> Is science deterministic and
> impersonal? Or does it also involve contingency and the personal, such
> that our state of scientific knowledge would be different if certain
> scientists had not been born?
David replied:
>The positivist concept of science does appear to me to focus
>overmuch on the discovery of "truth",
It is interesting that the "discovery of truth" perspective is
at great tension with the sense of provisonalism, which is
supposed to be a crucial element of science. Exactly at
what point does a provisional claim become "truth
discovered?" That is, when does a claim stop being
tentative and start being dogma? I think this is a thorny
problem as I also think science is indeed capable of discovering
truth about the world, but exactly what criteria are met
that allow us to know we have indeed found the truth?
An inductive hypothesis, no matter how well it is supported,
is always possibly wrong. I would argue that to the
degree a question is about reproducible and directly
observable phenomena is the degree to which we can
abandon provisionalism (that the heart pumps blood
need not be viewed tentatively). But if we are dealing
with questions that rely strongly on layers of indirect
detection and assumptions, I think it would be deleterious
to abandon the important sense of provisionalism.
>to the neglect of the individuals
>and the community that are taking things forward.
·.is to neglect all kinds of intangibles that brought
so many scientific discoveries to fruition. For example,
not all scientists are equally creative and creativity and
imagination have played important roles in science.
>Part of the fascination of scientific biography is that we are brought
>face to face with real people, grappling with issues in a way that is
>intensely human.
Indeed. The positivistic perspective forgets that science
only happens because people make it happen. Science is
absolutely dependent on human beings and humans don't
cease being human beings upon becoming scientists.
I also think the positivistic perspective doesn't truly
appreciate just how contingent human history is (and
scientific history is just part of human history). If
we played back the tape of time to 1600, and then
restarted it, would science really be in the same place
it is today in this altered reality? I don't think so.
The positivists might argue it is objective reality
that is approached objectively that makes science
special and would thus guarantee we'd be in the same
place. Not only is this idealism, it ignores the simple
fact that not all scientists are equally intelligent,
equally knowledgeable, equally creative, equally helpful,
equally careful, and equally motivated. Differences
in these respects are human differences and science
is where it is because one specific combination of
all these traits existed at any one point in time.
And any single slight change in the combination
might have profound ripple effects.
For example, let's do a thought experiment. Let's
say Dr. X makes a very significant discovery that
serves as the foundation for many subsidiary discoveries.
But let's go back and imagine how Dr. X came to make
his discovery. Say he was hired at University X because
when he finished his post-doc, an opening appeared
at University X only because Dr Z decided to retire
earlier than planned due to illness. Thanks to Dr Z's
illness, Dr X is now at University X. While there,
he meets Dr Y who is quite creative and helpful.
Dr X and Y make friends and Dr Y is then able to
offer an crucial experimental suggestion to Dr X
(even though Y may not be working on the same
problem). Dr X is then able to incorporate this
suggestion into his approach and it turns out to
be an essential link in making his discovery.
Thus, all those subsidiary discoveries rely on
Dr X's discovery, which relied on Dr. Y's suggestion,
which came about because of Dr Y's creativity
and friendship, all made possible by Dr. Z's early
retirement due to illness.
Now imagine another possible universe, where
Dr. Z does not come down ill. When Dr X sends
out his 80 applications, he doesn't send any to
University X because they don't have an opening.
Instead, he gets hired at University Y, but at this
school, there is no Dr Y. Dr X thus continues to
work on his project, making minor discoveries,
but never making the compelling breakthrough
experiment that occurred in the other possible
universe.
>In reality. the agenda for science today is not the "quest for
>truth", but whether funding agencies can be persuaded to give
>priority to particular proposals. The decisions often relate to
>industrial involvement, economic benefit, public policy. etc.
Yes, this is an important point. While the quest for
truth and the need to obtain funding need not be
mutually exclusive, it does indicate that certain truths
will be ignored or dismissed if they don't hold
promise in terms of funding. Furthermore, the truth
that science investigates is influenced by the larger
political climate. In the early 1900s, the political
climate allowed science to express itself in the form
of eugenics. Today, this essentially cannot happen.
That is, even if, for example, "The Bell Curve" is scientifically
sound, science will shy away from this because science needs
scientists and scientists are unlikely to risk their funding
and ability to secure tenure to propagate politically
risking "truths."
>Del Ratzsch has a couple of excellent chapters on the philosophy of
>science in his book: "The Battle of beginnings" (IVP, 1996). This is
>a quote that I agree with and which seems relevant to this exchange:
"So our perceptions, theorising and evaluations of theories all seem
to have an inescapable human tinge to them. And given the significant
interflow among those various components, human tinges in any one of
the areas have at least the potential to seep into other areas as
well. Thus we cannot eliminate humanness from science (as
inductivists wanted to do), nor can we quarantine that humanness in
one small corner of science (as hypothetico-deductivists wanted to
do). Science is done by humans, and it cannot escape what is
inescapably human. Our science is limited to humanly available
concepts, humanly available data, humanly available patterns of
reasoning, humanly shaped notions of understanding and explanation,
and humanly structured pictures of what the world must be like. How
could it be otherwise? Science seems to have a serious and incurable
case of the humans". (page 129).
This is an excellent quote! The excesses of the positivists
becomes apparent when they take a human endeavor and
persuade themselves it is not human. Did you ever notice
how often "science says" or "science shows" is used rather
than "scientists think/believe?" It's as if there is some
entity independent of human beings that is supposed to be
dishing out "truth." Ironically, the positivist approach itself
is thoroughly human also. Humans have a long history of
needing an Authority that provides Truth. In the past, this
urge has expressed itself in the adherence to religious leaders,
holy books, and monarchies. In modern culture, this urge
needs a different outlet and finds its home on the polls
of the democracy and the "findings" of science. Since many
positivists look to Science like the medieval man looked to
Scripture, Science *must be* an objective, other-than-human,
Authority and attempts to outline how human science is
will be reacted to as many religious people reacted to
the idea the Bible was a human book.
Mike