Re: Definitions of ID?

From: Chris Cogan (ccogan@telepath.com)
Date: Thu Sep 07 2000 - 09:08:59 EDT

  • Next message: Bertvan@aol.com: "Definitions of ID"

    FMA
    >I am trying to find out what ID exactly means. Please feel free to add other
    >resources or definitions.
    >
    >http://www.nabt.org/resources_panda1.html
    >
    >"First, it is defined (p. 150) as the theory that biological organisms owe
    >their origin to a preexistent intelligence, God presumably being this
    >preexistent intelligence."
    >
    >It should be interesting to note that present inferences of ID cannot
    >exclude natural forces as the designer.
    >
    >"Second, observing that "Darwinian evolution locates the origin of new
    >organisms in material causes, Pandas declares that (p 14):
    >
    > Intelligent design, by contrast, locates the origin of new organisms
    > in an
    >immaterial cause in a blueprint, a plan, a pattern devised by an
    >intelligent agent. "
    >
    >A plan or blueprint is a very subjective indicator. Is there a purposeful
    >arrangement of parts? Purposeful in what manner? That it works or that it
    >works according to a plan?
    >I'd argue that no evidence of purposefulness exists.
    >
    >"And third, in a discussion of fossils, a further declaration offers yet
    >more precision (p. 99-100):
    >
    > Intelligent design means that various forms of life began
    >abruptly
    > through an intelligent agency, with their distinctive features
    > intact fish with fins and scales, birds with feathers, beaks,
    >and
    > wings, etc.
    >
    >That seems to be disproven by the evidence.

    Chris
    And how!

    But, it is clearly not necessary for "new" forms to be discontinuous with
    earlier forms for life to be subject to design. However, *if* this were the
    case, it would conflict with evolution.

    I would suggest that we separate out the design from the implementation. We
    may design something without actually carrying it out. Design is
    *primarily* a verb, and activity, something that is done. It may be done
    before that which is designed is created, or during (as when a programmer
    designs a program on the fly).

    Thus, design would not be something that is present as such in the result,
    but which is present *only* in the designer himself (more on this later).
    Design would be the choosing of desired features that something is to have
    in order for it to serve some purpose(s) the designer has in mind. Thus,
    whether living things were designed or not, they would not be, strictly,
    examples of design but examples of the *results* of design (and
    implementation).

    Thus, we could say that design is the process or activity of choosing the
    features that something is to have. We say, "He is *designing* a house,"
    not, "The house *is* a design" (though we might say, "The house is of his
    design(ing)").

    While we're at it, and since I have it handy, we have this from the
    American Heritage Dictionary:

    deásign (dÕ-z¼nã) v. deásigned, deásignáing, deásigns. --tr. 1.a. To
    conceive or fashion in the mind; invent: design a good excuse for not
    attending the conference. b. To formulate a plan for; devise: designed a
    marketing strategy for the new product. 2. To plan out in systematic,
    usually graphic form: design a building; design a computer program. 3. To
    create or contrive for a particular purpose or effect: a game designed to
    appeal to all ages. 4. To have as a goal or purpose; intend. 5. To create
    or execute in an artistic or highly skilled manner. --intr. 1. To make or
    execute plans. 2. To have a goal or purpose in mind. 3. To create designs.
    --deásign n. 1.a. A drawing or sketch. b. A graphic representation,
    especially a detailed plan for construction or manufacture. 2. The
    purposeful or inventive arrangement of parts or details: the aerodynamic
    design of an automobile; furniture of simple but elegant design. 3. The art
    or practice of designing or making designs. 4. Something designed,
    especially a decorative or an artistic work. 5. An ornamental pattern. See
    Synonyms at figure. 6. A basic scheme or pattern that affects and controls
    function or development: the overall design of an epic poem. 7. A plan; a
    project. See Synonyms at plan. 8.a. A reasoned purpose; an intent: It was
    her design to set up practice on her own as soon as she was qualified. b.
    Deliberate intention: He became a photographer more by accident than by
    design. 9. Often designs. A secretive plot or scheme: He has designs on my
    job. [Middle English designen, from Latin d¦signÒre, to designate. See
    DESIGNATE.] --deásignãaáble adj.

    Now, about the locus of design. It is clearly in the designer, not in the
    thing designed. This may be easily understood, if we understand that a
    designer may design something that is identical to something that is not
    designed. Thus, a designer may even strive for a "natural" look, a look of
    something that is not designed (by deliberately avoiding the typical
    results of design).

    The importance of this is that it means that there is no "magic bullet" of
    design that will necessarily be unambiguously found in nature, even if it
    *is* designed. The designing activity can be completely hidden from viewer
    of the result, because it is in the designer, not in the thing designed.

    This is why, barring *very* odd forms of evidence (such as finding exactly
    the first ten million digits of pi blatantly encoded in a long stretch of
    "junk" DNA in the human genome), there is a good chance that design, even
    if present, might not be detectable to us (especially if God is the
    designer, rather than aliens or "metaverse" residents).

    The appearance of design in something is relational; either the thing
    designed is in some context in which it would not be by naturally-occurring
    events, or it has features that are themselves related in ways that would
    not be naturally-occurring, or both. Pi-in-the-human-genome would be both,
    as far as we can tell.

    But, again barring such evidential oddities, it is very risky asserting
    design of things in nature because it is *so* easy to be wrong about
    claiming that Nature can't do things. It can't make a bumblebee that can
    fly (but they do). It can't create order out of chaos, a tiny bit at a time
    (ah, but it *can* create order in just this way). Just because a *human*,
    such as Behe, or Johnson, or Stephen Jones, cannot think of a way for
    something to happen in Nature without outside purposeful help does *not*
    imply that it can't happen; they could be wrong. Their claims are nearly
    always claims based on their own ignorance or incredulity. Until they find
    something akin to pi-in-the-genome, something that really *is* irreducible
    in construction to a series of small steps (and I'm not even absolutely
    sure about the pi), they would do well to be much more conservative in
    their claims than they have been. Behe's ludicrous assertion that alternate
    pathways to a particular "irreducibly complex" structure are inherently
    improbable is an example of the nonsensical results of this kind of
    self-inflicted no-nothingism. When you have to keep from examining evidence
    or from engaging in rational analysis to maintain a claim that something
    cannot or is not likely to happen naturally (and without design), it's time
    to back off and start over. Nature, fortunately for us naturalistic
    evolutionists, just "loves" to refute people like Behe. The bumblebee
    *does* in fact fly. There *are* transitionals between dinosaurs and birds.
    Why does this "upsetting" of the opinions of humans occur in Nature so
    often? Because many humans have ideas that arbitrarily limit what they can
    think of without a lot of outside help, and also because the human mind
    simply cannot generally consider all the possible prospective ways in which
    something might be tried. Nature has time and quantity on its side, and it
    is limited only by physics, not by the accidents of concepts and ideas, not
    by preconceptions.

    The bumblebee is able to fly because of the way its wings flex. The "proof"
    that bumblebees could not fly did not take this flexing into account. The
    person generating the proof probably did not know about the flexing, and
    certainly did not think it relevant. Thus, while Bertvan, following her
    usual pattern, might argue that it is in fact improbable that the bumblebee
    flies, or even that it must have outside (i.e., "designer") help when it
    *does* fly, the bumblebee nevertheless flies and does not in fact seem to
    be getting a boost from God.

    Until Johnson and Jones and company can show that there is a contradiction
    involved in the claim that something happened (or probably happened)
    naturally in Nature, we must assume that their claims, like the similar
    claims of the impossibility of bumblebee flight must be presumed to be
    false. The bumblebee flies. Nature finds ways to create complex structures
    in *very* roundabout ways that Behe probably would not normally think of on
    his own even if he thought about possibilities for decades.

    If the panda-precursor has a need for a thumb but does not have one, the
    advantage of any small step in the direction of having a thumb-substitute
    will give those panda-precursors better survival/reproduction odds than
    those that don't have such thumb-substitute precursors. Nature does not
    care that *we* might not think of making a "thumb" out of non-thumb parts,
    and is thus free to go ahead and make a little bump that helps the
    panda-precursor eat bamboo shoots, and to gradually make the bump into a
    thumb-like projection in small steps. Nature's limitation is different
    from ours. Nature is only limited by the lack of "fitness" paths in certain
    directions, where human minds are almost always limited *much* more
    severely (and certainly *differently*).

    If an organism needs a complex molecule of a certain sort, but does not
    have it handy and it cannot make one out of a *simpler* molecule, it *may*,
    just to spite "mainstream" ID theorists, create such a molecule by
    modifying one that is already *more* complex than the one it wants but
    which *is* achievable by more-nearly-direct means.



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Thu Sep 07 2000 - 09:12:44 EDT