On Thu, 24 Feb 2000 18:34:18 -0800 Brian D Harper
<bharper@postbox.acs.ohio-state.edu> writes:
>
> This may well be my problem, but what I was trying to do is follow
> out the
> consequences wrt free will if God *does* see the world as you and
> others
> have suggested.
>
> I like the flat land analogy but I believe it fails in the sense
> that God
> is not
> only an observer, he is also creator. OK, so let's suppose that God
> created
> the entire universe (space-time) at once. Is God so constrained that
> this is
> the only all at once space-time universe that he could create? Could
> he have
> created one ever so slightly different from this one except that I
> choose (for
> sake of argument) not to follow Christ but Joe Bloe from my previous
> example
> does? So, how can we place God as merely an observer with choices
> being
> made by us? Is it possible for me to change the fabric of this all
> at once
> created
> space-time? If so, then how can we say it was all at once created?
> If not, how
> can we say that I am free?
>
> Another observer illustration: Suppose you and I got together and
> observed the
> behavior of Burgy for a very long time. Suppose eventually it came
> to the point
> that we could predict Burgy's behavior in each and every situation.
> Would you
> say that Burgy is free? I would say no. Nevertheless, we are only
> observers,
> we are not causing any of the things Burgy does. Thus it seems to me
> that
> complete predictability (no surprises) eliminates any reasonable
> (not
> simplistic)
> possibility of freedom.
>
> Another speculation: Is it possible that there are many many
> possible universes
> and the particular one we occupy is the result of many many free
> will choices?
> [note: this is not an Anthropic Principle type "many worlds" wherein
> these
> different
> universes actually exist. Only one exists but many are possible].
> Many of these
> possible universes have me as a believer and Joe Bloe as a
> nonbeliever. In many
> others the situation is reversed. In yet others, my parents never
> met and I
> don't
> even exist :). The idea then is that God would foresee all
> possibilities,
> not just the
> one actualized by the free choices that happened to have happened.
> [this idea
> is based on an excellent essay by William James, "The Dilemma of
> Determinism".]
>
I responded to Burgy on some of these point, and so will not repeat here.
But you raise some matters that he did not.
First, why should God have a problem with human freedom because he is the
Creator? This is not a deistic view in which he would it up and set it
going so he could nap until it was time for the last judgment. Creation
and Providence (pace Reformed theologs) are simply two aspects of the
total reality of the universe. Why can he not provide a place where his
rational creatures can choose? Neither Providence nor Creation require
coercion of those who bear his image and likeness.
What restraints are there on the Creator to produce one universe, one
universe out of several, many universes of which ours is one? I would
say, none. He is sovereign, unconditionally sovereign. However, in the
only universe with which we are familiar, there seem to be some
characteristics of persons which tie together. Could God have created a
bunch of automatons that would love him? Imagine a robot with all the
characteristics of a woman. Push "love" on the remote and it would
cuddle. It would never say, "I'm tired," "I'm sick," "I'm busy." When one
had enough cuddling, the robot would wait quietly without complaint, or,
at the press of a button, would make something wonderful in the kitchen.
It could show all the external signs of consideration and caring, but
could there ever be anything but a sad imitation of love and these other
human characterististics? Frankly, I don't want that kind of tractable
robot no matter how convenient. I'll take the inconvenient woman who has
loved me for over 50 years. Similarly, God wants love freely given, not a
programed simulation. I don't think there can be automated love.
Is anyone unfree because predictable? Or is freedom compatible only with
total reandomness? I note that free fall occurs only when there is
essentially nothing the faller can do about it. But this is determinism,
not freedom. In a different context, someone may say that I am not free
to chase skirts because I'm married. However, we constantly read of
adultery, so it cannot be held that it is physically or logically
impossible for me to chase skirts. What is specified is that I cannot be
moral, cannot remain committed to love and honor my wife as I promised,
and cheat on her. The problem is that "free" is used in many varied
senses in different contexts. In terms of free will, all it can mean is
that a person's choice is determinative, however limited that choice may
be. It does not involve an unconstrained choice.
I can't share your enthusiasm for William James. It's been years since I
read "The Dilemma of Determinism," but my recollection is that I set it
down as one of the least perspicuous discussions of the subject. About
the highest praise I can heap on him is that he was not as wrongheaded as
his disciple John Dewey.
Dave
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