Gordon:
You say:
>
> My understanding of your argument is that a randomly selected value in the
> viable range works to enable life. Therefore the value must be randomly
> selected. The problem with this argument is that a value in this range
> that is selected by a nonrandom method also works.
>
This is the kind of argument that I am trying to avoid. It seems to me that
the argument or the "intuition" of a multiverse has nothing to do with
whether life arises or not. It has to do with the "intuition" that there
is no reason why any of the parametrically indexed universes should exist
over another. Because all "appear" to our "intuition" to be equally
likely, it seems that the other universes could possibly exist (i.e.,
there is no reason, says our (naturalistic?) intuition, that they are
not real possibilities.)
Hence, we reason that, given sufficient time and circumstance, all
possibilities will be realized eventually. This intuition, however,
does not, it seems, go so far as to say whether the worlds exist
simultaneously or subsequently (i.e., there is always at any given
time (?) one world, a reasonable assumption.)
Understand that I am not arguing in favor of a multiverse. I am simply
trying to lay bear the thinking that Mann attempts to lay out in his
article.
bill
To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
"unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.
Received on Tue Sep 1 22:21:30 2009
This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Tue Sep 01 2009 - 22:21:31 EDT