From: Chris Cogan <ccogan@telepath.com>
[...]
>What always gets me (and apparently Ralph) is that *anyone* thinks that
>this category of argument is sound. I suppose it's implicitly based on an
>analogy with a valid game-theory conclusion that would support such a
>conclusion given a suitable imbalance of consequences for acting rightly
>and wrongly in each case. In such a situation, there are four
>possibilities, and we already have knowledge that limits them to these four
>(or some similar variation):
>
> Possible consequences
>Action If Right If Wrong
>------------------------------------------------------------------
>A Very Good Very Mild Bad
>Not-A Very Mild Good Very Bad
>
>Obviously, in this kind of situation, action A is the correct action
>(assuming about equal chances of each being right). Since, in reality, as
>far as we could tell, there are millions of possibilities, and no way to
>make the resulting table come out so that the risk-analysis favor of
>theism. As I say, I suppose this is the implicit type of reasoning (if any)
>going on, but, still, it's so clearly inappropriate that it is indeed
>surprising that some theists still use it.
I think the above 2-option risk analysis is valid, providing you recognize
that the likelihoods of the two outcomes are based purely on the subject's
personal assessment. If the subject happens to think there is a significant
likelihood of A being true, then he should accept it.
The reasons I reject Pascal's wager are the following:
1. My personal assessment is that the likelihood of Stephen's dogma (that
there is a God who will condemn non-believers to eternal torment) being true
is zero. Why should I believe such an absurd thing? It's clearly just a
threat which has been added to a religious belief for the purpose of scaring
potential recruits and wavering adherents. Would Stephen accept that the
Earth is flat if I said: "Accept that the Earth is flat or the Boogeyman
will get you"? Does Stephen accept the threats of other religions? No, of
course not.
2. Stephen's dogma is inconsistent with the major claim of Christianity that
God is good. A being who could condemn people to eternal torment just for
not believing in him, especially when he gives no clear evidence of his
existence, would be utterly evil. Even if I believed in a god, I would not
believe a dogma that contained such a massive self-contradiction.
3. Belief is not entirely a matter of conscious choice. (Though we can
perhaps consciously influence our beliefs to some extent.) Even if I
was scared enough to want to believe in God, that doesn't mean I would
necessarily be able to do so. And presumably just going through the motions
of worshipping such an evil God would not satisfy him.
4. I don't think that believing Stephen's dogma when it's false is only a
"very mild bad". If this is really the only life that I have, I don't want
to waste it on a lie.
I suspect that Stephen and his ilk are very embarrassing to the many
reasonable, respectable Christians in the world who do not resort to
pseudoscience and threats to support their beliefs.
I was impressed by a bishop who appeared on a television discussion
programme recently and said straight out that he did not accept the truth of
everything in the Bible, and that he would not want to worship any God who
did all the things attributed to him in the Bible.
Richard Wein (Tich)
--------------------------------
"Do the calculation. Take the numbers seriously. See if the underlying
probabilities really are small enough to yield design."
-- W. A. Dembski, who has never presented any calculation to back up his
claim to have detected Intelligent Design in life.
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Nov 01 2000 - 04:55:03 EST