>I don't see much to contend with in Tim's latest, except perhaps for these
>clarifications.
>
><<Actually, I do believe that beliefs can be evaluated on the basis of
>reasonableness, with the caveat that "reasonableness" can be a slippery
>criterion>>
>
>On that basis, then, we can confront Hamas. We agree that beliefs CAN be
>evaluated. Within a theological context, too. Within a naturalistic context,
>however, they cannot. That has been my point throughout. [...]
If two people can agree on a few basic axioms -- whether it's because we
share a common culture, common religious perspectives or even a common
biological psychology -- then even if they differ slightly on lesser
details, I think they can go pretty far.
As for the Hamas, and disputing their ethical/moral claims, I do not
think that materialistic reductionism is up to that level so I do
agree that naturalism is not in the picture. It's a higher order
argument (I might call it an argument on a different "emergent"
level for which we do not know the underlying causes -- Aside: Please
pardon my metaphysical gobblygook; I don't know the lingo).
A discussion with a Mormom bishop removed...
[...]
>At that point, our discussion ended. But there is an example of reasonable
>discussion about religious matters. It can be done.
I think I can agree with that.
Again, thank you, Jim, for the conversation. It has been great and I
appreciate your's (and Stephen's) inputs.
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)
[I'm afraid I have to "activate my cloaking device" and fade into
lurk-mode for at least the next week or so -- But I'll still monitor
personal email.]