Re: [asa] Multiverse math

From: wjp <wjp@swcp.com>
Date: Tue Sep 01 2009 - 22:26:28 EDT

Schwarzwald:

I am presuming that a "fake" universe is one that is not real.
Later you seem to be saying that a "fake" universe is a "simulated"
one.

I frankly have no idea what you're trying to say. I can only make sense
of this if I attempt to adopt some form of Idealism or Platonism, where
ideas have a kind of independent reality.

You'll have to come at this again if I'm to make any sense of it.

bill

On Tue, 1 Sep 2009 20:49:35 -0400, Schwarzwald <schwarzwald@gmail.com> wrote:
> Paul Davies has something interesting to say about multiverse speculations.
>>From The Goldilocks Enigma:
>
> "If we are prepared to entertain the notion that there exists limitless
> possible universes that are unobservable from this one, why sould we rule
> out the existence of limitless simulated, or fake universes, too? No
> reason
> at all. In fact, not only have we no reason to rule them out, we have
> every
> reason to rule them in."
>
> His argument more or less goes: If there is a superabundance of real
> universes, then - unless there's something special about human
> consciousness
> - there are going to be a superabundance of fake universes as well. Some
> civilizations (infinite number?) in the universes where life is possible
> will reach a level of technology capable of simulating a universe, or at
> least a reality. And what's more, you can have nested simulations -
> simulations within simulations within simulations, etc. And if for any one
> universe capable of supporting intelligent life, you thereby have a
> universe
> where 1 to n fake universes can be hosted, you're in an interesting
> dilemma.
> Namely, it seems we're more likely to be living in a fake universe than a
> real one. While Davies doesn't point out the following, I will: If we're
> living a simulated universe, then atheism is false and deism or some
> variety
> of theism is true.
>
> Davies goes on, I think, to mention that multiverses may 'solve'
> fine-tuning
> of our universe at the cost of having to explain fine-tuning of the
> multiverse-generator. In other words the fine-tuning problem doesn't go
> away
> - it shifts up a level.
>
> On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 7:48 PM, Dehler, Bernie
> <bernie.dehler@intel.com>wrote:
>
>> Gordon said:
>> "How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value
> you
>> get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected
> for
>> some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable."
>>
>>
>>
>> As I understand it, there is no compelling reason for the exact values
> for
>> the constants, other than that they are in the viable range for life to
>> exist. If the multiverse hypothesis were true, then you'd expect these
>> values to fall within a range, but other than that, be random (not
> special
>> in any other way). (Because any other random number wouldn't generate
> life
>> so we'd never see it.) The constants do appear to be randomly sitting
>> within the range they need to be. There is no ‘exact value’ that
> they need
>> to be!
>>
>>
>>
>> Bill said:
>> “I personally don't see why the narrow range for life as we know it to
>> exist is relevant. The "intuition" of the argument is that there
> appears to
>> be no reason why any value should obtain and not others, whether or not
> life
>> should arise or not. This is why I have intentionally posed the
> argument as
>> not anthropic.”
>>
>>
>>
>> I read this book “Many worlds in one”
>>
> http://www.amazon.com/Many-Worlds-One-Search-Universes/dp/0809067226/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1251848624&sr=8-1.
>> I took it that it was very important to confront the anthropic
> principle,
>> and the multiverse theory does that by explaining the exact constants
> aren’t
>> special in any way other than being in the right narrow range.
>>
>>
>>
>> Bill said:
>> “But apparently many others find the compulsion to a multiverse to be
> akin
>> to a cosmological argument.”
>>
>>
>>
>> …because it (many worlds) answers the anthropic principle argument,
> which
>> is a very strong case for creationism. If not many worlds, how else to
>> explain creation without God?
>>
>>
>>
>> …Bernie
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
>> Behalf Of gordon brown
>> Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 4:30 PM
>> To: asa@calvin.edu
>> Subject: RE: [asa] Multiverse math
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, 1 Sep 2009, Dehler, Bernie wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> >
>>
>> > "3) Since it is possible that these parameters can take on other
> values,
>>
>> > they will."
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Maybe a different way to state it is like this:
>>
>> >
>>
>> > 3. Since these values fall within a small range, the actual numbers
>> aren't
>>
>> > special but appear to be randomly selected.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> >
>>
>> > For example, let's say a certain constant is 1.5667 and it must be
>> between
>>
>> > 1.5000 and 1.6000 for existence to be viable. Amazing, it is 1.5667!
>> Yes,
>>
>> > but it could have been 1.5571 or 1.5001, etc. The actual number is in
>> the
>>
>> > life-giving range, but other than that, it is special in no way. I
> think
>>
>> > that makes a compelling argument.
>>
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value
> you
>>
>> get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected
> for
>>
>> some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gordon Brown (ASA member)
>>

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Received on Tue Sep 1 22:27:01 2009

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