Re: [asa] Multiverse math

Wjp,

I'm giving an abbreviated version of what Davies writes in his book, so I'm
probably not laying things out so neatly. Sorry about that.

Here, a "fake" universe does not mean a "non-existent" universe. It just
means a simulated universe - Davies calls it fake since it's not at the "top
level" of reality. If we were to assume our universe is a/the real one, but
we created such a simulation, that simulation/simulated universe would be
fake. It exists, but any inhabitants in the program would be measuring and
experiencing the universe we made for them, not the "actual" universe.

On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 10:26 PM, wjp <wjp@swcp.com> wrote:

> Schwarzwald:
>
> I am presuming that a "fake" universe is one that is not real.
> Later you seem to be saying that a "fake" universe is a "simulated"
> one.
>
> I frankly have no idea what you're trying to say. I can only make sense
> of this if I attempt to adopt some form of Idealism or Platonism, where
> ideas have a kind of independent reality.
>
> You'll have to come at this again if I'm to make any sense of it.
>
> bill
>
> On Tue, 1 Sep 2009 20:49:35 -0400, Schwarzwald <schwarzwald@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > Paul Davies has something interesting to say about multiverse
> speculations.
> >>From The Goldilocks Enigma:
> >
> > "If we are prepared to entertain the notion that there exists limitless
> > possible universes that are unobservable from this one, why sould we rule
> > out the existence of limitless simulated, or fake universes, too? No
> > reason
> > at all. In fact, not only have we no reason to rule them out, we have
> > every
> > reason to rule them in."
> >
> > His argument more or less goes: If there is a superabundance of real
> > universes, then - unless there's something special about human
> > consciousness
> > - there are going to be a superabundance of fake universes as well. Some
> > civilizations (infinite number?) in the universes where life is possible
> > will reach a level of technology capable of simulating a universe, or at
> > least a reality. And what's more, you can have nested simulations -
> > simulations within simulations within simulations, etc. And if for any
> one
> > universe capable of supporting intelligent life, you thereby have a
> > universe
> > where 1 to n fake universes can be hosted, you're in an interesting
> > dilemma.
> > Namely, it seems we're more likely to be living in a fake universe than a
> > real one. While Davies doesn't point out the following, I will: If we're
> > living a simulated universe, then atheism is false and deism or some
> > variety
> > of theism is true.
> >
> > Davies goes on, I think, to mention that multiverses may 'solve'
> > fine-tuning
> > of our universe at the cost of having to explain fine-tuning of the
> > multiverse-generator. In other words the fine-tuning problem doesn't go
> > away
> > - it shifts up a level.
> >
> > On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 7:48 PM, Dehler, Bernie
> > <bernie.dehler@intel.com>wrote:
> >
> >> Gordon said:
> >> "How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value
> > you
> >> get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected
> > for
> >> some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable."
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> As I understand it, there is no compelling reason for the exact values
> > for
> >> the constants, other than that they are in the viable range for life to
> >> exist. If the multiverse hypothesis were true, then you'd expect these
> >> values to fall within a range, but other than that, be random (not
> > special
> >> in any other way). (Because any other random number wouldn't generate
> > life
> >> so we'd never see it.) The constants do appear to be randomly sitting
> >> within the range they need to be. There is no ‘exact value’ that
> > they need
> >> to be!
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Bill said:
> >> “I personally don't see why the narrow range for life as we know it to
> >> exist is relevant. The "intuition" of the argument is that there
> > appears to
> >> be no reason why any value should obtain and not others, whether or not
> > life
> >> should arise or not. This is why I have intentionally posed the
> > argument as
> >> not anthropic.”
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> I read this book “Many worlds in one”
> >>
> >
> http://www.amazon.com/Many-Worlds-One-Search-Universes/dp/0809067226/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1251848624&sr=8-1
> .
> >> I took it that it was very important to confront the anthropic
> > principle,
> >> and the multiverse theory does that by explaining the exact constants
> > aren’t
> >> special in any way other than being in the right narrow range.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Bill said:
> >> “But apparently many others find the compulsion to a multiverse to be
> > akin
> >> to a cosmological argument.”
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> …because it (many worlds) answers the anthropic principle argument,
> > which
> >> is a very strong case for creationism. If not many worlds, how else to
> >> explain creation without God?
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> …Bernie
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu [mailto:asa-owner@lists.calvin.edu] On
> >> Behalf Of gordon brown
> >> Sent: Tuesday, September 01, 2009 4:30 PM
> >> To: asa@calvin.edu
> >> Subject: RE: [asa] Multiverse math
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> On Tue, 1 Sep 2009, Dehler, Bernie wrote:
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> > "3) Since it is possible that these parameters can take on other
> > values,
> >>
> >> > they will."
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> > Maybe a different way to state it is like this:
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> > 3. Since these values fall within a small range, the actual numbers
> >> aren't
> >>
> >> > special but appear to be randomly selected.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> > For example, let's say a certain constant is 1.5667 and it must be
> >> between
> >>
> >> > 1.5000 and 1.6000 for existence to be viable. Amazing, it is 1.5667!
> >> Yes,
> >>
> >> > but it could have been 1.5571 or 1.5001, etc. The actual number is in
> >> the
> >>
> >> > life-giving range, but other than that, it is special in no way. I
> > think
> >>
> >> > that makes a compelling argument.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> How can you look at a single measurement and determine that the value
> > you
> >>
> >> get must have been randomly selected? It might be that it was selected
> > for
> >>
> >> some additional reason besides causing existence to be viable.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Gordon Brown (ASA member)
> >>
>
>

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Received on Tue Sep 1 22:37:02 2009