Re: [asa] Worthy of response?

Jim A. said: * With respect to potentiality, every cell in our body - with
its genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of becoming a person.*

Not really though. Potentiality doesn't mean potentiality in a very
abstract sense. Even with our current technology, it seems that we can't
clone a person from any human cell. A skin cell does not carry potentiality
in anything like the same sense as a zygote.

On 9/5/07, Jim Armstrong <jarmstro@qwest.net> wrote:
>
> The question of the last paragraph (and observation) would seem to be a
> good one. With respect to potentiality, every cell in our body - with its
> genetic roadmap - carries the potentiality of becoming a person. Let one of
> those nucleii be transplanted into some other person's enucleated egg and
> away we go. In light of this, it would seem to be as you suggest, that the
> potentiality aspect of an entity doesn't work well for cleanly defining
> "personhood". One might wish to point to the merging of genetic
> potentialities at conception as that transition point. But the mere
> existence of parthenogenesis muddies that water, even though it may not be
> specifically demonstrable for humans (outside the lab). So that pretty much
> points - as you suggest - to a definition of personhood that arises from a
> value system rather than some potentiality criterion. Or so it seemeth to
> me.
> JimA
>
> Jack wrote:
>
> Twinning occurs before implantation. Dizygotic twins occur when two eggs
> are fertilized by 2 sperm, so they are separate entities from conception.
>
> Monozygotic twins separate at the morula stage, or the blastocyst stage,
> which can be as early as 3 days post conception, and *before*implantation.
>
> I don't understand Burgy's statement: "It would seem, based on various
> medical findings, that ensoulment does
> not take place at conception and, indeed, does not take place until after
> implantation has taken place." If he is talking about twinning as the
> medical evidence, it is clear that this occurs before implantation, and very
> early after conception, so implantation seems to be an arbitrary definition
> of when personhood, (via 'ensoulment') begins.
>
> Having said that, I disagree with David O when he says : ""Personhood"
> ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on both present and *
> potentential* aspects of the entity. " What does an argument for
> personhood based on potentiality look like without having to resort to
> religious, and especially biblical values? This *IS *exactly where
> religion and science clash on this matter.
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* David Opderbeck <dopderbeck@gmail.com>
> *To:* Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com>
> *Cc:* asa@calvin.edu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 04, 2007 2:32 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [asa] Worthy of response?
>
>
> Burgy said: *I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that
> Jews were not persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a
> person regardless of any ethical judgements made by others*.
>
> I respond: right, but the question "what consitutes 'personhood'"
> ultimately is a metaphysical / ethical question, not a scientific question.
> I agree that empirical data from the natural sciences, such as data about
> what can physically happen to a zygote pre-implantation, bears on this
> question. However, I don't think such observations can answer the
> question.
>
> And, the fact that the Nazis made wrong and evil ethical judgments doesn't
> mean there is no basis on which we could reach a different, *objectively*better conclusion, without reducing the question to a merely "scientific"
> one. In other words, when I say something is primarily an "ethical" rather
> than a "scientific" issue, I don't think that relegates the question to the
> realm of merely subjective emotion, concerning which the Nazi view is just
> as valid as any other view.
>
> In response to my musings on the pre-implantation zygote and ensoulement,
> Burgy said: *The problem with this explanation is that is (I think)
> entirely ad hoc. Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it? *
> **
> I respond: I think you are improperly shifting the burden of proof here.
> You asserted that the indeterminacy of the zygote before implantation -- the
> fact that it can split into two and then re-fuse or not re-fuse -- defeats
> any notion of ensoulement before implantation. In making that assertion,
> you took on the burden of proving it.
>
> I offered a few scenarios under which your assertion might not hold. In
> doing that, I've at least provisionally defeated your defeater concerning
> ensoulement -- you haven't carried your burden of proof. I don't need to
> offer any more evidence, because I'm not claiming any specific concept of
> ensoulement is necessarily correct. I'm only suggesting that there are any
> number of plausible ways in which pre-implantation ensoulement could
> possibly remain viable despite your proposed defeater. In order to carry
> your burden of proof, you now need to show why my possible scenarios fail.
>
> I could go a bit further, though, and say that if a zygote can split in
> two before implantation, and if that results in two distinctly individual
> fetuses being brought to term and growing into distinct individuals, that in
> itself is evidence against your claim. But at the end of the day, neither
> of us has enough data to know what is or isn't possible concerning
> ensoulement, or even whether ensoulement is a useful concept.
>
>
> On 9/4/07, Carol or John Burgeson <burgytwo@juno.com> wrote:
> >
> >
> >
> > "I had said: The medical data that indicates fairly clearly that an
> entity prior to
> > implantation is not a person is as follows:
> >
> >
> >
> > David O posted:
> >
> > "I think that is too strong a statement."
> >
> > We must disagree, then, on that claim.
> >
> > "The data you cite certainly suggest that the concept of
> "personhood" is difficult to apply prior to implantation."
> >
> > I understand your use of a milder term. Perhaps it would help if I
> agreed that the data, while "clear," is not a rock solid 100% proof. It is,
> as are so many concepts in this area, always provisional.
> >
> > "However, the notion of "personhood," IMHO, ultimately is not
> something that can be conclusively determined one way or the other by these
> sorts of empirical observations."
> >
> > We can, on that basis, never have conclusive proof of such things. But
> none the less we have to (sometimes) bet on what looks the most likely. That
> is all I am doing.
> >
> > "Personhood" ultimately is an ethical value judgment based on
> both present and potentential aspects of the entity."
> >
> > I cannot agree. The Nazis made an ethical judgement that Jews were not
> persons. That did not make them not persons. A person is a person regardless
> of any ethical judgements made by others.
> >
> > "I would argue that the potentiality of a not-yet-implanted
> human zygote gives it a kind of dignity that requires us (a) not to discard
> it without very good reason; and (b) not to create it without the intention
> to bring it to term if possible."
> >
> > I have not argued otherwise.
> >
> > "As to "ensoulment," the fact that a zygote that has the
> potential to split into two entities before implantation, it seems to me,
> does not decide the question one way or the other. If the "soul" is an
> entirely immaterial substance that God implants in the womb, and if God
> knows beforehand whether a given zygote will split into two entities before
> implantation, then it seems entirely possible that God gives that zygote two
> souls before it splits, with one going each way as it were. And if the two
> entities subsequently fuse, it would seem that God is capable of accounting
> for that in advance as well when he does the ensoulement."
> >
> > The problem with this explanation is that is (I think) entirely ad hoc.
> Or perhaps there is supporting evidence for it?
> >
> > "But I'd also suggest that the notion of "ensoulement" perhaps
> isn't very helpful. It analogizes the soul to a material substance that
> would be injected, so to speak, into the zygote / fetus / baby at a fixed
> time in its development. That makes what is essentially a spiritual
> property too much like something material."
> >
> > Good point.
> >
> > " Rather than searching for a specific time of "ensoulment," I'd
> suggest that we advocate respect for human life from its very start to its
> very end -- which means, at least, not taking active measures to terminate
> human potentiality."
> >
> > As in most discussions of this nature, the devil is in the details.
> Above you said "without very good reasons" and we might debate endlessly
> about what those reasons might be. AT the end, we would have to agree to
> disagree.
> >
> > Thanks for the dialing.
> >
> > Burgy
> >
>
>
>
>

To unsubscribe, send a message to majordomo@calvin.edu with
"unsubscribe asa" (no quotes) as the body of the message.
Received on Wed Sep 5 11:49:29 2007