>One uses observation/empiricism in an inductive sense, but then one has to put
>it all back into the mix, which is addressing the question of explanations.
>>Does the evidence fit, or "cohere", with the explanatory web one is
>>constructing?
>Does the explanatory web best account for what is observed?
Agreed. It's amusing that Owen Gingerich responded to "Darwin on Trial" by
making similar points a couple years ago. Owen thought Phil was
concentrating too much on the anomalous evidence instead of the evidence
that did fit the model and the fact that the anomalous evidence did not
affect the model much.
>
>Once we understand that, we are not limited by a "need to obtain empirical
>evidence."
But I would not go so far as to say that we are not limited by the need to
obtain empirical evidence. In fact, isn't that the accusation Phil makes
of the ultra-Darwinians? That they don't have solid empirical evidence?
It seems to me we need a) empirical evidence, b) a framework for
interpreting the evidence, c) and a philosophical base that gives us
confidence in our interpretive framework. Drop any one of the three and
you're wandering in the wilderness. It seems to me that philosophical
naturalists have dropped c).
>That, by itself, is one of the false constrictions of naturalism.
>Naturalism is assuming that all explanatory power is based upon observation.
>>But it isn't.
Agreed.
>
>Now, when it comes to irreducible complexity, one looks at the evidence and
>seeks the best explanation for it. Here, naturalism is on flimsy ground. It is
>flimsy when it rejects obvious design signs for some as yet unnamed "other". As
>the record stands now, it appears to me that intelligent design has much
>>greater explanatory power.
Intelligent design convinces me that there is an intelligent designer. It
doesn't IMO yield much light on the methods the designer used. And it
seems to me science is about the methods He used (and uses).
Bill Hamilton | Vehicle Systems Research
GM R&D Center | Warren, MI 48090-9055
810 986 1474 (voice) | 810 986 3003 (FAX)
hamilton@gmr.com (office) | whamilto@mich.com (home)