Anolther response from Kevin regarding continuity between
the corpse and the resurrection body.
I believe there is strict continuity in
the sense that those bodies are numerically identical.
Echoing St. Paul, I
believe that that which is sown persishable, it is raised
inperishable, etc.
Now, although there is numerical identity b/w our earthly
and resurrection
bodies there is also radical change. I take it that our
resurrection bodies
will be able to do things that our earthly bodies are not
able to do, not
because they are numerically different bodies but because
the body is radically
changed. Compare: your body (the one you have now) is
numerically the same
body you had 15 years ago, although it has changed over
the years. Indeed,
there are good reasons to believe that the body you have
now is numerically
identical with the six month old fetus in your mother's
womb. It looks a lot
different now than it did then and it is made of
completely different stuff.
Even so, I believe it is one and the same body. (I give an
account of what we
philosophers call "the persistence conditions" for bodies
in chapter three of
the book.) So, I take it that our resurrection bodies will
stand to these
earthly bodies as this earthly body of mine now stands to
the fetal body in my
mother's womb. The resurrection body will be the radically
altered but
numerically same body as I have now.
There you have my view, for what it's worth! It's sobering
to know people are
thinking about this stuff!!!! (btw: the essay "A New Way
to Be Human" will
run in the November/December issue of Books & Culture.
Pax,
Kevin
Kevin J. Corcoran, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Calvin College
Grand Rapids, MI 49546
Office: (616) 526-6636
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/corcoran/index.htm
attached mail follows:
Jack,
Right, here the first author wonders about the continuity b/w our earthly
bodies and our resurrection bodies. I believe there is strict continuity in
the sense that those bodies are numerically identical. Echoing St. Paul, I
believe that that which is sown persishable, it is raised inperishable, etc.
Now, although there is numerical identity b/w our earthly and resurrection
bodies there is also radical change. I take it that our resurrection bodies
will be able to do things that our earthly bodies are not able to do, not
because they are numerically different bodies but because the body is radically
changed. Compare: your body (the one you have now) is numerically the same
body you had 15 years ago, although it has changed over the years. Indeed,
there are good reasons to believe that the body you have now is numerically
identical with the six month old fetus in your mother's womb. It looks a lot
different now than it did then and it is made of completely different stuff.
Even so, I believe it is one and the same body. (I give an account of what we
philosophers call "the persistence conditions" for bodies in chapter three of
the book.) So, I take it that our resurrection bodies will stand to these
earthly bodies as this earthly body of mine now stands to the fetal body in my
mother's womb. The resurrection body will be the radically altered but
numerically same body as I have now.
There you have my view, for what it's worth! It's sobering to know people are
thinking about this stuff!!!! (btw: the essay "A New Way to Be Human" will
run in the November/December issue of Books & Culture. And I was only given
two copies of my book when it came out a couple of weeks ago. There gone, but
I'm supposed to be receiving 15 more. Just as soon as I do, I'll mail it to
you!! Where should I send it?)
I'll send you an update on my confusing personal life in a separate missive.
Pax,
Kevin
Kevin J. Corcoran, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Philosophy
Calvin College
Grand Rapids, MI 49546
Office: (616) 526-6636
http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/corcoran/index.htm
Received on Mon Apr 24 09:16:47 2006
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