Chris
>>Well, yes and no. The question with respect to the computer is: How >does
>>it choose? Is that PROCESS of choosing supernatural? Does it go >beyond
>>naturalism? Clearly not. Suppose a computer was programmed >with
everything
>>EXCEPT how to process one choice, and suppose we let >cosmic rays hitting
a
>>detector determine how that choice was to be >carried out. Are you then
>>going to claim that the cosmic ray was >supernatural, or that it was
>>choosing in some supernatural way? Or >what?
Jason
>The choice would still be predetermined exactly, depending who CHOSE to
>allow the detecting to begin when. The cosmic rays are predetermined,
>whether or not the operator knows where they actually are at the time. It's
>still operator choice. You're somewhat missing my point. Computers don't
>choose. Not at all. They do what they are programmed to, that's all.
Chris
Yes. As a computer programmer, I'm well aware of that. What they are often
programmed to do is CHOOSE: They are programmed to evaluate various
alternatives and select the one that seems best given the standards and data
they have to work with. You appear to be, without visible reason for doing
so, implying that choice must necessarily be indeterministic. WHY?
Chris
>>No: The fact is that what's in a computer is not supernatural, and >that
>>the question of how it got there is a DIFFERENT question (as the >cosmic
>>ray example shows). If you want to support a claim that choice >is
>>supernatural, you have to show that ordinary brain functions can't >do it.
>>Since we know, almost as well as we CAN know such things, that >the brain
>>CAN do it, and that, WHEN it does it, there is no apparent >external
>>intervention, the introduction of supernaturalism is >superfluous, like
>>introducing supernaturalism to explain why a person >smashed to a pulp
>>against a wall by a speeding car is a DEAD person.
Jason
>But how it got there again determines exactly what results from it,
>therefore returning the element of choice a level up: to the programmer and
>operator. Now, how do you know brain functions are sufficient to choose?
I'm
>not saying they are or aren't, but I think the burden of proof is on you,
as
>you're making the positive claim (that the brain can choose).
Chris
Any neurologist can explain it to you, but basically, this is simply the
minimalist interpretation of one of the brain's functions. We know very well
that the brain is complex enough to support comparison of multiple chunks of
information (such as the chunk of information about going right, and the
chunk of information about going left) and "settle" on one or the other,
thus resulting in corresponding physical action.
You have the ultimate burden of proof here; the theory that the brain can
handle it is a minimalist theory; supernaturalism goes enormously beyond it,
because WHATEVER is doing the choosing faces ALL of the same information
processing requirements in either case, and would necessarily also be just
as deterministic (since the concept of indeterministic causation is a
logical contradiction). By positing some supernatural "thingy," you don't
SOLVE the problem so much as RELOCATE it to the supernatural realm, with an
even LARGER burden of proof. You have to prove that it's possible, and you
have to show how IT can make non-deterministic choices any better than a
brain or a computer can, and so on. PLUS, you have to show how there can be
an "interface" between it and the human body that doesn't violate the law of
conservation of energy, and that can possibly work in a brain where, even at
the microscopic level, no one has ever found a sub-organ that could be the
interface mechanism between the physical realm and the supernatural. Or, if
you claim that no such interface is necessary, you have to prove that the
supernatural can interface with the brain (or whatever) WITHOUT such an
interface. All I have to do, basically, is prove that the brain is
sufficiently complex as to be able to support the comparison of two or more
alternatives and cause the body to act to implement whichever alternative
appears best. Since I claim that determinism is true, I don't have to worry
about positing exceptions to basic laws of logic and causation; you DO
(ANOTHER burden of proof).
Finally, let me point out that even something as simple as a
Do you see now why I say that the theory that the brain does the required
(and deterministic) information processing is a minimalist theory?
(Minimalist theories are among my favorites. I don't believe in multiplying
conceptual and/or posited metaphysical entities beyond cognitive
necessity -- or at least beyond cognitive usefulness. Since naturalism seems
to cover all the bases needed from a metaphysics, I see no reason to posit
any form of supernaturalism.) It also gives me an advantage in debating,
because nearly views opposing mine require RADICALLY different and stronger
evidence than mine. One of my main rules is: Theories should stay close to
the evidence. The supernaturalist's corresponding rule seems to be: Take a
little bit of evidence and then leap to the hugest and most bizarre possible
conclusion that might account for the evidence.
Jason
>"no apparent external intervention" -- maybe there is simply inapparent
>external intervention that we haven't noticed.
Chris
Could be, but the person who makes such claims has the burden of proof (not
to mention the burden of positing a source for that intervention that is
logically possible).
Chris
>>Choice is not a mysterious process, nor is its existence.
Jason
>No? Do you know why it exists? Or how it came to exist? I'd say it's quite
>mysterious.
Chris
Here's my hypothesis as to why it exits (I'd call it something stronger, but
I don't want to
devote twenty pages to supporting the stronger claims): It exists because of
its tremendous survival value.
Here's my hypothesis as to how it came about, with a little preliminary
information.
In a sense, even a single neuron can make a choice, because it can accept
both excitatory and inhibitory information from different dendrites and
"decide" whether to fire or not on the basis of that mix of information
signals. But even simpler systems can make decisions of a sort: A
single-celled organism that is phototropic but also sensitive to some
harmful chemical may face the "choice" of whether to go toward light and
thus also go to an area of higher concentration of the chemical, OR to back
away from the chemical but also move into darkness.
These examples are not, of course, choices in the human sense, but they are
precursors of choice, and they serve the same basic biological function: to
balance alternative course of actions and attempt to respond optimally for
the organism. Those organisms that can make these choices most often
correctly tend to be the ones whose genes are passed on.
When the brain becomes complex enough to be aware of THINGS in the
environment, the process involves many brain cells, but the basic mechanism
is the same: comparison of alternatives and acting on the (apparent) best
alternative. No indeterminism need apply. In fact, if it IS indeterministic,
it LOWERS it's survival value, because it then becomes a LESS reliable
comparison process.
Chris
>>>Care to verify the links between all of these and the assertion they
>>are
>>>illusions? (specifically the irreducible complexity and design >>in
>>>nature)
Chris
>>Sure, though I thought it was obvious: They are linked by the fact of
>>"seeing" things that are not there, or not actually shown to be there >by
>>what is seen. Claiming that the mere appearance of a "Virgin >Mary"-like
>>water stain is a supernatural event, claiming that every >car-horn beep is
>>someone sending messages to one, claiming that >molecular structures prove
>>design, etc., are all instances of grossly >out-of-rational-bounds
>>interpretation, of imputing that the evidence >is evidence of something
far
>>beyond what it can possibly be rational >evidence of.
Jason
>That's different than your original assertion. It implied there isn't any
>design, and so anyone who thinks design exists is merely disillusioned.
Chris
I assume the word you want here is "delusional." But I'm inclined to agree,
because it is a kind of delusion that it is viable to accept beliefs without
sufficient cognitive basis to justify them. If you believe in the Easter
Bunny but have no evidence for its existence, isn't that delusional?
Jason
>Claiming that design is either proven OR disproven is wrong, as has been
>stated many times before on this list.
Chris
Well, it cannot be absolutely disproven because we cannot absolutely exclude
the possibility that the designer is not only a designer, but for some
reason seeks to hide his interventionism. What we can do, however, is show
that there is no APPARENT design, from a scientific or philosophical
perspective.
We ALSO cannot conclusively disprove that little green gremlins don't live
on the other side of the Moon, gremlins that disappear whenever we attempt
to look at the area where they live. We can't disprove the theory that
trillions of invisible bizarre beings live amongst us watching our every
move at every instant, or the theory that there is a civilization at the
center of the Earth that manages to cloak itself via advanced technology.
We could make up millions of such theories, and not be able to absolutely
DISPROVE any of them. What makes them delusional is that there is no sense
in believing them. They are silly theories that serve no cognitive function.
Jason
>>>Or if it's actually there. How do you rule that out?
Chris
>>The question is, how do you rule it IN? The burden of proof is on the
>>design-claimant. In practice, we rule it out by showing simply that >we
>>don't have the kinds of evidence needed for a proof of design.
>
Chris
>As I understand science, a theory is formulated to fit what facts are
known,
>and then tested according to any knew facts are found. So if someone
>proposes a theory of design to account for the complexity of the world,
what
>facts discount this?
Chris
The fact that the theory does not imply any "test" facts, or any that are
not implied by naturalistic theory, or that it implies new facts that turn
out to not to be the case, or that it is NOT, in fact able to account for
the complexity of the world, etc.
Chris
>>In science and in philosophy, we don't get to make arbitrary >assumptions
>>and still have a right to claim rationality. Design must >be PROVED, not
>>assumed.
>
>It also has to be proven wrong to be discounted.
Chris
No. You do not have to disprove all the trillions of theories that could be
made up by over-active imaginations. You can discount it the instant it
turns out to be in a category that is outside the scope of the type of
evidence available, once it is shown to be not usefully predictive, or
simply because we have simpler alternatives that do the work it is supposed
to do. Occam's Razor, again.
Jason
>Anyway, we have to make
>assumptions in all we do. Everything we think we know is based on
>assumptions. (true, some more rational than others)
Chris
Can you prove that, or is it just an assumption?
The fact is that this is not true. The claim that it is true is in fact
self-refuting. You do not need, ultimately, to assume ANYTHING. If you poke
yourself in the eye with a knitting needle, do you need to collect together
some assumptions to know that you are in pain? I think not.
Chris
>>Until it is, it rules itself out by requiring much stronger evidence >than
>>naturalistic explanations of Nature do.
>
>Until it's proven wrong, I see no reason to rule out something. Why rule
>anything out when there is nothing against it?
Chris
I'm not arguing against absolutely ruling it out; if ever any evidence comes
along of the strength and types needed to support it, then fine. So be it.
But, until then, yes, it and the trillions of other theories in the same
category should be ruled out as far as real candidates for truth because
they have nothing to make them viable as compared to naturalistic theories.
Again, let me remind you that Occam's Razor applies to all theories, not
just to naturalistic theories.