a non-natural `world' outside of the natural
world".
The problem in Chris asking for evidence "for a non-natural realm outside
of the natural world" is that Chris has already denied that there *could* be
such evidence in his initial premise! So no amount of evidence "for a non-
natural realm outside of the natural world" would suffice for Chris.
In order to fairly evaluate the evidence for "a non-natural realm outside of
the natural world", Chris would need to at least adopt a position that there
*could be* "a non-natural realm outside of the natural world".
CC>Stephen Jones criticizes me for what he apparently regards as my attempt to
>"tilt" the "playing field" in favor of naturalism. Apparently he wants us
>to start from the supposition that the natural world is not known to exist,
>and then pose the following "leveled" version of the issue:
>Is there a natural world? Is there a non-natural world? Given some
>phenomenon, shouldn't we look for the cause in both the natural and the
>non-natural world?
No one is denying that "the natural world is not known to exist".
What Chris wants as the question-begged tilted "playing field" is the
"supposition that" *only* "the natural world" *does* "exist"!
CC>In this way, Jones seems to feel, we can "level" the playing field and
>demand that the naturalist provide proof for the existence of the natural
>world as well as demanding it of the non-naturalist.
See above. No one is demanding "that the naturalist provide proof for the
existence of the natural world". The question is about whether "the natural
world" is all that there is. The atheist assumes that it is, the theist that it
isn't.
That is, the theist assumes that there is a also supernatural `world', and can
provide evidence in support of his assumption. But the atheist cannot
accept the theist's evidence without contradicting his own assumption that
"the natural world" is all that there is.
CC>But, empirically, where would we look for evidence of a natural world, if
>not in the natural world to begin with?
See above. We are not looking for "evidence of a natural world" since
*both* the theist and atheist accept the existence "of a natural world".
What is in dispute is the existence of existence "of a" *super- "natural
world".
CC>Besides, as is often the case with the challenges and demands of Stephen
>Jones, the demand is made disingenuously. He already accepts the existence
>of the natural world, so why is he demanding proof of its existence? If he
>is merely demanding proof of evolution as a natural phenomena, and wants us
>to think that the theory that there is a non-natural explanation for it is
>just as tenable as the naturalistic one, then *he* is the one attempting to
>"tilt" the playing field, because he *first* must show that there *is* a
>non-natural world before he can start referencing it as a plausible basis
>for explaining the phenomena of life.
See above. I am not "demanding proof of its (the natural world's)
"existence". It would save everybody's time if Chris stopped erecting
straw men and dealt with his opponent's *real* arguments!
CC>Basically, he wants us to accept his metaphysical claims without
>validation, or as axioms. But, while a naturalistic view of Existence can
>be regarded as a "natural" conceptual development of the axiomatic fact
>that *some* kind of world exists *and* our life-long experience of that
>axiomatic world, the existence of a *non-natural* world cannot be so
>justified. It is *not* merely the filling in of details of "some" kind of
>world, thereby gradually making it into "this" kind of world, as naturalism
>is. The non-natural realm is not subject to knowable perception (that is,
>*if* we were to perceive it, we would not be able to distinguish that
>perception from a mere perception of some aspect of the natural world (such
>as our own brain state, perhaps). This is the big problem with all
>metaphysical claims made on the basis of mystical or religious experience.
>There is no *conceivable* experience that would not be instantly absorbable
>into a naturalistic view of the world.
No. I am happy to have my "metaphysical claims" (i.e. ultimate
assumptions) subject to scrutiny and testing against the evidence, as
long as Chris will allow the same for *his* ultimate assumptions.
CC>Naturalism is minimal; it assumes only the already-known natural world.
I do not even accept that "Naturalism is minimal; it assumes only the
already-known natural world" because Naturalism has a number of hidden
assumptions about the reality of one's mind, the reality of "the natural
world" and the ability of the human mind to truly understand the "the
natural world".
But the question is not only which metaphysical assumption is the more
"minimal" but which more adequately fits and explains the *whole* of
reality.
The Christian theist would argue that naturalism, while it might be
adequate to explain the ongoing operations of the existing physical world
(and even that is not granted totally), it is not adequate to explain the origin
of that physical world, nor the existence of transcendental, mental and
spiritual phenomena.
For example, is the statement: "Naturalism is minimal; it assumes only the
already-known natural world" *itself* part of the natural world?
CC>Non-naturalism is *maximal*; it claims *both* the existence of the natural
>world *and* the existence of *another* world, a world *beyond* the natural
>world.
The question is which assumption best fits and explains the *whole* of
reality? The Christian theist would argue that his position is the minimal
position that explains the whole of reality, and that the naturalist position is
too simplistic.
CC>And *that*, ladies and gentlemen, is why *it* has a special burden of
>proof, and why all of Jones' and Johnson's whining claims about
>"unfairness" is propaganda. *They* have chosen a position that requires a
>special burden of proof (because, unlike the natural world, no such proof
>of its existence has been pre-established). If I claimed that Santa Claus
>was literally *real*, would you let me get away with demanding that you
>prove that the non-Santa Claus world exists, and that we should look,
>instead, for non-Santa Claus explanations for the phenomena of Christmas?
Chris might as well use "Santa Claus" as a name for his straw man
caricature!
Chris just begs the question all the way through. His demand that his
atheistic assumption of reality has a privileged position before the
comparison of rival positions even begins is a sign of *weakness* of Chris'
position. If Chris' position is true, he would not have to insist on a tilted
playing field.
CC>No. We reject the Santa Claus explanation because: a) we have an adequate
>non-Santa Claus explanation, and b) there is no proof of the existence of
>Santa Claus *at all*, let alone proof for the particular claims of the
>Santa Claus explanation of Christmas phenomena, so that, even if we did
>*not* have an adequate non-Santa Claus explanation, we would not seriously
>consider the Santa Claus explanation.
No one is arguing for "Santa Claus". One of the marks of a weak position
is that it cannot fairly state the position of its rivals.
When I used to play tournament chess, a cardinal rule is that one always
counts on the *strongest* possible move by one's opponent, and then work
out how to counter it. If one counts on the weakest position of one's
opponent, then one is deluding oneself.
CC>If Stephen Jones wants us to accept his "Santa Claus" theory of the origin
>of the Universe, of life, and of the development of life on Earth, *HE* has
>the burden of proof. And he has this burden even if evidence showed that
>life *was* in fact designed, because, *rationally*, we'd be bound to take
>*only* naturalistic variants of design theory seriously until some evidence
>was found that had no *conceivable* naturalistic explanation.
See above.
That this sophistry does not even satisfy Chris is evident by his continual
insistence of having a tilted playing field and advancing spurious straw man
and question-begging arguments. If Chris was certain his position was the
correct one he would not need to resort to such tactics.
CC>Why? Partly because of the general burden of proof of non-naturalism as a
>metaphysical theory, and partly because all difficulties that might be
>attributed to a naturalistic theory would *also* necessarily apply to any
>non-naturalistic theory with the same claimed explanatory power.
Chris is sounding like a broken record. His demand that his ultimate
metaphysical assumption be granted privileged status I simply reject as
question-begging.
CC>Coming up in my next major post (probably): On the questions of the origin
>of the Universe, of Existence in general, and of God.
It is good to see that Chris actually has *other* arguments in favour of his
atheistic position! His demand for privileged status for his own position
was becoming downright *boring*!
Let's hope (against hope!) that these arguments on "the origin of the
Universe, of Existence in general, and of God" (based on Chris' ultimate
metaphysical *assumption* that "the natural world" is all there is), don't
depend crucially on straw man caricatures of rival positions and beg the
question in favour of Chris' position.
BTW, I note that Chris capitalises "Existence". Is this just a typo or does
Chris invest existence with all the ultimate metaphysical content that a
Christian theist does for God?
Steve
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"Yet even here, where Darwin's arguments are strongest, nagging
questions remain. For example, a reader of the Origin might be justified in
wondering what Creationist view Darwin is referring to. Perhaps this is a
problem more for the present-day reader. Darwin's contemporaries may
have known exactly what he meant, though I doubt it. Often the Creationist
position seems merely a straw man-set up only to be knocked down. The
constraints on space in the Origin, which led Darwin to abandon his
original intention of arguing on both sides of the mutability issue, add to
this feeling. The result is that the Creationist position is never clearly
defined in the Origin." (Gale B.G., "Evolution Without Evidence: Charles
Darwin and the Origin of Species," University of New Mexico Press:
Albuquerque NM, 1982, p.139)
Stephen E. Jones | sejones@iinet.net.au | http://www.iinet.net.au/~sejones
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