From a Biblical perspective, I would also add this for
everyone's consideration...Regardless of when
"ensoulment" or "personhood" occurs (if we could ever
even know or agree on the definition), I think
Scripture could be interpretted to support the
sanctity of human life from conception on other
grounds--mainly, marriage, which is established and
sanctified by God, is described in the phrase
"Therefore shall a man leave his father and his
mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall
be one flesh."--is there any greater physical
expression of this blessing than conception, when
quite literally, two become one?
Some food for thought :) Back to work with me :)
In Christ,
Christine
--- David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com> wrote:
> Jack said: *You just keep asserting that human
> potential is worthy of
> protection without actually arguing why.*
>
> I just alluded to three arguments -- the
> precautionary principle, Kantian
> deontological duties, and virtue ethics:
>
> 1. The precautionary principle says that, when
> faced with uncertainty, we
> ought not to take action that will cause significant
> harm if one or more of
> the uncertain scenarios turns out to be true. We
> are uncertain about the
> moral status of pre-implantation zygotes. If we are
> wrong about their moral
> status, and we abort them or create them for the
> purpose of destructive
> testing, we will have destroyed human life -- a
> grave harm. Therefore, at
> present, we ought not to take such actions.
>
> 2. A Kantian categorical imperative says that we
> ought to act only
> according to maxims that we would wish to become a
> universal law, and
> further that we should always treat humanity as an
> ends and not a means. It
> follows from this that human potential should be
> encouraged for its own
> sake. Thus, we ought not to create potential human
> life for the purpose of
> destructive testing.
>
> 3. An Aristotelian virtue perspective says that a
> community should adhere
> to virtues such as generosity, courage, and fidelity
> to trust, that are
> likely to enhance human flourishing. Possessing the
> generosity, courage,
> and trustworthiness to nurture human potentiality
> requires us to adopt
> certain practices -- such as providing for the care
> of expectant mothers,
> infants and children -- and to eschew others -- such
> as establishing systems
> in which human potentiality is purposefully
> terminated.
>
> You might question the underlying basis for the
> precuationary principle, or
> deontological duties, or virtue ethics, but
> justifying each one would
> require libraries of books, and at the end of the
> day we might still not
> have clear answers. But the point is, it is
> certainly possible to build an
> argument from any of these approaches under which
> the human potentiality of
> a zyogote deserves a high degree of moral respect.
> (And we could also
> develop other persepectives, such as natural law
> theory...) None of these
> perspectives require a specifically Biblical basis.
>
> Jack said: *If you did make an argument, I suspect
> there would be an
> underlying biblical presupposition..... I am just
> saying that arguments
> based on potentiality will inevitably be based on a
> religious idea, and that
> is where the clash exists.*
>
> Yes, I'd have to admit that ultimately any argument
> I might make ultimately
> will have an underlying Biblical presupposition,
> because that's who I am.
> But, someone could argue from any of the above
> perspectives without
> specifically invoking Biblical presuppositions --
> although you could argue
> that all of the above perspectives in a broad way
> are rooted in some natural
> sense of morality, which must ultimately at least
> imply some kind of *
> theistic* presupposition.
>
> This is why I have a big problem with saying there's
> a "clash" here. It's
> very difficult to come up with *any *kind of ethical
> / metaphysical argument
> that doesn't involve a "religious" idea somewhere
> along the line. If you
> want to call that a "clash," it seems to me that you
> have to elide ethical
> considerations altogether. Many want to do that,
> and they claim that
> "science" fills the gap -- but it doesn't. If
> "science" wants to move from
> theories about how nature *is* to theories about how
> people *ought *to act,
> it moves out of its original domain and can't hide
> behind the presumed
> authority of "science."
>
> On 9/5/07, Jack <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > You just keep asserting that human potential is
> worthy of protection
> without actually arguing why. If you did make an
> argument, I suspect there
> would be an underlying biblical presupposition.
> >
> > I am not saying that there is anything wrong with
> such an argument. I am
> just saying that arguments based on potentiality
> will inevitably be based on
> a religious idea, and that is where the clash
> exists.
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: David Opderbeck
> >
> > To: Jack
> > Cc: Carol or John Burgeson ; asa@calvin.edu
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2007 8:09 AM
> > Subject: Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
> >
> >
> > Jack said: What does an argument for personhood
> based on potentiality
> look like without having to resort to religious, and
> especially biblical
> values?
> >
> > I don't like the notion of a "resort" to Biblical
> values. I don't think
> it should be a problem for Christians to present
> ethical arguments in the
> public square that are grounded in Biblical values.
> That said, there are
> general ethical principles that are not directly
> derived from the Bible that
> could apply here. For example, the precautionary
> principle springs
> immediately to mind. One could also make Kantian
> deontological arguments
> based on a principle that the potential for human
> development ought to be a
> universal value. Or, one could make an Aristotelian
> virtue argument that
> human flourishing depends on nurturing human
> potential. Given the
> infinitely elastic nature of utilitarian arguments,
> one could probably also
> argue that the benefits accrued from protecting
> human potentiality outweigh
> any costs (including opportunity costs of medical
> research) in not doing
> so. And so on.
> >
> > Jack said: This IS exactly where religion and
> science clash on this
> matter.
> >
> > I don't see why there must be a clash. All
> science can give us here is
> some empirical observations about the process of a
> zygote becoming implanted
> and the possibility of twinning. It can't tell us
> anything, IMHO, about the
> metaphysical question of "personhood," much less
> about the ethical questions
> surrounding human potentiality. Where exactly is
> the clash?
> >
> > On 9/5/07, Jack <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic
> twins occur when two
> eggs are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate
> entities from
> conception.
> > >
> > > Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage,
> or the blastocyst stage,
> which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and
> before implantation.
> > >
> > > I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would
> seem, based on various
> medical findings, that ensoulment does
> > > not take place at conception and, indeed, does
> not take place until
> after
> > > implantation has taken place." If he is
> talking about twinning as the
> medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs
> before implantation, and very
>
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Received on Wed, 5 Sep 2007 07:18:47 -0700 (PDT)
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