Dear Kevin,
We both seem to acknowlege this debate is going the way of "Yes it is!
No it isn't!!" So as you suggest at the end, perhaps we should just
agree to disagree. Though it seems a pity, for I feel that you are
unable to apreciate the points I am making. And obviously from your
language, you feel that I am unable to see the points you are making.
What can be done? On my part all I can say is, that I endevour to be
open minded to others views, while remaining committed to intellectual
integrity.
In explaining why you think the debate is going the way it is, you
say:
> At the risk of sounding like a bullying elitist authoritarian
> hell-bent on forcing you to accept his point-of-view as the only
> true reality, I am not defending my own personal philosophy, but I
> am trying to explain what is generally considered to be biological
> fact. As such, for me, the debate is not about who has the better
> philosophical argument, but about whether you are willing to believe
> that what I am saying is true.
I am perfectly willing to consider your arguments, and change my views
if I believe you have demonstrated them to be wrong. I would hope
that you too would approach the debate with the same flexibility. If
my (philosophical) argument is better, to the extent that it shows
that you are wrong, surely you would be willing to accept it? To go
into an argument with ones only allowable purpose being to show them
that "what one is saying is true", is not wise. How are we to learn
if we do not allow the possibility of correction?
You go on to say:
> Because whether you recognize it or not, this debate is the
> biological equivolent of arguing over whether the sky is blue. It's
> all well and fine to have a powerful philosophical argument for why
> the sky is not blue and cannot be blue, but such an argument is
> irrelevant to the scientific fact that the sky is indeed blue.
Well, no I don't accept that the argument is like debating whether the
sky is blue. And your next point makes it sound like philosophy and
science are detached entities, the former having no bearing upon
reality. Not so at all. If science truly does demonstrate that the
sky is blue, then any philosophical argument to the contrary is weak,
not powerful.
But perhaps this is really what you are trying to say anyway. I
accept the strength of scientific evidence where it really does have
strength. And you acknowledge this when you write:
> at the end of your last post you stated, "If science really does
> demonstrate what you say it does then you would be correct, but I
> doubt very much that it does." In other words, you are not willing
> to accept that what I say is true. That is fine with me, but I find
> your reasons disturbing from a scientific point of view.
As to why you find my reasons disturbing, you go on to say:
> One reason is that you place philosophical argument over evidence
> and fact; that is, you appear to be arguing that philosophical
> argument is more important than fact, such that if the facts
> contradict philosophy, philosophy must take precidence.
Well I don't accept this. As I said above, if scientific evidence
contradicts philosophical argument then the latter is wrong. Science
and philosophy are not two separate streams with independent
conclusions. To arrive at truth, both must work with and utilise the
other. [On a minor point, I suggest you distinguish "scientific
evidence" from "fact". The latter is what is in fact true, whereas
the former is evidence (possibly strong) for truth.] Getting back to
the point, you argue for your view of my misuse of philosophy by
quoting me thus:
> > Let's take your example of the world revolving around the sun.
> > If I spent the time, I could write down two mathematical models.
> > One which described the motion of the planets in terms of a fixed
> > sun. Another which described the motion of the planets and the
> > sun in terms of a fixed earth. Both models would match the
> > scientific data equally well, because the models would be related
> > to each other by an invertible mathematical transformation.
But you will notice that my argument is about whether science really
draws the conclusions you say it does. I go on later to show that it
does, but only with the help of occam's razor, a philosophical
principle. My point was to show the interrelationship of philosophy
and science, not that one should somehow accept philosophy at the
expense of science.
Now you then proceed to argue that heliocentricity is more than just a
question of occam's razor, arguments which I will address shortly, but
I hope you can see that the purpose of my argument was not to deny
science its rightful place, but rather to show the close connections
between science and philosophy.
Now let's look at the helio/geo-centricity debate.
> According to Newtonian mechanics, for one object to hold another
> object in ordit around itself, the first object must have a
> gravitational field powerful enough to overcome the second object's
> inertia. Since the strength of a gravitational field is
> proportional to mass, this means that the first object must have a
> mass equal to or greater than the second object. A fixed sun model
> accounts for this fact easily, because the sun is accepted to have a
> mass greater than all the rest of the material in the solar system
> combined.
>
> How would a fixed earth model account for this fact? There are only
> two ways it can. The first is to assume the existence of a force
> that can counter gravity, so that the less massive earth could hold
> the sun and all the rest of the material in the solar system in
> orbit around it despite their far greater inertias and gravitational
> strengths. Where is the evidence for such an "antigravity" force?
>
> The second is to assume that the sun and all the planets have a
> combined mass that is equal to or less than that of the earth.
You then go on to argue, convincingly, against this second scenario.
I certainly have no disagreement with Newtonian mechanics (Einsteinian
questions ignored) or with the fact that mass of the sun is primarily
responsible for the motions within the solar system we see. My
disagreement with you is over whether this can be used to argue
against the geocentric perspective, or rather, on what grounds this
may be done.
In Newtonian mechanics the "nice" reference frames are _inertial_
reference frames. But it is possible to have non-inertial reference
frames. All of Newton's laws work happily in a non-inertial reference
frame, but you do need the inclusion of a non-inertial reference frame
force. This would be the "antigravity" force you refer to. I can use
a non-inertial reference frame for my geocentric model, and Newton's
law of universal gravitation would work very nicely in explaining the
motion of the bodies within our solar system. What is the evidence
for this "antigravity" force? My evidence is the fact that my model,
which includes this force, does very well in matching the experimental
data.
So we have two models, one heliocentric, one geocentric, which match
the experimental data equally well. How do we choose between them?
Well, by using Occam's razor. The geocentric model is more complex,
not only because the description of orbits is more complex, but also
because mechanics within a non-inertial frame description is more
complex than within an inertial frame (namely it requires the
inclusion of an extra force).
And this was my point, that heliocentricity is not simply a scientific
fact, but actually requires the philosophical underpinnings of Occam's
razor.
You finish this point with:
> My point, however, should be clear: no matter how philosophically
> "perfect" a claim is, if it contradicts known facts it should be
> discarded. The question before us therefore boils down to whether
> you accept the facts as real.
I hope you can now see what I am saying. Certainly I agree that any
philosophically "perfect" claim which contradicts the facts should be
discarded. My argument above was that it is possible to have two
scientific models (one heliocentric, one geocentric) which match the
facts (experimental data) equally well. In such situations either you
need to design new experiments which will be able to distinguish
between the models (which I doubt will be possible here) or you need
to invoke some philosophical principle, such as Occam's razor (which
is what we generally do).
It seems where we differ here, is about whether one can in fact
distinguish between a geocentric and heliocentric model based on
experimental evidence, for you write:
> In point of fact, all I would need to do is exactly what I did
> above: present evidence that a fixed earth model cannot account for,
> but which a fixed sun model can. Yet your above paragragh indicates
> that you would ignore such evidence in favor of your "philosophical
> reasons for wanting to accept the 'earth centric' model"; in other
> words, in this case at least, you seem to be suggesting that
> philosophy is more important, or at least more convincing, than
> physical evidence.
Hopefully I have explained why a geocentric and heliocentric model may
both account for the scientific data equally well. If you could
demonstrate that there is some physical evidence for which only the
heliocentric model accounts, then I would accept the heliocentric
model without needing to resort to additional philosophical reasoning.
So I am not saying that philosophy is more important and more
convincing than physical evidence. I am saying that philosophy and
physical evidence work together hand in hand (not in competition), and
that in situations where physical evidence fails to distinguish
between models, we must resort to philosophy.
> This is what I find disturbing.
Hopefully you are no longer disturbed, as I am not arguing that
philosophy should ignore or overide physical evidence.
You ended here with:
> Acceptance of the heliocentric model is based on physical evidence, not
> Occam's razor or any other philosophical argument.
I hope I have explained above how by modelling the solar system
mechanics using a non-inertial reference frame, one may present a
geocentric model which accounts for the physical evidence. Hence
Occam's razor or some other philosophical principle is needed. If you
can provide physical evidence for which a geocentric model can not
account, then I will gladly change my view on this, but so far I
cannot think of any.
And now we start moving back towards the original debate about
cellular death:
> > Now it just happens to be the case that I do not have
> > philosophical reasons for wanting the "earth centric" model, so I
> > am quite happy to take the occam's razor choice of the "sun
> > centric" model. However I do have philosophical reasons for
> > considering organism death to be not identical to cellular death.
>
> Exactly my point. Since you place philosophical argument over
> physical evidence, I doubt there is any kind of evidence I could
> present that would convince you of the truth.
You will now have seen that I do place physical evidence in high
standing. My argument here was, that given that physical evidence
couldn't help us, and that we needed to resort to the philosophical
occam's razor, any other philosophical principle also has a right to
be heard. That is, if physical evidence doesn't distinguish between
the models, then our only hope is that philosophical argument will.
In the geo/helio-centric debate it seems to me that Occam's razor is
the sensible tool to use, but I could imagine someone with different
philosophical views wishing to disagree with me.
> Yet, just as the heliocentric model, or the color of the sky, is
> established by physical evidence and not philosophical argument, so
> too is the equality of organism death with cell death established by
> physical evidence and not philosophical argument. Your
> "philosophical reasons" are irrelevant in the face of physical
> evidence. I'm sorry, but that is simply the way it is.
But that isn't the way it is. I think I have established that the
question of heliocentricity is different to the question of the sky
being blue. The former does hinge on philosophical argument. So too
are philosophical arguments important when considering the notion of
organism death and cell death being identical.
> > From what you are saying it would seem that you wish to redefine
> > everyday understanding of animal/human death. You need to
> > therefore either demonstrate where this understanding conflicts
> > with science, or present philosophical reasons for rejecting this
> > understanding.
>
> It is not a matter of redefining "everyday understanding of
> animal/human death", but of pointing out that "everyday
> understanding" is wrong and needs to be replaced by scientific
> definition. And you already admit that this scientific definition
> conflicts with "everyday understanding", so I don't need to
> demonstrate it. All that remains is whether you are willing to
> accept the physical evidence that establishes the superiority of the
> scientific definition over "everyday understanding" or whether you
> prefer to cling to philosophical arguments that contradict known
> scientific fact.
You believe the "everyday understanding" of death is wrong and needs
replacing, which is effectively the same thing as saying you wish to
redefine it. I wouldn't say that everyday understanding of death
_conflicts_ with a scientific understanding (where scientific
understanding equates to "massive cellular death"). I would say they
are different yet compatible with each other. It depends on the
context as to which is more useful. I do not know of any physical
evidence that differentiates between the scientific notion of death
and the "everyday" one. So it is not a case of me clinging to
philosophical arguments contradicting known scientific fact. If you
can show me such physical evidence then I will have to change my view.
Next you express the following concern:
> Another reason I am disturbed is your suggestion that when "other
> realms" make claims about physical reality, that science cannot be
> used to correct those claims. For example:
>
> > Well, it's not entirely clear to me what "from a biological point
> > of view" really means. But I could possibly accept that for some
> > purposes in biology, viewing "organism death" to be simply
> > "massive cellular death" could be a useful perspective. But this
> > does not permit you to automatically translate such a perspective
> > to other realms, for example, theology. When making a
> > theological statement like "there was no animal death before the
> > fall", the biological perspective you propound might not be
> > appropriate.
Rest assured, that if any "other realms", like theology, make claims
about physical reality, then certainly I believe science has every
right to endevour to correct those claims. So no, your above
assessment of my meaning was not my meaning at all. What I was
saying, is that just because "massive cellular death" may be a useful
notion of death in biology, doesn't mean that you can assume it to be
the _only_ notion of death, and therefore force this definition to be
used in theological statements like "there was no animal death before
the fall".
Now it's important for me to be clear here. Science may, in the right
circumstances, be used to attack such a statement, but it has to be
careful about how it does so. It may be that, in making this
statement, the person means more than "massive cellular death", but
not less than it. That is, "massive cellular death" makes up part of
their conception of death. In this case, scientific evidence that
massive cellular death must have occured pre-fall, will be evidence
against the statement. The important point I was making was that one
should not automatically assume that a theological statement involving
"death", must be talking about "massive cellular death" in isolation.
> > > Besides, "everyday understanding" is not the criterion by which
> > > "logical consistency" is judged, since logic can and often does
> > > contradict "everyday understanding". Take the following
> > > syllogism for example: All elephants are pink; Nellie is an
> > > elephant; therefore Nellie must be pink. According to
> > > "everyday understanding" elephants are not pink, but in fact it
> > > is logically consistent to claim that Nellie must be pink since
> > > she is an elephant and according to the syllogism all elephants
> > > are pink. So if "logical consistency" can contradict "everyday
> > > understanding", then "everyday understanding" is not a valid
> > > method by which to determine whether a scientific conclusion is
> > > logically consistent.
> >
> > In your example, "everyday understanding" has nothing to say
> > about the logical validity of the syllogism, and so you would be
> > right not to judge "logical consistency" through "everyday
> > understanding", but this is a different context from the one in
> > which I was arguing.
>
> You missed my point, which was that "everyday understanding" did
> indeed have something to say about the "logical validity of the
> syllogism", namely that since elephants are not pink, to claim that
> they are invalidates the logic of the syllogism.
But the syllogism doesn't claim that "elephants are pink" in
isolation. It claims that "if elephants are pink and Nellie is an
elephant", __then__ "Nellie is pink" (by definition of syllogism).
The logical validity of this claim has nothing to do with whether
elephants are in fact pink, but rather, pertains to the internal
connections between the statements. As such, I repeat, "everyday
understanding" has nothing to say about the logical validity of the
syllogism.
But perhaps what you are getting at is that, given everyday
__misunderstanding__ about what a syllogism is, people might think
they can use their experience to determine its validity, even though
it is inappropriate. This seems to be what you are saying here:
> In other words, "everyday understanding" is being used to determine
> the validity of a logical argument. You recognize in this case that
> using "everyday understanding" in this fashion is inappropriate.
> What you do not seem to recognize is that using "everyday
> understanding" in a similar fashion to determine the validity of
> scientific arguments is also inappropriate.
Well certainly, if someone were to __misunderstand__ the nature of
scientific reasoning, and apply their everyday experience in an
inappropriate way while reasoning scientifically, then sure, it would
be inappropriate. But again, my argument was in a different context,
as I explained below. But let me add to this. You have been
attempting to use science to invalidate the theological claim that
"there was no death before the fall". Before science can investigate
this claim, it needs to know what is theologically meant by "death"
here, and "everyday understanding" may well shed some light on this
matter.
> > The point I was making was that it is logically inconsistent to,
> > on the one hand claim that animal/human death is the same as
> > cellular death, and at the same time make real use of the more
> > extensive everyday notion of animal/human death. To be
> > consistent with your position you should refuse to make use of
> > everyday notions of death, except perhaps in the process of
> > pointing out that these notions are invalid. I would be very
> > surprised if you did this, for example I imagine if a good friend
> > died young, you would be willing to talk of his hopes and dreams
> > dying --- notions not associated with cellular death.
>
> This description of "logical consistency" is also inappropriate. It
> is in fact perfectly consistent to accept the biological fact that
> organism death and cellular death are the same while simultaneously
> discussing philosophical implications of human death. The reason is
> because these are separate concepts. The idea of "hopes and dreams
> dying" is a subjective, emotional, philosophical concept that has no
> counterpart in biology, but because it has no counterpart it also
> doesn't invalidate the clear biological evidence that organism death
> is the same as cellular death. Hopes and dreams die when the
> organism dies, but the organism doesn't die until its cells die.
> The fact that "hopes and dreams dying" is not associated with
> cellular death is irrelevant to the scientific question of whether
> cellular death is the same as organism death.
Before I address the substance of your argument here, let me state
that even from a biological point of view, organism death is the same
as "massive cellular death in an organism", not the same as "cellular
death". You can have cells of an organism die without the whole
organism dying.
Now to the substance. For the sake of the argument here, let me
accept that the death of hopes and dreams are "philosophical
implications of human death" rather than part of the concept of human
death itself, though it seems strange that something could be a
"philosophical implication" without being part of the concept itself.
So what are we left with? Well we have two concepts. One concept
which has these "philosophical implications" (organism death) and one
concept which doesn't (cellular death). How can these two concepts be
the same if they have different philosophical implications?
> > > You should also remember that Glenn began this thread by
> > > describing a specific biological mechanism that controls when
> > > and how cells die, not by describing a general philosophical
> > > principle of what he believed death to be. As such, this has
> > > been a scientific discussion from the start. You are
> > > attempting to interject philosophical arguments into a
> > > scientific discussion; this is inappropriate because in science
> > > validity is determined by empirical evidence, and there is no
> > > evidentiary support for the claim that organism life is
> > > different from cellular life.
> >
> > Glenn began this thread by discussing biological mechanisms of
> > cellular death, arguing first that cellular death is an integral
> > part of life, necessitating its existence before the fall, and
> > second that therefore the YECs are wrong to claim there was no
> > death before the fall. The problem with this argument is that
> > many YECs I imagine (and certainly me if I were arguing the YEC
> > position) would see the statement "no death before the fall" as
> > referring to animal/human death, not cellular death. Glenn
> > himself recognized this in his initial email and argued,
> > unsuccessfully I believe, against it.
>
> This does not contradict what I said.
Yes it does. You were suggesting that this was a "scientific
discussion from the start" as opposed to a philosophical one, and that
I was wrong to "interject philosophical arguments into a scientific
discussion". Above I was pointing out that, although Glenn did invoke
science in his argument, fundamentally the discussion has been a
philosophical one from the start, for we have been examining the
philosophical (theological) claim, that there was "no death before the
fall".
> Glenn discussed a known biological mechanism to support his
> argument; he did not use philosophical arguments. My point is that
> you are introducing philosophical arguments into what is essentially
> a scientific argument: knowing that organism death is the same as
> cellular death, and knowing that there is a biological mechanism of
> ontological development that depends upon cellular death, if there
> was no organism death before the Fall there could be no cellular
> death either, and as a result there would have been no ontological
> development either.
While it's true Glenn did not use philosophical arguments when
explaining the biological mechanism of cellular death, he did however
use philosophical arguments when attempted to apply this biological
mechanism to the theological question of "was there death before the
fall?" He argued that cellular death and animal/human death are one
and the same, which is a philosophical argument. And I'm sure you
disagree with this last sentence, but it is the truth, because those
who disagree with Glenn and you, disagree with you at the
philosophical level (or at least my disagreement is at this level).
With regard to the remainder of your paragraph, the argument presented
is effective in showing that cellular death before the fall must have
been present if pre-fall biology was anything like today's biology.
There is a conceptual difference however, between animal/human death,
and cellular death. What is the relationship between animal/human
death, and cellular death? This is a question that involves both
philosophy and science. You are trying to apply science to a
theological question, which is perfectly reasonable, but you shouldn't
think that by doing so you are allowed to shut out theological and
philosophical reasoning.
> > The point in dispute is a philosophical one, not a scientific
> > one, and so you are wrong to say that this has been a scientific
> > discussion from the start. Fundamentally it is a theological
> > discussion ("Was there death before the fall?") and the tools of
> > science and philosophy have been used to try and tackle the
> > question. It is certainly not a case of me trying to "interject
> > philosophical arguments into a scientific discussion".
> > Philosophical questions were at stake right from the beginning.
> > By all means invoke science where appropriate, but science
> > shouldn't be used to answer questions that science doesn't
> > address.
>
> The problem is that you are wrong. This was a scientific
> discussion from the start; that it had theological overtones does
> not invalidate this. You have consistently ignored the science in
> favor of philosophical arguments, apparently because you feel they
> are more important than physical evidence. Yet the philosophical
> questions are largely irrelevant and serve only to confuse what is
> otherwise a straightforward issue: is organism death independent of
> cellular death.
The centre of this whole debate is over the YEC claim that there was
no death before the fall. This is a theological position. So to
refute it is not simply a scientific discussion with "theological
overtones". Glenn was refuting a theological position, using mainly
science, but also a bit of philosophy, as his tools.
I am not ignoring science, I am assessing how relevant this scientific
evidence is, and if it is relevant, in what way. This assessment is a
philosophical one. Logic (philosophy) tells me that: if it is true
that cellular death implies that organism death must occur, and if
pre-fall biology had to be basically the same as current biology, then
animal/human death had to occur before the fall. Having established
this, I then must first examine whether cellular death occuring really
does imply organism death occuring. This is largely a scientific
question, but notice that I have distinguished cellular death from
organism death. If you want to claim that cellular death is in fact
the same thing as organism death, then you have brought philosophy
back into the discussion. Second I must examine how closely our
"humanness" or animals "animalness" is linked with today's biology.
This question involves philosophy, science and theology. "What is the
essence of humanness?", a question to which both philosophy and
science have something to say. Can we envisage a biology which is
different from today, which gives rise to the same
humanness/animalness? As to the role of theology: given that we
believe theologically that we will have new bodies in heaven, couldn't
it be that we could have had different bodies pre-fall?
I hope you can see that I am not ignoring science in favour of
philosophy, but rather, using philosophy to determine how best to
apply science.
[End of part 1]
_/~~~~~~~~\___/~~~~~~\____________________________________________________
____/~~\_____/~~\__/~~\__________________________Mark_Phillips____________
____/~~\_____/~~\________________________________mark@ist.flinders.edu.au_
____/~~\HE___/~~\__/~~\APTAIN_____________________________________________
____/~~\______/~~~~~~\____________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
"They told me I was gullible ... and I believed them!"