Because if it is determined, it isn't a choice. Predetermined choice makes
no sense.
>You have the ultimate burden of proof here; the theory that the brain >can
>handle it is a minimalist theory; supernaturalism goes enormously >beyond
>it, because WHATEVER is doing the choosing faces ALL of the >same
>information processing requirements in either case, and would >necessarily
>also be just as deterministic (since the concept of >indeterministic
>causation is a logical contradiction).
Why so? Why does whatever does the choosing have to be deterministic?
Perhaps whatever does the choosing selects between two undetermined choices
and then determines what humans do. The causation is determined but the
choice isn't necessarily.
>you have to show how there can be an "interface" between it and the >human
>body that doesn't violate the law of conservation of energy, >and that can
>possibly work in a brain where, even at the microscopic >level, no one has
>ever found a sub-organ that could be the interface >mechanism between the
>physical realm and the supernatural.
How do you know that last? Before we know how to study the supernatural (IF
we ever do) we can't make claims about the possibilities for interfaces
between them. Why shouldn't the brain be an interface?
>All I have to do, basically, is prove that the brain is sufficiently
> >complex as to be able to support the comparison of two or more
> >alternatives and cause the body to act to implement whichever
> >alternative appears best.
Then do so.
>Finally, let me point out that even something as simple as a
>
What were you going to say here? It looks like you planned to come back to
this and forgot.
>One of my main rules is: Theories should stay close to the evidence.
The problem here is that so many people see their theories as quite close to
the evidence. How do you determine closeness?
>The supernaturalist's corresponding rule seems to be: Take a little >bit of
>evidence and then leap to the hugest and most bizarre possible
>conclusion that might account for the evidence.
Really? How do you measure whether a conclusion is far away or near the
evidence? Do you have a 'ruler' for this?
>>choice
[snip]
>In fact, if it IS indeterministic, it LOWERS it's survival value, >because
>it then becomes a LESS reliable comparison process.
How so?
>Jason
>>That's different than your original assertion. It implied there >>isn't
>>any design, and so anyone who thinks design exists is merely
>> >>disillusioned.
>
>Chris
>I assume the word you want here is "delusional." But I'm inclined to agree,
>because it is a kind of delusion that it is viable to accept beliefs
>without
>sufficient cognitive basis to justify them. If you believe in the Easter
>Bunny but have no evidence for its existence, isn't that delusional?
Yeah, I was thinking of that word, but trying to find another word that
carried less connotative baggage.
But anyway. With your last sentence you make what I would say is a true
statement. However you implicitly try to associate this with
supernaturalism. We then get to the discussion of what evidence is. Most who
believe in a supernatural realm would say they have evidence but I suspect
you wouldn't consider whatever it is they would put forward as valid.
>Jason
>>Claiming that design is either proven OR disproven is wrong, as has >>been
>>stated many times before on this list.
>Chris
>Well, it cannot be absolutely disproven because we cannot absolutely
> >exclude the possibility that the designer is not only a designer, but
> >for some reason seeks to hide his interventionism. What we can do,
> >however, is show that there is no APPARENT design, from a scientific >or
>philosophical perspective.
How do you propose to do that? What is the definition of "apparent design"
you use to show that none exists? Simply producing a scientific possibility
for everything doesn't mean that it wasn't designed that way.
>We could make up millions of such theories, and not be able to >absolutely
>DISPROVE any of them. What makes them delusional is that >there is no sense
>in believing them. They are silly theories that >serve no cognitive
>function.
So how do you measure whether there is sense in believing something? Those
who DO believe what you would call silly theories are quite serious and
think they are indeed sensical.
>>facts to rule out design?
>The fact that the theory does not imply any "test" facts, or any that >are
>not implied by naturalistic theory, or that it implies new facts >that turn
>out to not to be the case, or that it is NOT, in fact able >to account for
>the complexity of the world, etc.
Support these please, especially the last 2.
>Chris
>No. You do not have to disprove all the trillions of theories that >could
>be made up by over-active imaginations. You can discount it the >instant it
>turns out to be in a category that is outside the scope of >the type of
>evidence available, once it is shown to be not usefully >predictive, or
>simply because we have simpler alternatives that do >the work it is
>supposed to do. Occam's Razor, again.
Again, how do you judge between theories that are out of the scope of
currently available evidence. If they are, doesn't that mean you simply
cannot prove nor disprove them? How do you know astounding evidence might
appear next week or year or decade that supports them entirely? Simply
because no current evidence applies to something doesn't mean it is or isn't
true.
>Jason
>>Anyway, we have to make assumptions in all we do. Everything we >>think we
>>know is based on assumptions. (true, some more rational >>than others)
>Chris
>Can you prove that, or is it just an assumption?
Of course it's an assumption! :) But then, how rational is it?
>If you poke yourself in the eye with a knitting needle, do you need >to
>collect together some assumptions to know that you are in pain? I >think
>not.
This is also easy to refute with assumptions. You assume you think
correctly. But I see what you mean. However, I was referring mostly to
science with my claim. Research is done under certain conditions, so the
results are: given (assuming) these conditions, this results. Now, enough
research may be done to show that a certain result is probable under ANY
conditions, but the assumptions are still there.
>Chris
>it and the trillions of other theories in the same category should be
> >ruled out as far as real candidates for truth because they have >nothing
>to make them viable as compared to naturalistic theories.
What basis do you have to put all these in the same category?
>Again, let me remind you that Occam's Razor applies to all theories, >not
>just to naturalistic theories.
So? Occam's Razor depends on what is considered evidence. If design is
considered evidence and a theory is formed by stating design is everywhere,
then given the evidence it may indeed be the simplest explanation. You have
to agree on what is evidence before applying Occam's Razor.
Cya,
Jason
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