Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Perhaps not the cell, but I was speaking of the cell nucleus. It's not
particularly abstract when you can take the (non-abstract) nucleus of a
skin cell (for instance) and simply (?) relocate it otherwise unaltered
in an egg (cell) which has been previously enucleated, and then - with a
little laboratory "help", or perhaps even natural "help" - encourage the
initiation of the usual division process. Only the physical cellular
context for the "potentiality" has changed. The nuclear entity with its
inherant potentiality has not changed, just its trajectory.

I would suggest that it might be a rickety position to bank on the
notion that just because a human clone has not happened yet that it
cannot or will not. Many feel - for better or worse - that this is just
a matter of time and place. So-called therapeutic cloning of tissue is
pretty much a done deal, isn't it?

JimA

David Opderbeck wrote:

> Jim A. said: With respect to potentiality, every cell in our body -
> with its genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of becoming a person.
>
> Not really though. Potentiality doesn't mean potentiality in a very
> abstract sense. Even with our current technology, it seems that we
> can't clone a person from any human cell. A skin cell does not carry
> potentiality in anything like the same sense as a zygote.
>
>
> On 9/5/07, Jim Armstrong <jarmstro@qwest.net
> <mailto:jarmstro@qwest.net>> wrote:
>
> The question of the last paragraph (and observation) would seem to
> be a good one. With respect to potentiality, every cell in our
> body - with its genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of
> becoming a person. Let one of those nucleii be transplanted into
> some other person's enucleated egg and away we go. In light of
> this, it would seem to be as you suggest, that the potentiality
> aspect of an entity doesn't work well for cleanly defining
> "personhood". One might wish to point to the merging of genetic
> potentialities at conception as that transition point. But the
> mere existence of parthenogenesis muddies that water, even though
> it may not be specifically demonstrable for humans (outside the
> lab). So that pretty much points - as you suggest - to a
> definition of personhood that arises from a value system rather
> than some potentiality criterion. Or so it seemeth to me.
> JimA
>
>
> Jack wrote:
>
>> Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic twins occur when
>> two eggs are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate entities
>> from conception.
>>
>> Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage, or the blastocyst
>> stage, which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and
>> before implantation.
>>
>> I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would seem, based on
>> various medical findings, that ensoulment does
>> not take place at conception and, indeed, does not take place
>> until after
>> implantation has taken place." If he is talking about twinning
>> as the medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs before
>> implantation, and very early after conception, so implantation
>> seems to be an arbitrary definition of when personhood, (via
>> 'ensoulment') begins.
>>
>> Having said that, I disagree with David O when he says :
>> ""Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on
>> both present and potentential aspects of the entity. " What does
>> an argument for personhood based on potentiality look like
>> without having to resort to religious, and especially biblical
>> values? This IS exactly where religion and science clash on this
>> matter.
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> From: David Opderbeck <mailto:dopderbeck@gmail.com>
>> To: Carol or John Burgeson <mailto:burgytwo@juno.com>
>> Cc: asa@calvin.edu <mailto:asa@calvin.edu>
>> Sent: Tuesday, September 04, 2007 2:32 PM
>> Subject: Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
>>
>>
>> Burgy said: I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical
>> judgement that Jews were not persons. That did not make them
>> not persons. A person is a person regardless of any ethical
>> judgements made by others.
>>
>> I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes
>> 'personhood'" ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical
>> question, not a scientific question. I agree that empirical
>> data from the natural sciences, such as data about what can
>> physically happen to a zygote pre-implantation, bears on this
>> question. However, I don't think such observations can
>> answer the question.
>>
>> And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical
>> judgments doesn't mean there is no basis on which we could
>> reach a different, objectively better conclusion, without
>> reducing the question to a merely "scientific" one. In other
>> words, when I say something is primarily an "ethical" rather
>> than a "scientific" issue, I don't think that relegates the
>> question to the realm of merely subjective emotion,
>> concerning which the Nazi view is just as valid as any other
>> view.
>>
>> In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and
>> ensoulement, Burgy said: The problem with this explanation
>> is that is (I think) entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is
>> supporting evidence for it?
>>
>> I respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of
>> proof here. You asserted that the indeterminacy of the
>> zygote before implantation -- the fact that it can split into
>> two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse -- defeats any notion of
>> ensoulement before implantation. In making that assertion,
>> you took on the burden of proving it.
>>
>> I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might
>> not hold. In doing that, I've at least provisionally
>> defeated your defeater concerning ensoulement -- you haven't
>> carried your burden of proof. I don't need to offer any more
>> evidence, because I'm not claiming any specific concept of
>> ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only suggesting that
>> there are any number of plausible ways in which
>> pre-implantation ensoulement could possibly remain viable
>> despite your proposed defeater. In order to carry your
>> burden of proof, you now need to show why my possible
>> scenarios fail.
>>
>> I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote
>> can split in two before implantation, and if that results in
>> two distinctly individual fetuses being brought to term and
>> growing into distinct individuals, that in itself is evidence
>> against your claim. But at the end of the day, neither of us
>> has enough data to know what is or isn't possible concerning
>> ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful concept.
>>
>>
>> On 9/4/07, Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com
>> <mailto:burgytwo@juno.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "I had said: The medical data that indicates fairly clearly
>> that an entity prior to
>>> implantation is not a person is as follows:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> David O posted:
>>>
>>> "I think that is too strong a statement."
>>>
>>> We must disagree, then, on that claim.
>>>
>>> "The data you cite certainly suggest that the
>> concept of "personhood" is difficult to apply prior to
>> implantation."
>>>
>>> I understand your use of a milder term. Perhaps it would
>> help if I agreed that the data, while "clear," is not a rock
>> solid 100% proof. It is, as are so many concepts in this
>> area, always provisional.
>>>
>>> "However, the notion of "personhood," IMHO,
>> ultimately is not something that can be conclusively
>> determined one way or the other by these sorts of empirical
>> observations."
>>>
>>> We can, on that basis, never have conclusive proof of such
>> things. But none the less we have to (sometimes) bet on what
>> looks the most likely. That is all I am doing.
>>>
>>> "Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value
>> judgment based on both present and potentential aspects of
>> the entity."
>>>
>>> I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that
>> Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A
>> person is a person regardless of any ethical judgements made
>> by others.
>>>
>>> "I would argue that the potentiality of a
>> not-yet-implanted human zygote gives it a kind of dignity
>> that requires us (a) not to discard it without very good
>> reason; and (b) not to create it without the intention to
>> bring it to term if possible."
>>>
>>> I have not argued otherwise.
>>>
>>> "As to "ensoulment," the fact that a zygote that has
>> the potential to split into two entities before implantation,
>> it seems to me, does not decide the question one way or the
>> other. If the "soul" is an entirely immaterial substance
>> that God implants in the womb, and if God knows beforehand
>> whether a given zygote will split into two entities before
>> implantation, then it seems entirely possible that God gives
>> that zygote two souls before it splits, with one going each
>> way as it were. And if the two entities subsequently fuse,
>> it would seem that God is capable of accounting for that in
>> advance as well when he does the ensoulement."
>>>
>>> The problem with this explanation is that is (I think)
>> entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
>>>
>>> "But I'd also suggest that the notion of
>> "ensoulement" perhaps isn't very helpful. It analogizes the
>> soul to a material substance that would be injected, so to
>> speak, into the zygote / fetus / baby at a fixed time in its
>> development. That makes what is essentially a spiritual
>> property too much like something material."
>>>
>>> Good point.
>>>
>>> " Rather than searching for a specific time of
>> "ensoulment," I'd suggest that we advocate respect for human
>> life from its very start to its very end -- which means, at
>> least, not taking active measures to terminate human
>> potentiality."
>>>
>>> As in most discussions of this nature, the devil is in the
>> details. Above you said "without very good reasons" and we
>> might debate endlessly about what those reasons might be. AT
>> the end, we would have to agree to disagree.
>>>
>>> Thanks for the dialing.
>>>
>>> Burgy
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Received on Wed Sep 5 12:45:31 2007