Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Good points -- but I would suggest that a potentiality argument would kick
in once the cell nucleus has been so implanted. In other words, an
individual cell or individual cell nucleus has a very different potentiality
than a clone (meaning the cloned cell, not necessarily just a "full grown"
clone). This is why we have to ask ethical questions about whether we ought
to proceed with human cloning if we have the technology to do so. I think
it's a different ethical problem to ask whether we should create a cloned
human egg cell as opposed to, say, growing cells from a melanoma in a petri
dish to see whether it is cancerous.

On 9/5/07, Jim Armstrong <jarmstro@qwest.net> wrote:
>
> Perhaps not the cell, but I was speaking of the cell nucleus. It's not
> particularly abstract when you can take the (non-abstract) nucleus of a skin
> cell (for instance) and simply (?) relocate it otherwise unaltered in an egg
> (cell) which has been previously enucleated, and then - with a little
> laboratory "help", or perhaps even natural "help" - encourage the initiation
> of the usual division process. Only the physical cellular context for the
> "potentiality" has changed. The nuclear entity with its inherant
> potentiality has not changed, just its trajectory.
>
> I would suggest that it might be a rickety position to bank on the notion
> that just because a human clone has not happened yet that it cannot or will
> not. Many feel - for better or worse - that this is just a matter of time
> and place. So-called therapeutic cloning of tissue is pretty much a done
> deal, isn't it?
>
> JimA
>
> David Opderbeck wrote:
>
> Jim A. said: * With respect to potentiality, every cell in our body - with
> its genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of becoming a person.*
>
> Not really though. Potentiality doesn't mean potentiality in a very
> abstract sense. Even with our current technology, it seems that we can't
> clone a person from any human cell. A skin cell does not carry potentiality
> in anything like the same sense as a zygote.
>
>
> On 9/5/07, Jim Armstrong <jarmstro@qwest.net> wrote:
> >
> > The question of the last paragraph (and observation) would seem to be a
> > good one. With respect to potentiality, every cell in our body - with its
> > genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of becoming a person. Let one of
> > those nucleii be transplanted into some other person's enucleated egg and
> > away we go. In light of this, it would seem to be as you suggest, that the
> > potentiality aspect of an entity doesn't work well for cleanly defining
> > "personhood". One might wish to point to the merging of genetic
> > potentialities at conception as that transition point. But the mere
> > existence of parthenogenesis muddies that water, even though it may not be
> > specifically demonstrable for humans (outside the lab). So that pretty much
> > points - as you suggest - to a definition of personhood that arises from a
> > value system rather than some potentiality criterion. Or so it seemeth to
> > me.
> > JimA
> >
> > Jack wrote:
> >
> > Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic twins occur when two
> > eggs are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate entities from
> > conception.
> >
> > Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage, or the blastocyst stage,
> > which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and *before*implantation.
> >
> > I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would seem, based on various
> > medical findings, that ensoulment does
> > not take place at conception and, indeed, does not take place until
> > after
> > implantation has taken place." If he is talking about twinning as the
> > medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs before implantation, and very
> > early after conception, so implantation seems to be an arbitrary definition
> > of when personhood, (via 'ensoulment') begins.
> >
> > Having said that, I disagree with David O when he says : ""Personhood"
> > ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on both present and *
> > potentential* aspects of the entity. " What does an argument for
> > personhood based on potentiality look like without having to resort to
> > religious, and especially biblical values? This *IS *exactly where
> > religion and science clash on this matter.
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > *From:* David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> > *To:* Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com>
> > *Cc:* asa@calvin.edu
> > *Sent:* Tuesday, September 04, 2007 2:32 PM
> > *Subject:* Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
> >
> >
> > Burgy said: *I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that
> > Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a
> > person regardless of any ethical judgements made by others*.
> >
> > I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes 'personhood'"
> > ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical question, not a scientific question.
> > I agree that empirical data from the natural sciences, such as data about
> > what can physically happen to a zygote pre-implantation, bears on this
> > question. However, I don't think such observations can answer the
> > question.
> >
> > And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical judgments
> > doesn't mean there is no basis on which we could reach a different, *
> > objectively* better conclusion, without reducing the question to a
> > merely "scientific" one. In other words, when I say something is primarily
> > an "ethical" rather than a "scientific" issue, I don't think that relegates
> > the question to the realm of merely subjective emotion, concerning which the
> > Nazi view is just as valid as any other view.
> >
> > In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and
> > ensoulement, Burgy said: *The problem with this explanation is that is
> > (I think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
> > *
> > **
> > I respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of proof
> > here. You asserted that the indeterminacy of the zygote before implantation
> > -- the fact that it can split into two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse --
> > defeats any notion of ensoulement before implantation. In making that
> > assertion, you took on the burden of proving it.
> >
> > I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might not hold. In
> > doing that, I've at least provisionally defeated your defeater concerning
> > ensoulement -- you haven't carried your burden of proof. I don't need to
> > offer any more evidence, because I'm not claiming any specific concept of
> > ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only suggesting that there are any
> > number of plausible ways in which pre-implantation ensoulement could
> > possibly remain viable despite your proposed defeater. In order to carry
> > your burden of proof, you now need to show why my possible scenarios fail.
> >
> > I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote can split in
> > two before implantation, and if that results in two distinctly individual
> > fetuses being brought to term and growing into distinct individuals, that in
> > itself is evidence against your claim. But at the end of the day, neither
> > of us has enough data to know what is or isn't possible concerning
> > ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful concept.
> >
> >
> > On 9/4/07, Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > "I had said: The medical data that indicates fairly clearly that an
> > entity prior to
> > > implantation is not a person is as follows:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > David O posted:
> > >
> > > "I think that is too strong a statement."
> > >
> > > We must disagree, then, on that claim.
> > >
> > > "The data you cite certainly suggest that the concept of
> > "personhood" is difficult to apply prior to implantation."
> > >
> > > I understand your use of a milder term. Perhaps it would help if I
> > agreed that the data, while "clear," is not a rock solid 100% proof. It is,
> > as are so many concepts in this area, always provisional.
> > >
> > > "However, the notion of "personhood," IMHO, ultimately is not
> > something that can be conclusively determined one way or the other by these
> > sorts of empirical observations."
> > >
> > > We can, on that basis, never have conclusive proof of such things. But
> > none the less we have to (sometimes) bet on what looks the most likely. That
> > is all I am doing.
> > >
> > > "Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on
> > both present and potentential aspects of the entity."
> > >
> > > I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that Jews were not
> > persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a person regardless
> > of any ethical judgements made by others.
> > >
> > > "I would argue that the potentiality of a not-yet-implanted
> > human zygote gives it a kind of dignity that requires us (a) not to discard
> > it without very good reason; and (b) not to create it without the intention
> > to bring it to term if possible."
> > >
> > > I have not argued otherwise.
> > >
> > > "As to "ensoulment," the fact that a zygote that has the
> > potential to split into two entities before implantation, it seems to me,
> > does not decide the question one way or the other. If the "soul" is an
> > entirely immaterial substance that God implants in the womb, and if God
> > knows beforehand whether a given zygote will split into two entities before
> > implantation, then it seems entirely possible that God gives that zygote two
> > souls before it splits, with one going each way as it were. And if the two
> > entities subsequently fuse, it would seem that God is capable of accounting
> > for that in advance as well when he does the ensoulement."
> > >
> > > The problem with this explanation is that is (I think) entirely ad
> > hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
> > >
> > > "But I'd also suggest that the notion of "ensoulement" perhaps
> > isn't very helpful. It analogizes the soul to a material substance that
> > would be injected, so to speak, into the zygote / fetus / baby at a fixed
> > time in its development. That makes what is essentially a spiritual
> > property too much like something material."
> > >
> > > Good point.
> > >
> > > " Rather than searching for a specific time of "ensoulment,"
> > I'd suggest that we advocate respect for human life from its very start to
> > its very end -- which means, at least, not taking active measures to
> > terminate human potentiality."
> > >
> > > As in most discussions of this nature, the devil is in the details.
> > Above you said "without very good reasons" and we might debate endlessly
> > about what those reasons might be. AT the end, we would have to agree to
> > disagree.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the dialing.
> > >
> > > Burgy
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>

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Received on Wed Sep 5 12:56:04 2007