Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Jack said: *You just keep asserting that human potential is worthy of
protection without actually arguing why.*

I just alluded to three arguments -- the precautionary principle, Kantian
deontological duties, and virtue ethics:

1. The precautionary principle says that, when faced with uncertainty, we
ought not to take action that will cause significant harm if one or more of
the uncertain scenarios turns out to be true. We are uncertain about the
moral status of pre-implantation zygotes. If we are wrong about their moral
status, and we abort them or create them for the purpose of destructive
testing, we will have destroyed human life -- a grave harm. Therefore, at
present, we ought not to take such actions.

2. A Kantian categorical imperative says that we ought to act only
according to maxims that we would wish to become a universal law, and
further that we should always treat humanity as an ends and not a means. It
follows from this that human potential should be encouraged for its own
sake. Thus, we ought not to create potential human life for the purpose of
destructive testing.

3. An Aristotelian virtue perspective says that a community should adhere
to virtues such as generosity, courage, and fidelity to trust, that are
likely to enhance human flourishing. Possessing the generosity, courage,
and trustworthiness to nurture human potentiality requires us to adopt
certain practices -- such as providing for the care of expectant mothers,
infants and children -- and to eschew others -- such as establishing systems
in which human potentiality is purposefully terminated.

You might question the underlying basis for the precuationary principle, or
deontological duties, or virtue ethics, but justifying each one would
require libraries of books, and at the end of the day we might still not
have clear answers. But the point is, it is certainly possible to build an
argument from any of these approaches under which the human potentiality of
a zyogote deserves a high degree of moral respect. (And we could also
develop other persepectives, such as natural law theory...) None of these
perspectives require a specifically Biblical basis.

Jack said: *If you did make an argument, I suspect there would be an
underlying biblical presupposition..... I am just saying that arguments
based on potentiality will inevitably be based on a religious idea, and that
is where the clash exists.*

Yes, I'd have to admit that ultimately any argument I might make ultimately
will have an underlying Biblical presupposition, because that's who I am.
But, someone could argue from any of the above perspectives without
specifically invoking Biblical presuppositions -- although you could argue
that all of the above perspectives in a broad way are rooted in some natural
sense of morality, which must ultimately at least imply some kind of *
theistic* presupposition.

This is why I have a big problem with saying there's a "clash" here. It's
very difficult to come up with *any *kind of ethical / metaphysical argument
that doesn't involve a "religious" idea somewhere along the line. If you
want to call that a "clash," it seems to me that you have to elide ethical
considerations altogether. Many want to do that, and they claim that
"science" fills the gap -- but it doesn't. If "science" wants to move from
theories about how nature *is* to theories about how people *ought *to act,
it moves out of its original domain and can't hide behind the presumed
authority of "science."

On 9/5/07, Jack <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
>
>
> You just keep asserting that human potential is worthy of protection
without actually arguing why. If you did make an argument, I suspect there
would be an underlying biblical presupposition.
>
> I am not saying that there is anything wrong with such an argument. I am
just saying that arguments based on potentiality will inevitably be based on
a religious idea, and that is where the clash exists.
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: David Opderbeck
>
> To: Jack
> Cc: Carol or John Burgeson ; asa@calvin.edu
> Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2007 8:09 AM
> Subject: Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
>
>
> Jack said: What does an argument for personhood based on potentiality
look like without having to resort to religious, and especially biblical
values?
>
> I don't like the notion of a "resort" to Biblical values. I don't think
it should be a problem for Christians to present ethical arguments in the
public square that are grounded in Biblical values. That said, there are
general ethical principles that are not directly derived from the Bible that
could apply here. For example, the precautionary principle springs
immediately to mind. One could also make Kantian deontological arguments
based on a principle that the potential for human development ought to be a
universal value. Or, one could make an Aristotelian virtue argument that
human flourishing depends on nurturing human potential. Given the
infinitely elastic nature of utilitarian arguments, one could probably also
argue that the benefits accrued from protecting human potentiality outweigh
any costs (including opportunity costs of medical research) in not doing
so. And so on.
>
> Jack said: This IS exactly where religion and science clash on this
matter.
>
> I don't see why there must be a clash. All science can give us here is
some empirical observations about the process of a zygote becoming implanted
and the possibility of twinning. It can't tell us anything, IMHO, about the
metaphysical question of "personhood," much less about the ethical questions
surrounding human potentiality. Where exactly is the clash?
>
> On 9/5/07, Jack <drsyme@cablespeed.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic twins occur when two
eggs are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate entities from
conception.
> >
> > Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage, or the blastocyst stage,
which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and before implantation.
> >
> > I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would seem, based on various
medical findings, that ensoulment does
> > not take place at conception and, indeed, does not take place until
after
> > implantation has taken place." If he is talking about twinning as the
medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs before implantation, and very
early after conception, so implantation seems to be an arbitrary definition
of when personhood, (via 'ensoulment') begins.
> >
> > Having said that, I disagree with David O when he says : ""Personhood"
ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on both present and
potentential aspects of the entity. " What does an argument for personhood
based on potentiality look like without having to resort to religious, and
especially biblical values? This IS exactly where religion and science
clash on this matter.
> >
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: David Opderbeck
> > To: Carol or John Burgeson
> > Cc: asa@calvin.edu
> > Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2007 2:32 PM
> > Subject: Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
> >
> >
> >
> > Burgy said: I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that
Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a
person regardless of any ethical judgements made by others.
> >
> > I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes 'personhood'"
ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical question, not a scientific question.
I agree that empirical data from the natural sciences, such as data about
what can physically happen to a zygote pre-implantation, bears on this
question. However, I don't think such observations can answer the
question.
> >
> > And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical judgments
doesn't mean there is no basis on which we could reach a different,
objectively better conclusion, without reducing the question to a merely
"scientific" one. In other words, when I say something is primarily an
"ethical" rather than a "scientific" issue, I don't think that relegates the
question to the realm of merely subjective emotion, concerning which the
Nazi view is just as valid as any other view.
> >
> > In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and
ensoulement, Burgy said: The problem with this explanation is that is (I
think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
> >
> > I respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of proof
here. You asserted that the indeterminacy of the zygote before implantation
-- the fact that it can split into two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse --
defeats any notion of ensoulement before implantation. In making that
assertion, you took on the burden of proving it.
> >
> > I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might not hold. In
doing that, I've at least provisionally defeated your defeater concerning
ensoulement -- you haven't carried your burden of proof. I don't need to
offer any more evidence, because I'm not claiming any specific concept of
ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only suggesting that there are any
number of plausible ways in which pre-implantation ensoulement could
possibly remain viable despite your proposed defeater. In order to carry
your burden of proof, you now need to show why my possible scenarios fail.
> >
> > I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote can split in
two before implantation, and if that results in two distinctly individual
fetuses being brought to term and growing into distinct individuals, that in
itself is evidence against your claim. But at the end of the day, neither
of us has enough data to know what is or isn't possible concerning
ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful concept.
> >
> >
> > On 9/4/07, Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > "I had said: The medical data that indicates fairly clearly that an
entity prior to
> > > implantation is not a person is as follows:
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > David O posted:
> > >
> > > "I think that is too strong a statement."
> > >
> > > We must disagree, then, on that claim.
> > >
> > > "The data you cite certainly suggest that the concept of
"personhood" is difficult to apply prior to implantation."
> > >
> > > I understand your use of a milder term. Perhaps it would help if I
agreed that the data, while "clear," is not a rock solid 100% proof. It is,
as are so many concepts in this area, always provisional.
> > >
> > > "However, the notion of "personhood," IMHO, ultimately is not
something that can be conclusively determined one way or the other by these
sorts of empirical observations."
> > >
> > > We can, on that basis, never have conclusive proof of such things. But
none the less we have to (sometimes) bet on what looks the most likely. That
is all I am doing.
> > >
> > > "Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on
both present and potentential aspects of the entity."
> > >
> > > I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that Jews were not
persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a person regardless
of any ethical judgements made by others.
> > >
> > > "I would argue that the potentiality of a not-yet-implanted
human zygote gives it a kind of dignity that requires us (a) not to discard
it without very good reason; and (b) not to create it without the intention
to bring it to term if possible."
> > >
> > > I have not argued otherwise.
> > >
> > > "As to "ensoulment," the fact that a zygote that has the
potential to split into two entities before implantation, it seems to me,
does not decide the question one way or the other. If the "soul" is an
entirely immaterial substance that God implants in the womb, and if God
knows beforehand whether a given zygote will split into two entities before
implantation, then it seems entirely possible that God gives that zygote two
souls before it splits, with one going each way as it were. And if the two
entities subsequently fuse, it would seem that God is capable of accounting
for that in advance as well when he does the ensoulement."
> > >
> > > The problem with this explanation is that is (I think) entirely ad
hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
> > >
> > > "But I'd also suggest that the notion of "ensoulement" perhaps
isn't very helpful. It analogizes the soul to a material substance that
would be injected, so to speak, into the zygote / fetus / baby at a fixed
time in its development. That makes what is essentially a spiritual
property too much like something material."
> > >
> > > Good point.
> > >
> > > " Rather than searching for a specific time of "ensoulment,"
I'd suggest that we advocate respect for human life from its very start to
its very end -- which means, at least, not taking active measures to
terminate human potentiality."
> > >
> > > As in most discussions of this nature, the devil is in the details.
Above you said "without very good reasons" and we might debate endlessly
about what those reasons might be. AT the end, we would have to agree to
disagree.
> > >
> > > Thanks for the dialing.
> > >
> > > Burgy
> > >
> >
> >
>
>

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Received on Wed Sep 5 08:56:26 2007