It is coming up on the new year, and time again to make my annual
prediction that Science will increasingly become open to what is
commonly regarded as `the supernatural'.
Some recent evidence (besides the revelation that the government has
used a team of psychics for years) is last night's program on ABC that
investigated psychic phenomena using the `best science' television-
money could buy.
I only caught part of it, but the fellow who was able to use ESP to
draw the picture of the bridge scene in Houston was pretty impressive.
Of course most Scientists will continue to ridicule such psychic
phenomena despite any evidence offered, but eventually the paradigm
will shift and Science will include things like ESP in their world view
(and eventually perhaps spirits or departed souls or whatnot, though
the evidence on the show was less compelling).
The point I like to make with this prediction is that the demarcation
between Science and faith is not between the supernatural and the natural,
as both are in the realm of science. The difference is about the nature,
character, and relevance of ultimate authority in the universe.
Faith says that there is a sovereign being who rules through the intent
of His will, and Science says that the universe is devoid of purpose.
[I use `Science' to refer to `science' encumbered by what usually
gets called `philosophic naturalism'.]
***
Once again I would like to try and sort out where the real source of
contentions between `faith' and `science' (or `Science') lie. It is
often cast as an issue of inclusion of the supernatural in science,
e.g. Brian then Walter:
b>The biotic message requires a supernatural creator and thus, by
b>definition, cannot be science. Or hadn't you realized that?
w>No, that is not the definition of science. Science puts the emphasis
w>on ***testability***, and does not rule out the supernatural. My book
w>advances the philosophy of science, by showing that when approached the
w>right way the supernatural can sometimes be testable science.
My suggestion is that the supernatural *will* be included in science, but
without addressing the inherent conflicts.
Ultimately Science can (and must) embrace any phenomena that can be
observed (i.e. the `what'), though it may endure many paradigm shifts
to do so. What science cannot do is say anything about purpose
(the `why'). ('Science' thinks there is no `why').
[It turns out that faith cannot say anything about purpose either,
apart from revelation. However faith does generally accept observations
that Science rejects (e.g. the testimony of Scripture).]
There seem to be several types of contention between `faith' and `science'.
The battle people like Phil Johnson seem to be fighting is that `Science'
should be `science'. Success here requires that the atheists become
agnostics (and perhaps some of the agnostics and theists can also become
at least agnostics).
But there is a much more fundamental dispute with `science' over the `how'.
This is the type of dispute we seem to have on the reflector (though
sometimes we accuse one another of being Scientists instead of scientists).
[For this discussion please ignore that last week I said I don't
believe there is such a thing as `how', and that I believe there is
only `why'. That discussion seemed to derail this other discussion, so
I am trying again].
`How' is not something we can directly perceive. Instead we postulate
`how' based on observations of cause and effect. We hit a ball, and
it moves away from us *after* we hit it. We fire a gun and
the trajectory follows rules about gravitation and friction. We observe
the location of the planets, and can successfully predict their subsequent
location based on Kepler's laws.
We assume that there is some underlying `how' built out of some
level of causes and effects (e.g. quantum fluctuations or whatever
underlies those).
But we don't know what `how' really is, so `how' gets represented by
a set of rules that allow us to say things about the universe without
really knowing `how'.
Constructing such rules is what constitutes science. Rules within
science are deemed valuable based on two types of criteria:
1) Whether they give rise to predictions, and how general and
accurate those predictions are.
2) Aesthetics (e.g. Ockam's razor).
It would seem that the most important issue should be whether the rules
are successfully predictive. This is the issue of `testability' that
Walter is concerned about. However this is only one aspect of science.
[It is also important to note that there are two types of testability.
One involves running experiments, and the other involves making
predictions about what observations can be made (e.g. predicting the
existence of black holes or brown dwarfs). Evolution doesn't have to
be subject to experiment to be a valid scientific theory].
However the most important issue is really aesthetics.
Besides issues like simplicity, aesthetics can also involve
preconceptions about the universe (e.g. science becomes Science).
However the most critical aspect of aesthetics involves the role
`rules' play in helping to organize science. The rules involve more
than just turning the crank on equations. Aesthetically pleasing
rules help develop reliable intuition in scientists.
Intuition is what implements the whole idea of `paradigm,' or world
view. It is critical in science because science is an endeavor by
human beings. Each of us operates using our intuition at some level,
even if it is just what we call `common sense'. Intuition tells us
what should be important and where to look (which is why it also
inhibits discovery). [The lack of intuition in Artificially Intelligent
programs is likely why AI failed].
Predictability is only important in that it can diminish the aesthetic
value of a theory (i.e. a set of rules).
***
An important point to repeat is that rules do *not* need to be able to
really say *anything* about `how'. Rules are a placeholder for `how'.
They speak of what is expected to be observed. Keplers's laws say
*nothing* about `how' the planets move. They just tell you what you
should expect to observe through your telescope.
It is predictiveness *and* aesthetics that are important to science.
I haven't understood this very well, and it has led me to some wrong
conclusions about evolution.
The implications for evolution:
1) Evolution doesn't need to say anything about `how'.
I used to think that evolution was poor science because it didn't
really tell me anything credible about `how' one species turned into
another. It only told me to expect relationships between species and
their environment. I would pester my evolutionist friends about this,
and they couldn't understand why it was important to me. The problem
is that I had the wrong view of science. I thought predictiveness
was everything, and ...
2) Evolution isn't very good at making predictions.
As anti-evolutions repeatedly point out, the predictive power
of evolution is extraordinarily poor. Punctuated stasis and
the fossil record sure do not match the observations that evolution
predicts.
This has required a lot of theories to be proposed as to why
evolution does *not* make better predictions. Why hasn't the
need for such auxilliary theories dealt a death-blow to evolution?
Because ...
3) Evolution is *terrific* science.
Why? Because it is a tremendously valuable framework for organizing
observations. My evolutionist friends told me this repeatedly, but
I was too hung up on predictability and truth to hear them. It helps
them create an intuition which organizes their world, and that has
great aesthetic benefit.
I used to think that evolution was supported by the philosophical
biases of Science, but it is really successful because there isn't
(yet) a better framework for organizing biological observations.
Perhaps someone (Walter, Phil, Art, or the Intelligent Design crowd)
will provide one --- but theirs will be even more loaded with philosophic
biases than the current one. For example, it is probably important
to them that a successful scientific theory be true.
4) Evolution is probably not true, but it doesn't matter.
Science is not about truth. Art has suggested it is a game, but
I would prefer to say that it is `an endeavor'. Philosophy is
about truth. 'science' becomes 'Science' when it tries to say
that it is truth.
My conclusions about science:
1) The distinction between natural and supernatural is meaningless.
A much better distinction is between observations that fit within the
current paradigm and observations that do not. The distinction is
not fundamental. The paradigm will shift.
2) The aesthetic properties of a theory can be far more important than
its predictive abilities, and not necessarily because of the
predispositions of Science.
3) Science is not about truth because:
a) it cannot really say anything about `how', it can only
construct rules.
b) it is largely confined to its current paradigm, which
filters only certain `what'.
c) the most important realities of the universe are associated
with the `why', and science cannot address `why', while Science
says there is no `why'.
4) The general public has little interest in philosophy, so all these
types of analyses about science will never change their view of
science. But it doesn't matter, because ...
5) The public doesn't really believe science tells them about truth
anyway. We buy lotto tickets, eat lots of fat, pollute the earth,
read horoscopes, and even attend church.
--Dave