JB: >> If you have not done so yet -- read Geisler's book Origin
Science, published by Baker Book House in 1987. As far as I can
see, you are in agreement with him, ...<<
I know of his book, but have not read it. I think I do share the
same approach.
JB: >> I don't see "science" as a "search for truth." That is the
job of the philosopher. <<
An interesting statement. It is consistent with the idea that
science is a "game" - but not easy to harmonise with the idea
that God has, in some way, revealed himself in the natural world.
If I were not a Christian, I think I would be an operationalist
in my philosophy of science. However, in the light of biblical
revelation, I think it is possible to justify a realist view of
science.
JB: >> The words of Whewell seem relevant here:
"... yet extraneous considerations, and extraneous evidence,
respecting the nature of the beginning of things, must never be
allowed to influence our physics or our geology." <<
Regarding the cited words of Whewell, I accept that he ruled out
supernatural causes for geological effects. He seems to be in
the mainstream Baconian tradition.
It is worth noting, in passing, that Whewell DID perceive a
difference between the empirical and historical sciences: he
coined the term "palaeteiology" which refers to that branch of
science which seeks to study origins and past historical events.
JB: >> A second example of this kind of thinking comes from the
introduction to Copernicus's work...
The introduction has been ascribed to Copernicus himself; most
scholars now think it was written by Andrew Osiander, a friend
who saw the book through the publishing cycle.
" ...it is not necessary that these hypotheses be true, or even
probably; but it is enough if they provide a calculus which fit
the observations ... ." <<
There is reason to believe that Copernicus would not have been
pleased to see Osiander's presentation of his hypothesis.
Copernicus thought that his heliocentric model was TRUE, as did
Rheticus. Osiander was adopting a compromise
position which was a reaction to the vested interests in
geocentricity - the universities were full of people who were
committed to geocentricity and the Church had aligned itself with
these scholars in the belief that it was a biblical teaching.
The Lutheran Reformer Melanchthon remained a geocentrist - but
recognising the pragmatic usefulness of the Copernican model, he
and his colleagues adopted a view essentially the same as
Osiander. This became known as the Wittenberg Interpretation.
JB: >> I have a gut fear that should Phil, and Norm, and others
ever be successful, it will open up science to all sorts of
nonsense. <<
There are risks with this approach, but there are equally risks
of limiting explanatory models to those acceptable to naturalism.
Furthermore, if science is a "game", why does this discussion
matter? Why can't we play to different rules to those defined
by the philosophical naturalists? It seems to me that only if
science is NOT a game can this issue be recognised as worthy of
discussion at all!
JB: >> Part of the rebuttals I make to this is to put science
(properly) in its place. Based on PN, it cannot ever assert PN.
I think that's proper and best. <<
This is helpful. I can see more clearly how your arguments
cohere. But one of my continuing concerns is that this leads to a
"science with unrecognisable gaps". The gaps are real - but the
commitment to naturalism means that the gaps can never be
recognised. This hinders understanding of the real world.
Best wishes,
*** From David J. Tyler, CDT Department, Hollings Faculty,
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
Telephone: 0161-247-2636 ***