<<Analogy and extrapolation can point one in a particular direction--but do
not constitute empirical evidence for that to which one extrapolates. You
need to obtain empirical evidence for the extrapolated model rather than
rely on analogous situations that do not directly address the situation in
question.>>
I have a bit of a problem with this rendition. The quest in science is not for
empirical evidence, it is for explanatory power. This is a very essential
distinction which, if missed, will lead to false conclusions.
Very little in life is built on empirical evidence. Very little in science, too.
One uses observation/empiricism in an inductive sense, but then one has to put
it all back into the mix, which is addressing the question of explanations. Does
the evidence fit, or "cohere", with the explanatory web one is constructing?
Does the explanatory web best account for what is observed?
Once we understand that, we are not limited by a "need to obtain empirical
evidence." That, by itself, is one of the false constrictions of naturalism.
Naturalism is assuming that all explanatory power is based upon observation. But
it isn't.
Now, when it comes to irreducible complexity, one looks at the evidence and
seeks the best explanation for it. Here, naturalism is on flimsy ground. It is
flimsy when it rejects obvious design signs for some as yet unnamed "other". As
the record stands now, it appears to me that intelligent design has much greater
explanatory power.
Jim