David O responded:
"I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes
'personhood'" ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical question, not a
scientific question. I agree that empirical data from the natural
sciences, such as data about what can physically happen to a zygote
pre-implantation, bears on this question. However, I don't think such
observations can answer the question."
We don't disagree much here. I guess I would simply say that the data,
when followed to an "inference to the best explanation" does indicate
that a "person" is not present in the process until implantation. I
understand that this may well not be convincing to others.
"And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical
judgments doesn't mean there is no basis on which we could reach a
different, objectively better conclusion, without reducing the question
to a merely "scientific" one. In other words, when I say something is
primarily an "ethical" rather than a "scientific" issue, I don't think
that relegates the question to the realm of merely subjective emotion,
concerning which the Nazi view is just as valid as any other view."
I probably should not have used the Nazi idea. All my point was this:
Either a "person" is present at a point in the reproductive process -- or
a "person" is not present. One's views on this do not make one (or the
other) true.
"In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and
ensoulement, Burgy said: The problem with this explanation is that is (I
think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it? I
respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of proof here.
You asserted that the indeterminacy of the zygote before implantation --
the fact that it can split into two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse --
defeats any notion of ensoulement before implantation. In making that
assertion, you took on the burden of proving it."
I think I mentioned that I was not offering "proof," only a reasonable
(to me) interpretation of the data.
"I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might not
hold. In doing that, I've at least provisionally defeated your defeater
concerning ensoulement -- you haven't carried your burden of proof. I
don't need to offer any more evidence, because I'm not claiming any
specific concept of ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only
suggesting that there are any number of plausible ways in which
pre-implantation ensoulement could possibly remain viable despite your
proposed defeater. In order to carry your burden of proof, you now need
to show why my possible scenarios fail."
I think you are (implicitly) agreeing with my observation that your "God
puts two soul in" idea is ad hoc. If not, sorry for misinterpreting you.
The question I have is whether (or not) an ad hoc argument can be a
"defeater." If it can, then I can claim that the ad hoc explanation of
OMPHALOS (last Tuesdayism) is a defeater for the claim that the earth is
vastly older than 6,000 years. Which may be technically true but not very
useful. Or am I still missing something here?
"I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote can
split in two before implantation, and if that results in two distinctly
individual fetuses being brought to term and growing into distinct
individuals, that in itself is evidence against your claim. But at the
end of the day, neither of us has enough data to know what is or isn't
possible concerning ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful
concept."
On your first sentence, I cannot understand. On the second, I agree.
Cheers from sunny Colorado.
Burgy
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Received on Wed Sep 5 10:07:04 2007
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