Re: Fw: Eschatology and The Beginning

On Mon, 24 Apr 2006 13:20:45 -0400
  Janice Matchett <janmatch@earthlink.net> wrote:
> At 09:16 AM 4/24/2006, drsyme@cablespeed.com wrote:
>
> @ I don't know what he means by "numerical" identity.
> And I would definitely disagree with him if he denies
>that there is such a thing as the human spirit that is
>naked without a body.

First, what does he mean by "numerical" identity? This is
a quote from his essay "The Constitution View of
Persons." , from IN SEARCH OF THE SOUL Joel B Green, and
Stuart L Palmer eds.

"Outside philosophy we use the term identical or the
phrase the same as in a loose and nontechnical sense. We
might say, for example, that your book is "the same as"
mine or that we have "identical" computers. What we mean
is that our books or computers are phenomenologically
indistinguishable: that is, they look exactly alike. When
philosophers use the term identical or the phrase the same
as, they do not have in mind phenomenological
indistnguishability. Instead, they are thinking in terms
of number, the number one. And with respect to number, of
course, you and I do not have the same book or computer;
you have one and I have one, and one plus one makes two.
 It is the distinction between numerical sameness and what
we might call qualitative sameness that led me to say a
moment ago that, if some thing x, could survive a change
that would destroy some thing, y, then x and y are
numerically distinct. What I meant was that x and y are
two things and not one."

This is Jack speaking now: notice the implication of the
last two sentences. Being a person, requires continuity.
 There can be no temporal gaps. In other words, if after
death we were to be recreated in a spiritual body, these
persons, the one that lived in a physical body, and the
one that lives in the spiritual body, would be numerically
distinct.

Second, he clearly would deny the existence of a
disembodied soul. A person must exist in some type of
physical body. I pressed him about the scriptural
references to the intermediate state. Since the "type"
or "nature" of this physical body is unknown, but is
distinct both from the present physical body, and the
post-resurrection spiritual body I suggested that it is
starting to look like a dualists view of a spirit, or a
ghost body. This was his response:

"Is the difference b/w my view and a dualist view of the
intermediate state
merely a semantic difference? I don't think so. The
dualist thinks there is
some non-physical component that survives death. I don't.
I don't believe
there are any non-physical parts to us. Though, you are
right, there are
important matters about which I and the dualist agree:

1. We are not identical with our physical organisms.
2. If we are going to live in an after life, something
must survive the death
of the cellular tissues that lay about decaying in a
corpse after a normal
death."

Third, as far as I know Kevin is not a preterist, so all
of your references to Hymenaenism is not relevant.
Received on Mon Apr 24 14:24:18 2006